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Abstract
This thesis studies some of the key factors that influence the distribution of household net
incomes in the EU countries. Part of the work analyses the impact of education changes
on income inequality. The remaining part of the thesis analyses from different angles the
role of tax-benefit policies for household incomes. The thesis consists of four self-contained
papers. In the methodology of all papers, I combine a tax-benefit model – EUROMOD –
with household micro-data. Chapter 1 is concerned with the impact on income inequality
of the substantial increase in the number of university graduates in Great Britain. Chapter
2 studies the impact on the income distribution of automatic stabilisers and discretionary
changes to tax-benefit policies in the EU-28. Chapter 3 evaluates ex-post the performance
of the main means-tested benefits in Bulgaria in terms of targeting and poverty reduction.
Finally, Chapter 4 studies how income poverty is affected by hypothetical changes to the
scale of both tax and benefit policies and investigates which are the most cost-effective
policies in reducing poverty or limiting its increase in seven diverse EU countries.
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Introduction
This thesis studies some of the key factors that influence the distribution of household
net incomes in the EU countries. Part of the work is concerned with the impact of the
recent expansion to higher education on income inequality in Great Britain. The remain-
ing part of the thesis analyses from different angles the role of tax-benefit policies for
household incomes in the EU countries. The thesis consists of four self-contained papers
which can be split in two groups by the broad research questions they address. Chapter
1 and Chapter 2 study the impact of different factors on the distribution of household
net income, using decomposition methods. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are both concerned
with the effectiveness of tax-benefit policies in reducing poverty. In the methodology of
all papers, I combine a tax-benefit model – EUROMOD – with household micro-data.
Decomposing changes in the distribution of income
The distribution of household net income is a complex function that depends on var-
ious factors related to tax and benefit policies, gross market incomes and individual and
household characteristics. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 in this thesis identify the contribution
to total income changes of some of these factors, by employing decomposition techniques.
Despite this similarity, the papers differ from each other substantially in two ways: First,
they address different research questions. Chapter 1 is concerned with the impact on in-
come inequality of the substantial increase in the number of university graduates in Great
Britain. Chapter 2, on the other hand, studies the impact on the income distribution
of automatic stabilisers and discretionary changes to tax-benefit policies in the EU-28.
Second, the papers differ from each other methodologically. Chapter 2 refines the method
formalised by Bargain and Callan (2010) which, using a tax-benefit model and household
micro-data, decomposes changes in the distribution of income into the contribution due
to i) discretionary policy changes versus ii) other factors. The paper then includes an ex-
tension to the method to decompose the contribution of other factors into the effect due
to automatic stabilisers versus changes to market incomes and population characteristics.
In comparison, Chapter 1 uses the refined method only; however, using a regression-based
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approach and re-weighting, Chapter 1 identifies further the contribution of changes in the
higher education pay premia, education composition and other population changes.
In more detail, the aim of Chapter 1 is to provide an in-depth account of the link
between the expansion of Higher Education (HE) and inequality of household net income
in Great Britain for the period 2001-2011. Although many authors have investigated
this link in developing countries (see e.g. Bourguignon et al. 2004), we know a lot less
about the relationship in developed countries. We find, that all else being equal, education
composition changes in Great Britain led to higher living standards mostly through higher
wages. As HE expansion benefited households from the middle and top of the distribution
more than the bottom, income inequality increased. Despite the increasing share of
high-educated workers, the HE wage premium remained broadly unchanged and we find
therefore no evidence of a ‘compression’ effect on inequality.
The second paper, Chapter 2, explores in detail the impact tax-benefit policies had
on the distribution of income in various EU countries between 2007 and 2014. Although
a large body of literature has studied the impact of tax-benefit policy changes on net
incomes, little is known about the link between automatic stabilisers and the income dis-
tribution. We fill in this gap in the literature by studying in detail the contribution of
automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy changes to changes in the distribution of
household net incomes in the EU-28 countries. Our results show that, discretionary policy
changes and the automatic stabilisation response of policies overall worked to reduce in-
equality of net incomes, and so helped offset the inequality-increasing impact of a growing
disparity in gross (pre-tax) market incomes. Inequality reduction was achieved mainly
through policy changes to benefits and through benefits acting as automatic stabilisers.
On the other hand, policy changes to and the automatic stabilisation response of taxes and
social insurance contributions raised inequality in some countries and lowered it in others.
The effectiveness of tax-benefit policies in reducing poverty
With its roots in the late nineteenth century, the modern welfare state is now estab-
lished in all EU countries and one of its most important missions has become poverty
reduction. Chapter 3 in this thesis evaluates ex-post the performance of the main means-
2
tested benefits in Bulgaria in terms of targeting and poverty reduction. Chapter 4, on the
other hand, studies how income poverty is affected by hypothetical changes to the scale
of both tax and benefit policies and investigates which are the most cost-effective policies
in reducing poverty or limiting its increase in seven diverse EU countries (one of which is
Bulgaria).
In more detail, although there are several means-tested benefits in Bulgaria to protect
those at risk of poverty, to date there has been little research on how successful these
benefits are in reaching and protecting them. Chapter 3 measures the degree to which
benefits are not taken-up by the entitled population (non-take-up) and to which non-
entitled are among the benefit recipients (leakage). As the benefits are means-tested –
and so ought to target individuals on low incomes by design – we estimate how many
of the poor are not being awarded with a benefit (exclusion of the poor) and how many
among the recipients are in fact not poor (inclusion of the non-poor). We combine the
tax-benefit model EUROMOD with household micro-data: The micro-data tell us which
households are receiving the benefits; while EUROMOD allows us to identify the house-
holds in the micro-data that are entitled to the benefits. We find that the transfers reach
a small proportion of households with incomes below a relative poverty line, they have
high non-take-up rates, and large proportions of the recipients are neither poor nor en-
titled to receive the benefits. Unsurprisingly, although an important income source for
poor households, the benefits have a very small impact on reducing the poverty rates.
We show that these results are robust to potential underreporting of benefit receipt in
the household survey. Through the simulation of reform scenarios we show that there is
a large scope for policy improvement.
Finally, Chapter 4, which simulates changes to the scale of policies and looks for the
most cost-effective way to reduce poverty, addresses two important limitations of the ex-
isting literature. First, while the literature mainly focuses on one type of policy (family
benefits), our analysis compares several types of policy instrument within as well as be-
tween countries. We consider commonly-applied policy instruments with a direct effect
on household income: child benefits, social assistance, income tax lower thresholds and
a benchmark case of re-scaling the whole tax-benefit system. Second, while most of the
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literature concentrates on the poverty-reducing effectiveness of different policy designs,
Chapter 4 sheds light on the effectiveness of the scale of given policy designs. Using
EUROMOD and household micro-data, we explicitly measure the distributional implica-
tions of increasing or reducing the scale of each policy, holding constant its design and
national context. Furthermore, to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of the instruments
in reducing poverty, we develop an indicator, defined as the ratio of the percentage point
change in poverty (headcount or gap) to the net cost to the public budget, expressed as
a proportion of GDP. We show that the assessment of the most cost-effective instrument
depends on whether the poverty headcount or poverty gap is used as the outcome indi-
cator and on the direction and scale of the change. Nevertheless, our results show that
the options that reduce poverty most cost-effectively in most countries are child benefits
and social assistance, while reducing the former is a particularly poverty-increasing way
of making budgetary cuts.
Tax-benefit microsimulation with behavioural responses
Tax-benefit policies affect household incomes directly through arithmetic changes to
tax liabilities and benefit entitlements. But they may also affect household incomes in-
directly if individuals make behavioural adjustments in response to their new budget
constraints, e.g. in terms of working hours and labour market participation.
Throughout this thesis, it is the direct distributional impact of tax-benefit policies
that I am concerned with. The thesis provides a detailed and novel account of these
issues using a static microsimulation approach. One limitation of this approach is that it
does not allow the estimation of the total effect, i.e. the direct + indirect effects. This
distinction becomes irrelevant if there are no indirect effects or if the indirect effects are
small in magnitude – in this case, the direct effect is equal to the total effect. Where
indirect effects are large, the direct effect alone may still be of interest.
While the indirect effects are not the focus of the thesis and they are not directly
estimated, they are however captured in ‘other’ estimates in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
The other estimates capture the sum of the indirect effects and other changes that may
have occurred over the period of study. The focus of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 differs
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slightly: The focus in these chapters is on the simulation of hypothetical policy changes
and the estimates are derived assuming there are no behavioural responses. While in
practise this assumption may be violated, the estimates for the size of the effects are still
reasonable in the absence of large behavioural changes.
Although this thesis does not deal with behavioural reactions to policies, in the rest of
this section, I will provide a brief overview of the main approaches of linking microsimula-
tion models with behavioural responses, in particular to labour supply. I will also discuss
issues related to incorporating these responses into the analysis. For an overview of tax-
benefit microsimulation approaches combined with behavioural models, see e.g. Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999), Creedy and Duncan (2002), Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) and
Figari et al. (2015).
Most commonly analysed behavioural responses to tax and benefit policy changes
are those related to labour supply choices. The most commonly used labour supply
model is the structural discrete choice random utility model (see e.g. van Soest 1995;
Aaberge et al. 1995; Blundell et al. 2000). In this setting, individuals face a discrete set
of alternatives for labour market participation, e.g. non-participation, working part-time,
working full-time or working over-time. The researcher assumes some form for preferences
and for each discrete choice, the individual obtains a utility level and disposable income.
Individuals face a maximisation problem and choose the labour supply that gives them the
highest utility level. The utility function has a random component (usually drawn from
an Extreme Value distribution Type I) that affects the optimal choice in terms of utility
level. Tax-benefit models, such as EUROMOD, are then used to calculate household
disposable income for each household and participation choice. Wages are predicted based
on a Heckman-corrected wage equation (either for non-workers only or for both workers
and non-workers). The parameters of the utility function are then estimated using the
observed labour supply choices. Labour supply elasticities are estimated by simulating
the impact on participation of a marginal increase to gross hourly wages. For recent
applications using labour supply models linked to EUROMOD, see e.g. Immervoll et al.
(2011), Bargain (2012), Bargain et al. (2014), Figari (2015).
Although important to consider for distributional analysis, behavioural models have
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certain limitations: They can be quite complex and difficult to model. Estimating confi-
dence intervals also becomes more troublesome as modelling individual’s behaviour pro-
vides additional error to static microsimulation estimates (Pudney and Sutherland, 1996).
Behavioural models are based on a set of assumptions about behaviour, model specifi-
cation and distribution of random terms which can be questionable; and the internal
validity of the structural approach can be questioned due to issues concerning omitted
variables or selection effects (Bargain and Doorley, 2017). Furthermore, labour supply
models are usually estimated on a subsample of the population only – e.g. couples and
singles – excluding individuals whose labour supply choices cannot be explained by the
factors controlled for in the models (e.g. disabled and students) (Figari et al., 2015).
Labour supply models have been extended to account for macroeconomic feedback
effects – e.g. Barrios et al. (2016) link a discrete choice labour supply model with EURO-
MOD and a dynamic general equilibrium model (QUEST) to analyse the fiscal and dis-
tributional impact of tax reforms. Figari and Narazani (2017) link EUROMOD to a joint
behavioural model of female labour supply and child care to estimate household responses
to changes in child care coverage. Other studies, linking tax-benefit microsimulation with
behavioural models, have accounted for e.g. changes to prices and consumption through
a general equilibrium model (e.g. see Vandyck and Regemorter (2014) for analysis of
the distributional and economic impact of increases to oil excises) or changes to benefit
non-take-up behaviour (Pudney et al., 2006).
To conclude, a number of approaches have been developed in the literature to account
for behavioural reactions to policies by combining tax-benefit microsimulation with be-
havioural models. This literature is substantial and differs from the approach taken in this
thesis. It would be possible to extend my work in that direction by estimating potential
behavioural responses, e.g. to labour supply. Whether such responses have occurred and
how large they were is an empirical question and future work on this topic would provide
further insights into the issues this thesis is dealing with.
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Chapter 1
The Changing Education
Distribution and Income Inequality
in Great Britain1
Abstract
Over the past years, the number of university graduates increased at an unprecedented rate
in Great Britain. We analyse how this higher education (HE) expansion affected inequality in
household net incomes in the 2000s. We show that all else being equal, education composition
changes led to higher living standards mostly through higher wages. As HE expansion benefited
households from the middle and top of the distribution more than the bottom, income inequality
increased. Despite the increasing share of high-educated workers, we find no evidence of a
‘compression’ effect on inequality, as the HE wage premium remained broadly unchanged.
Keywords: higher education expansion; income distribution; decomposition
JEL codes: D31, I24, I26
1Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Mike Brewer, Paola De Agostini, Paul Fisher, Kitty Stew-
art, Holly Sutherland and Philippe Van Kerm for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am also
grateful for the comments by participants at the 2014 Essex workshop on Understanding changes in
income inequality in the austerity period; the 2014 European Meeting of IMA in Maastricht, the Nether-
lands; the Tenth Winter School on Inequality and Social Welfare Theory in Alba di Canazei; the SASE
27th Annual Conference in London, UK; and the 6th ECINEQ meeting in Luxembourg. This research was
supported by the NORFACE ERA-NET (New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-operation
in Europe Network) Welfare State Futures Programme, Grant Number 462-14-010. The results presented
here are based on EUROMOD version G2.12. EUROMOD is maintained, developed and managed by
the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex, in collaboration with
national teams from the EU member states. The process of extending and updating EUROMOD is
financially supported by the European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation Easi
(2014-2020). I make use of microdata from the Family Resources Survey data made available by the
Department of Work and Pensions via the UK Data Service. I alone am responsible for the analysis and
interpretation of the data reported here.
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1.1 Introduction
Over the past years, there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of university
graduates in Great Britain. The share of individuals with at most secondary education
fell by 22% between 2001 and 2011; whilst the share of individuals with post-secondary
education increased by 30% and the share of higher education (undergraduate and post-
graduate) degree holders increased for females by 48% and for males by 40% (Table 1.1).
One result of these substantial changes is that the education qualification gap narrowed
between males and females; but also between different ethnic groups (Hills et al., 2016a).
These large structural changes in education have important consequences for income
inequality. For developing countries in particular, it has been noted that the returns to
education are convex and hence, an equally distributed expansion of education among low-
and high-skilled can lead to a rise in inequality (Battisto´n et al., 2014). Bourguignon et al.
(2004) refers to this link between education and inequality as the ‘paradox of progress’.
The literature on the effect of education on income inequality emphasises the ‘composition’
and ‘compression’ effects of education expansion (Knight and Sabot, 1983; Gregorio and
Lee, 2002; Rehme, 2007; Teulings and van Rens, 2008). With an increase in the relative
size of the high-education group, the ‘composition’ effect initially raises inequality but
eventually lowers it as fewer low-educated people remain.2 The ‘compression’ effect lowers
inequality as the increasing share of educated workers reduces the higher education (HE)
wage premium.
The link between recent education trends and household net income inequality in
Great Britain is not well understood and the aim of this paper is to provide an in-depth
account of this relationship for the period 2001-2011. Brewer et al. (2009) look at summary
measures of inequality and find that earnings inequality fell within education groups and
the gap in incomes by education groups narrowed in the 1990s and early 2000s.3 Our
paper extends their work by looking at changes along the distribution of income and
covers the period of the recent education expansion including the crisis period (2001-11).
In more detail, we estimate the separate effects on the income distribution of changes
2Knight and Sabot (1983) show that the impact of the education composition effect on inequality
depends on the relative size of the education categories, their relative mean wages and wage variances.
3For the 1970s and 1980s, Brewer et al. (2009) find the reverse: an increased gap in earnings and
household net incomes within and between education groups.
to the HE wage premia, other changes to wages, and changes to the composition of HE
degree holders. We also estimate the effect of changes to tax-benefit policies on incomes.
By creating counterfactual distributions of income, the contribution of each of the factors
is estimated in isolation from other changes, e.g. we isolate the contribution of the rising
number of university graduates to changes in the income distribution, holding constant
the graduate pay premium and income tax policy rule. We are also able to examine all
these effects across the whole income distribution.
Our approach is to combine the methodologies of Bargain and Callan (2010) and
Bourguignon et al. (2008). Using a tax-benefit microsimulation model, we separate out
the changes to the tax-benefit policies from the changes to the distribution of gross market
incomes and the composition of the population. Using a regression-based approach and
re-weighting, we then decompose the latter two to identify the impact on the income
distribution of changes in the HE pay premia, education composition and other population
changes. The data used come from the Family Resources Survey for Great Britain for
2001/02, 2007/08 and 2011/12.
First, we estimate the distributional impact from changes to the HE wage premium.
We find very small income gains and a rise in income inequality in the boom period
(2001-07) due to slight increases in the HE wage premium, although these are primarily
for white British male workers in the richest 15% of the income distribution. However,
during the crisis we find no change in the education earnings differentials by ethnicity
and sex groups (consistent with Blundell et al. (2016) and Machin (2011)) and so there
is little impact on the distribution of household net incomes. Hence, we find no evidence
for a ‘compression’ effect in the full period 2001-11.
Second, we find evidence for education ‘composition’ effect. Our results show that, fix-
ing the HE wage premium, HE expansion raised living standards through higher earnings
and other market incomes. In the pre-crisis period 2001-07, real mean household income
grew by 3.8% due to HE expansion and it rose a further 3.1% during the crisis period
2007-11. However, the income gains due to education made net incomes more unequal
as households in the middle and top of the distribution benefited more than those at the
bottom.
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In a nutshell, between 2001 and 2007, we find that overall income inequality for the
middle 95% of the income distribution remained broadly unchanged while it fell between
2007 and 2011. This was despite the upward pressure due to education as well as wage
changes, and is due to changes in the tax-benefit system. We show that not only have
tax-benefit policies been equalising (consistent with e.g. Sefton et al. (2009), Hills et al.
(2014), Hills et al. (2016b)), but also that the drop in inequality in 2007-11 was entirely
due to policy changes which benefited mostly the bottom of the distribution.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 and 3 describe the methodology,
data and the tax-benefit model EUROMOD, section 4 discusses the results and section 5
concludes.
1.2 Methodology
The central question addressed in this paper is, other things being equal, what was the
contribution of education composition and education premium changes to changes in the
distribution of household net incomes in Great Britain in the 2000s. To answer this, we
need to separate the effect of education trends from everything else that could have af-
fected household incomes, such as changes to benefit entitlements and tax liabilities, other
compositional changes in the society, or other changes to market incomes. To identify
the contribution to total income changes of these different factors, we employ decompo-
sition techniques. The basic idea is that starting from the observed end-period income
distribution, we can work our way backwards to the observed start-period distribution by
constructing intermediate counterfactual distributions. By changing different factors one
step at a time, the counterfactuals gradually become less like the end-period and more
similar and eventually identical to the start-period distribution. A comparison between
the different distributions unveils the contribution of each factor to the total change.
First, we decompose the total change in household net incomes into the impact due
to changes in population characteristics and market incomes (PCMI) and to changes to
tax and benefit policies (TBP). The method follows on the work by Bargain and Callan
(2010) who propose a formal framework based on Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition and
using a tax-benefit calculator.
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Second, we decompose the PCMI effect into the part due to changes in education; the
part due to changes to the pay premium by education; and a residual. The method is based
on Bourguignon et al. (2008) who build on the work by Juhn et al. (1993) and DiNardo
et al. (1996) and propose a regression-based approach and/or re-weighting suitable for
decomposing changes in the income distribution. The method builds on the literature
generalising the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of changes in the mean to changes along
the distribution of wages.4
In the rest of the section, we first present formally how we decompose the total change
in the income distribution into PCMI and TBP effects. Second, we explain how the
PCMI effect can be further decomposed to identify the impact of education changes on
the income distribution.
1.2.1 Decomposing the total change
Formally, let I be a distribution of household net income (or a functional such as Gini or
mean income) and expressed as a function f(d, r, p, e, x, y, o) where d denotes the design
of tax-benefit policies (e.g. progressive vs flat tax), r tax-benefit percentage rates (e.g.
20% tax rate), p tax-benefit amounts (e.g. £8,000 personal income tax allowance), e
education level (secondary, college, undergraduate, postgraduate), x a vector of other
individual/household characteristics, y gross earnings and o other individual/household
gross market incomes (e.g. self-employment income). The change in the distribution I
between two periods (0 and 1) is
∆I = f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d0, r0, p0, e0, x0, y0, o0) (1.1)
An intermediate, counterfactual distribution is next added (and subtracted) as a func-
tion of d, r and p from the end-period but e, x, y and o from the start-period. It yields
4See Fortin et al. (2011) for an overview of the literature that decomposes changes in the earnings
distribution.
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the identity:
∆I = f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e0, x0, y0, o0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
population characteristics and market income effect (nominal)
+ f(d1, r1, p1, e0, x0, y0, o0)− f(d0, r0, p0, e0, x0, y0, o0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax-benefit policy effect (nominal)
(1.2)
The purpose of adding the counterfactual is to answer two questions: i) Given the tax-
benefit regime in the end-period, what would have been the impact on I if we would go
back to the population and distribution of market incomes from the start-period; and
ii) given the population and distribution of market incomes from the start-period, what
would have been the impact on I if tax-benefit policies from the end-period were in place?
The first term answers i) which identifies the contribution of changes to population char-
acteristics and market incomes (PCMI) (conditional on d, r and p from the end-period)
on the total change in I. The second term answers ii) which identifies the contribution of
changes to tax-benefit policies (TBP) (conditional on e, x, y and o from the start-period)
on the total change in I.
In the counterfactual, tax-benefit amounts from the end-period p1 are applied on gross
market incomes from the start-period y0 and o0. To make these comparable (as £1 in
period 1 is worth less than £1 in period 0), equation 1.2 is extended to include two
counterfactuals in which y0, o0 and p0 are adjusted for inflation by a factor α=Consumer
Price Index:
∆I = f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e0, x0, αy0, αo0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i) population characteristics and market income effect (real)
+ f(d1, r1, p1, e0, x0, αy0, αo0)− f(d0, r0, αp0, e0, x0, αy0, αo0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ii) tax-benefit policy effect (real)
+ f(d0, r0, αp0, e0, x0, αy0, αo0)− f(d0, r0, p0, e0, x0, y0, o0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
iii) nominal effect
(1.3)
For a scale-dependent measure (e.g. mean income), the sum of the first two terms in
equation 1.3 gives the real change in I and the third term captures the effect of price
changes on (start-period) incomes. For a scale-independent measure (e.g. the Gini coef-
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ficient) the nominal effect equals 0 as a change in the nominal levels of both tax-benefit
policy amounts and market incomes should not affect the relative position of households
in the income distribution (Bargain and Callan, 2010). In the results section, we provide
estimates of the first two terms only.
The decomposition is path-dependent, e.g. the change in I can be decomposed by
conditioning the PCMI effect either on end- or start-period policies. We estimate the
effects for all possible combinations and take the average (for details, see Paulus and
Tasseva (2018) (Chapter 2 in this thesis)).
1.2.2 Decomposing the changes in PCMI
We decompose the PCMI effect on I to the HE wage premia and separately other changes
to wages (hereafter changes to wages), using a regression-based approach. We then
separately identify the contribution of changes to the education composition, using re-
weighting. Further details are given below.
By constructing new counterfactuals, the first term in equation 1.3 is decomposed as:
∆I i) = f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ1,δˆ1,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1 , o1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
iv) changes to wages
f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆ
βˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ1,δˆ1,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1 , o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ1,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1 , o1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v) changes to returns to HE for white British males
f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆ
βˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ1,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1 , o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1 , o1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vi) changes to returns to HE for non-white-British males
f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆ
βˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1 , o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ1,e1 , o1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vii) changes to returns to HE for white British females
f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆ
βˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ1,e1 , o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ0,e1 , o1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
viii) changes to returns to HE for non-white-British females
f(d1, r1, p1, e1, x1, yˆ
βˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ0,e1 , o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, eˆ0, x1, yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ0,eˆ0 , o1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ix) changes to education composition
f(d1, r1, p1, eˆ0, x1, yˆ
βˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ0,eˆ0 , o1)− f(d1, r1, p1, e0, x0, αy0, αo0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x) residual
(1.4)
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In term iv), we estimate the impact on the income distribution of changes to wages,
but fixing the HE wage premia and amount of education at their t = 1 levels. We
construct the counterfactual in iv) as follows: First, the following four models of wages
are estimated:
ln ywBmi(ht) = x
wBm
i(ht) βt + e
wBm
i(ht) λt + i(ht)
ln ynwBmi(ht) = x
nwBm
i(ht) γt + e
nwBm
i(ht) δt + ηi(ht)
ln ywBfi(ht) = x
wBf
i(ht)pit + e
wBf
i(ht)νt + µi(ht)
ln ynwBfi(ht) = x
nwBf
i(ht) ρt + e
nwBf
i(ht) θt + υi(ht)
(1.5)
where ln ywBmi(ht) , ln y
nwBm
i(ht) , ln y
wBf
i(ht) and ln y
nwBf
i(ht) are the log of monthly earnings of individual
i in household h in period t for the sample of white British males (wBm), non-white-
British males (nwBm), white British females (wBf) and non-white-British females (nwBf),
respectively. The e’s denote the individual level of education while the x’s are a set of
other observable individual/household characteristics. The residual terms are denoted
by i(ht), ηi(ht), µi(ht) and υi(ht).
5 The returns to individual/household characteristics are
denoted with βt, γt, pit, ρt and those to education with λt, δt, νt, θt.
Wages are then predicted for the t = 1 sample of workers by: a) applying the coeffi-
cients βˆ0, γˆ0, pi0 and ρˆ0 from the models estimated on t = 0 data; b) applying the returns
to higher education (HE) from the models estimated on t = 1 data; and c) adjusting
the predicted residuals by the ratio of the estimated standard deviation of the residu-
als in t = 0 and t = 1. The counterfactual distribution of wages (yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ1,δˆ1,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1)
represents workers wages in t = 1 if they were renumerated according to the returns
prevailing in t = 0. By adjusting the predicted residuals, changes in the variation of the
unobservables are also captured in the counterfactual.
In terms v) to viii), we use the same procedure as above but apply the returns to HE
from the models estimated on t = 0 data. In this way, we assess the impact of changes to
the returns to HE for: v) white British males (yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ1,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1); vi) non-white-British
males (yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ1,θˆ1,e1); vii) white British females (yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ1,e1); and viii)
non-white-British females (yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ0,e1). For more details on how we construct
5Since the data used in the paper are cross-sectional, we do not have repeated observations for indi-
viduals and households which we note with parenthesis i(ht) in equation 1.5.
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the wage counterfactuals, see Appendix A.
The term ix) captures the contribution of changes in the amount of education. To
construct the counterfactual, we use re-weighting to identify the impact of increased uni-
versity attainment on I. The re-weighting approach follows on the algorithm by Gomulka
(1992). The household survey data weights in t = 1 are adjusted to specified control totals
for education by age, sex and household type from t = 0 while minimising a function of the
differences between the old and new weights.6 By re-weighting and building on the coun-
terfactual from term viii), another wage counterfactual distribution (yˆβˆ0,γˆ0,pi0,ρˆ0,λˆ0,δˆ0,νˆ0,θˆ0,eˆ0)
is constructed in which the education level of the population in t = 1 is like of the popula-
tion in t = 0 (eˆ0). The counterfactual distribution of education affects not only wages but
also other forms of market incomes, as after the re-weighting more/less weight is given to
certain household types (classified by education level, age and sex) who may also be more
or less likely to receive certain market incomes (e.g. from private pensions and investment
income).
Term x) captures the residual, i.e. the impact on the income distribution of all other
changes to market incomes and population characteristics not accounted for by the de-
composition, e.g. changes in the distribution of self-employment income, migration etc.
In all counterfactuals in terms iv) to x) we apply tax-benefit policies from t = 1 using
a tax-benefit model. In each scenario the model calculates the counterfactual benefit enti-
tlements and tax liabilities of each individual/household in the end-period, on the basis of
their counterfactual wages/education level and end-period other market incomes and char-
acteristics. Household gross incomes minus personal taxes and minus national insurance
contributions (NI) gives the distribution of household net incomes in each counterfactual.
Although tax-benefit policies are the same across the counterfactuals, the level of
benefit entitlements, personal income taxes and NI differ across scenarios in response to
the wage/education changes. This effect is referred to in the literature as the automatic
stabilisation effect of tax-benefit policies (Figari et al. 2015, Dolls et al. 2012). We can
express the function of household net incomes as the sum of market incomes (conditional
6The control totals in the re-weighting are based on the population in the start-period and capture
the share of individuals out of the total population by level of education, sex and age (in 5-year bands)
and across household type (with/without children and with 1/2+ adults in the household). We make use
of the Stata command reweight2 by Browne (2012).
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on population characteristics) (g()) and benefit entitlements minus personal taxes and NI
(conditional on market incomes and population characteristics) (h()), f(d, r, p, e, x, y, o) =
g(y, o|e, x) + h(d, r, p|e, x, y, o). As household net incomes are decomposable by income
source, the change in gross incomes can be separated out from the automatic stabilisation
effect of tax-benefit policies.
We provide standard errors for the level and change in income inequality by bootstrap-
ping the population sample 1,000 times. To provide standard errors on the decomposition
results for changes in mean incomes we employ the delta method (Taylor approximations).
Our estimates account for sample variation but not measurement error.
1.3 Data and the tax-benefit model EUROMOD
We use data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS), which is a purpose built income
survey, for 2001/02, 2007/08 and 2011/12. The data are cross-sectional, nationally repre-
sentative and contain rich information on individual and households characteristics and
circumstances. The data series Households Below Average Income (HBAI), which are
based on the FRS, are used by different government and non-government bodies, e.g.
for analysing income trends by the Department for Work and Pensions (2017) and the
Institute for Fiscal Studies (see Hood and Waters (2017)).7
To mitigate the risk of measurement error at the bottom of the income distribution
(Brewer et al., 2017), we trim the sample by dropping the poorest 4%. Jenkins (2017)
shows that HBAI estimates, derived entirely from the FRS data, do not capture changes
at the top of the income distribution. Thus, we also drop the richest 1% of the data
to reduce measurement error at the top of the distribution. For similar approaches, see
Belfield et al. (2017) and Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2015). As a result, our analysis focuses
on the middle 95% of the distribution and ignores inequality at the tails. Furthermore,
households from Northern Ireland were included in the survey only from 2002/03 onwards
and so, we restrict the sample to Great Britain.
To derive household net incomes, we combine information on gross market incomes
7The HBAI data contain derived income variables from the FRS and imputations of top earners.
However, we use the FRS instead of the derived HBAI variables because we need individual/household-
level data on population characteristics and gross incomes.
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from the FRS with information on benefit entitlements, income tax liabilities and NI
contributions obtained from a tax-benefit microsimulation model. We use the model
EUROMOD to calculate benefits, income tax and NI contributions for the actual as well
as counterfactual income distributions. This is a standard practice in the decomposition
literature which separates changes in the income distribution into direct policy effect (i.e.
changes to tax and benefit policies) and population characteristics and market income
effect (using EUROMOD, see e.g. Bargain and Callan, 2010 and Bargain, 2012; using
IFS TAXBEN, see e.g. Joyce and Sibieta, 2013). EUROMOD contains syntax of functions
which determine a) who – e.g. a family with certain characteristics/market incomes – is
entitled to receive a certain benefit or liable to pay an income tax/NI and b) the size
of the benefit entitlement/personal tax/NI. The syntax reflects the policy rules (design,
percentage rates and amounts) on 30th of June in 2001, 2007 and 2011. EUROMOD reads
the individual-level FRS data on market incomes and socio-economic characteristics and
based on the policy rules it calculates individual/household benefit entitlements, income
tax and NI liabilities.
To ensure EUROMOD calculations (given the policy rules and FRS data) reflect the
actual income distribution in a given year, the model is regularly tested and validated
against official statistics on benefit spending and recipients/tax revenues and payers, and
the income distribution. The quality control checks are carried out by a team of re-
searchers at the University of Essex, UK responsible for the maintenance and updating of
EUROMOD. The model is publicly available for research purposes and user feedback is
fed into the validation process. For more information on the UK model see the Country
Report by De Agostini and Sutherland (2016). For a model description and a literature
review of research applications with EUROMOD, see Sutherland and Figari (2013) and
Figari et al. (2015).
The measure of household net income in this analysis is cash income and is the sum of
gross market incomes, national insurance benefits, means-tested benefits, state pensions
minus direct income taxes and NI contributions. To account for household composition
and economies of scale, we equivalise household net incomes using the modified OECD
equivalence scale.
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For more detailed information on the data, see Appendix B.
1.4 Results
We begin by documenting the broad distributional changes in the boom (2001-07) and
crisis (2007-11) periods, showing that our results using simulated incomes are consistent
with the existing evidence. In the second part of the section, we analyse how much
of the income changes along the distribution were attributed to changes to population
characteristics and market incomes (PCMI) and its components (in particular education),
and to changes to the tax-benefit policies (TBP). The final part of the section examines
the contribution of changes to PCMI and TBP to changes in income inequality.
1.4.1 Trends in income inequality
We first replicate the broad inequality trends (between 2001 and 2011) that have been
documented elsewhere (e.g. Jenkins, 2017 and Belfield et al., 2014), using our simulated
incomes derived from EUROMOD model based on FRS data. Table 1.2 shows the change
in inequality in 2001-07 and 2007-11, focusing on the middle 95% of the income distribu-
tion. We look at five measures of inequality – the Gini coefficient (which is more sensitive
to incomes at the centre of the distribution than at the tails), the Atkinson index with
aversion parameter equal to 0.5, 1 and 2 (an increase in the parameter value gives more
weight to incomes at the bottom tail of the distribution) and the coefficient of variation
(which captures the ratio of the income standard deviation to the mean).
Inequality remained broadly unchanged between 2001 and 2007. In the crisis years
2007-11, there was a statistically significant drop in inequality across all measures apart
from the coefficient of variation. The Gini fell by 0.006 from 0.274 to 0.268. The Atkinson
index with aversion parameter of 0.5, 1 and 2 dropped by 0.002, 0.005 and 0.011 reaching
levels of 0.056, 0.106 and 0.189 in 2011, respectively. Only the coefficient of variation
continued to remain stable at 0.526 in 2011.
To understand better what is behind the inequality changes, Figure 1.1 shows the real
change in mean household net income by ventiles and for the population (all) between
2001 and 2007 and between 2007 and 2011. Mean incomes grew by 8.6% between 2001
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and 2007. Incomes rose at all points of the distribution although households from the
poorest ventile saw their incomes grow less than the rest of the distribution. The 3rd
and 4th ventiles enjoyed the strongest income growth of around 11%. Between 2007 and
2011, the population mean did not change but that masked different trends along the
distribution: income growth was pro-poor, except at the top, which explains the drop
in inequality. Incomes increased on average by 3.7% for the first 8 ventile groups, with
the strongest growth of more than 6% enjoyed by households from the first and second
income ventiles. The richest 20th ventile also experienced a small income gain of 1.3%.
For the rest of the distribution incomes fell with an average loss of 1.6%.
Appendix C provides evidence that our conclusions about the changes in the income
distribution hold, regardless of whether we use simulated incomes (based on EUROMOD
and FRS data) or FRS reported incomes. It also discusses the reasons why our results
depart from Jenkins (2017), who focuses on the very rich.
1.4.2 Decomposing income changes along the distribution
In this section, we decompose changes in net income at different points of the distribution,
for the boom (2001-07) and crisis (2007-11) periods separately. Our aim is to understand
what drove income changes at different points of the distribution. We begin by inves-
tigating how much of the income changes were attributed to changes to PCMI and its
components. We then show the contribution of the TBP effect. We finally compare and
contrast the different effects.
To summarise the overall results, we find that changes to PCMI contributed to income
gains in the boom period that were pro-rich. During the crisis, they led to changes in
net incomes that were U-shaped, with small gains at the bottom and top ventiles and
losses along the rest of the distribution. Despite these differences, the largest share of the
PCMI effect went to changes to wages and to the education composition which on the
whole benefited the upper part of the income distribution more than the bottom in both
periods.
Figure 1.2 decomposes the real change in mean household net income by income ven-
tiles between 2001 and 2007. Each subfigure corresponds to a different component of the
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PCMI effect (black line), i.e. the contribution to income changes of: changes to wages,
excluding the returns to HE; changes to the HE wage premia by sex and ethnicity; com-
positional changes to education; and a residual. The total change (light grey) and the
PCMI effect (grey line) are replicated in each subfigure (the black lines sum up to the
grey one). To estimate the impact of changes to wages and the returns to HE, we estimate
equation 1.5: the estimated coefficients are broadly as expected and full results are given
in Appendix D.
Starting with the changes to PCMI, we find that they account for nearly all of the
growth in mean income (all). However, the PCMI effect was regressive in contrast to
the total change, with very small gains for the poorest households and the largest gains
concentrated in the top 12th-20th ventiles, who saw growth of 9-10%.
The main factors that contributed to the pro-rich income gains due to the PCMI
effect were changes to wages (top left subfigure) and compositional changes to education
(bottom right subfigure). The changes to wages led to gains in net income that were
larger for the second than the first half of the distribution, and the gains due to HE
expansion (working through market incomes) were monotonically increasing with income.
The increases in net income due to HE expansion, especially at the higher end of the
distribution, exceeded those from the changes to wages.
Changes to the HE wage returns for white British men led to tiny income gains for
the richest three ventiles. There were no other major income changes driven by changes
to the HE wage returns among non-white British men and women. This is broadly
consistent with the evidence of constant graduate wage premia (Machin, 2011). Finally,
our decomposition results cannot explain all losses at the bottom and gains along the rest
of the distribution, captured in the residual.
[Figure 1.2 here]
Figure 1.3 shows results from further decomposing the PCMI components by income
source. The sources are: earnings, self-employment income, other market incomes (private
pensions, investment income, rent and private transfers between households (received mi-
nus paid)) and automatic stabilisers (tax-benefit effect). Taxes and benefits as automatic
stabilisers capture the reaction of the (same) tax-benefit policies to changes in market in-
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comes (or changes to population characteristics) (Dolls et al., 2012). Acting as automatic
stabilisers, policies in a progressive system such as is the UK are expected to work in the
opposite direction to market incomes – when market incomes fall, policies should offset
(part of) the loss through lower tax/NI liabilities and increased benefit entitlements and
vice versa. Tax-benefit policies would tend to mitigate (part of) the inequality increase
in case of more unequally distributed market incomes, but the opposite effect may also
be true.
The most striking feature of Figure 1.3 is that changes to wages and HE expansion
(i.e. education composition changes) led to increases in earnings that were larger for
the middle and top of the income distribution than the bottom; while the automatic
stabilisation response of policies was to offset part of these increases. In more detail, we
find that changes to wages contributed on average to a rise in earnings of 3.7% but 1.4
percentage points was lost to lower benefit entitlements and/or higher tax/NI liabilities.
Earnings fell between the first and sixth ventiles due to wage changes, in contrast to the
rest of the distribution. Policies offset the loss by providing net income gains through
higher benefits and lower taxes. Self-employment income and other market incomes –
mostly private pensions – seemingly changed at different points of the distribution but
the effect is entirely due to household re-ranking as a result of the wage changes.
HE expansion led to statistically significant increases in mean earnings (3.9%), self-
employment income (0.6%) and other types of market incomes such as private pensions
(0.8%) and investment income (0.5%). The gains from earnings, self-employment and
investment income were larger for the upper part of the distribution while the gains from
private pensions were more equally distributed across households. Tax-benefit policies
partly offset the income gains due to HE expansion.
A final notable feature of Figure 1.3 are the income gains from earnings and self-
employment income for the bottom ventile groups in the last subfigure showing the resid-
ual. This is consistent with Belfield et al. (2017) who document a reduction in the number
of males working full-time and an increase in part-time (less than 30 hours per week) em-
ployment which is attributed to increased inequality of male earnings. They find an
increase in self-employment, in the number of one-earner households and their relative
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size at the bottom of the distribution. Our results further show that mostly changes to
earnings and self-employment income had an income equalising effect, which was partly
offset by the regressive automatic stabilisation response of policies.
[Figure 1.3 here]
We now present results from repeating the above analysis for the crisis (2007-11)
period. Between 2007 and 2011 and in contrast to the earlier period, the PCMI effect
on net incomes led to an average loss of 1.7% (Figure 1.4). The income changes were
U-shaped with small gains at the bottom and top ventiles and losses along the rest of the
distribution.
As in 2001-07, the main components contributing to the PCMI effect during the crisis
were changes to wages and to the education composition. Although changes to wages did
not affect average net incomes, they led to small income losses along the entire distribution
apart from the 19th and 20th ventiles where incomes rose by 0.7% and substantial 4.8%,
respectively. Mean net income rose by 3.1% due to the expansion in education: There
were income gains at all parts of the distribution – somewhat larger for the first and last
ventiles.
The wage returns to HE (by sex and ethnicity) remained constant in the crisis despite
the continuous increase in the number of university graduates. This has also been shown
by Blundell et al. (2016) who propose, as an explanation for the constant graduate wage
premia, a model in which firms respond to the increased supply of graduates through
a decentralisation of the organisation structure. The remaining changes in net income,
captured in the residual, show that they were pro-poor resulting in smaller income losses
at the bottom than the rest of the distribution.
[Figure 1.4 here]
Decomposing the PCMI components in 2007-11 by income source (Figure 1.5) shows
that earnings fell throughout the distribution – apart from the top ventile – due to wage
changes but the losses were partly offset by the automatic stabilisation effect of policies.
In contrast, the increase in earnings in the top ventile was reduced by the automatic
stabilisers.
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HE expansion contributed to statistically significant increases in mean earnings (3%)
and other market incomes, in particular private pensions (1%). Increases in self-employment
income were smaller, (statistically significant at the 10% level) at 0.3%. The tax-benefit
system partly reduced the income gains due to changes in the education composition.
What is also interesting is that although the impact of HE expansion was not the same
across the distribution, policies worked to smooth the effect.
The residual captures market income gains for the second and third ventiles and
losses for the rest of the distribution. The fall in market incomes throughout most of
the distribution can be largely attributed to the increase in unemployment during the
crisis; while the growth in earnings in the second and third ventiles can be explained
by further relative increases in the number of one-earner households (compared to no-
earner households). In some cases the income loss in gross market incomes exceeded 10%,
although the net loss (after taxes and benefits) was less than 6%.
[Figure 1.5 here]
Figure 1.6 now presents the TBP effect (black line). We contrast this to the total
change (light grey) and PCMI effect (dark grey line). In both periods, the total change
masked opposite trends in the TBP and PCMI effects. Between 2001 and 2007, mean
income remained the same due to changes to TBP but across the distribution income
changes were pro-poor, contrasting from the regressive PCMI effect. Changes to TBP led
to clear income gains for the first half of the distribution, with the largest gains for the
poorest households. The income increase enjoyed by households from the poorest ventile
was almost entirely due to TBP changes – increased generosity in tax credits and means-
tested benefits. The top ventiles, on the other hand, saw their incomes falling by a small
but statistically significant share, due to increased tax liabilities and NI contributions.
The analysis by Hills et al. (2014) provides an in-depth discussion of the TBP effect in
the UK in 2001-07 and 2007-11.
Between 2007 and 2011, the shape of the TBP effect was less progressive compared to
the effect in the earlier period and led to gains along the entire distribution (excluding the
last ventile), with an average income gain of 1.7%. This result is again different from the
U-shaped and mostly negative PCMI effect. The direct effect of the introduction of the
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top 50% marginal tax rate in 2010/11 can be seen to affect the richest ventile although the
behavioural response to the reform – the income forestalling effect – is in fact captured by
the PCMI effect. It is noticeable that in both periods the poorest households gained less
compared to the following ventile groups due to incomplete benefit take-up. To conclude,
policy reactions in the 2000s were working towards increasing the incomes of those at
the bottom half of the distribution, thus reducing inequality and offsetting part of the
regressive income gains due to changes to PCMI and HE expansion, in particular.
[Figure 1.6 here]
1.4.3 Decomposing inequality changes
After analysing the income changes along the distribution, we turn to decomposing
changes in aggregate measures of income inequality in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4. We find
that changes to PCMI increased inequality in the 2000s – with the effect being relatively
large and positive in the economic growth period (2001-07) and small and not statistically
significant in the crisis period (2007-11) (there is a statistically significant change only for
the coefficient of variation). As in the previous section, we further decompose the PCMI
effects into its subcomponents. Between 2001 and 2007, we find that the inequality in-
crease was mainly driven by changes to the education composition. Between 2007 and
2011, education composition changes as well as changes to wages were the main factors
contributing to higher inequality.
In more detail, we find that, the wage changes affected only one out of the 5 inequality
measures in 2001-07: they led to a small and statistically significant increase in inequality
only for the Atkinson index with an aversion parameter of 2. In 2007-11, the effect of
wages was clearly inequality-increasing across all measures.
Looking separately at changes to the wage returns to HE, the aggregate inequality
effect (summing rows 4 to 7) was positive but small and masked opposing trends in
2001-07. Namely, the changes to the HE wage returns for white British males and for
non-white-British females slightly increased inequality; while changes to the returns for
white British female workers were equalising. In the crisis years, the absence of changes
to the HE wage premia led to no effect on inequality. Hence, we find no evidence for the
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‘compression’ effect of HE expansion on inequality.
Moving to changes to the education composition, we find that the increase in HE
attainment led to higher income inequality in both periods. Our results show that, in
the 2001-07 period, HE expansion is also the main component of the PCMI effect that
explains the rise in income inequality. In 2007-11, HE expansion continued to widen the
gap between rich and poor although to a smaller extent.
The residual did not have any statistically significant impact on inequality in 2001-
07. However, between 2007 and 2011, the increase in income inequality, driven by wages
and education composition effect, was offset by changes captured in the residual (work
patterns and household composition).
Our results for the PCMI effect are consistent with the evidence on wage inequality
(Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2015; Lindley and Machin, 2013). Lindley and Machin (2013)
suggest a key explanation for rising wage inequality in the UK is the increased relative
demand for educated workers driven by technological change.
Furthermore, the increase in income inequality due to HE expansion is likely to stem
from inequality in education attainment. In the 1980s and 1990s, UK HE participation
among children from richer families rose faster than among children from poorer back-
grounds (Blanden and Machin, 2004). Although education inequality fell in the 2000s,
there is limited evidence for a reduction in the inequality at higher levels of education
attainment (Blanden and Macmillan, 2014; Crawford, 2012).
Looking at between-group income inequality changes, we find that the income gains
due to HE expansion – mostly through higher earnings – for working-age females and non-
white-British exceeded the gains for working-age males and white British, respectively.
As a result, income inequality in 2000s between sex and ethnic groups fell due to HE
expansion, all else being equal. Hence, although education composition changes increased
overall inequality, they pushed down between-group inequality among some subgroups
(see Appendix E). This finding complements the analysis by Hills et al. (2016a) who show
that the HE qualification gap between sex and ethnic groups is closing due to increases
in HE attainment but overlook the income changes.
Finally, what seems to have pushed down inequality levels in both periods is tax-
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benefit policies, especially in the boom period. This result is in line with the literature
on the redistributive effect of tax-benefit policy changes which finds that in the majority
of EU countries policies have worked towards greater redistribution (see e.g. Hills et al.
2014, De Agostini et al. 2016). Overall, we find that inequality fell in the 2000s through
policy changes and most of the effect was achieved in the good years when there was less
pressure on the government budget. On the other hand, changes in PCMI worked in the
opposite direction, offsetting to a large extent the reduction achieved through policies.
[Table 1.3 here]
[Table 1.4 here]
1.5 Conclusions
The share of individuals with HE in Great Britain increased by 45% between 2001 and
2011. This paper analyses how this recent HE expansion affected the distribution of
household net incomes.
We find that between 2001 and 2011 HE expansion led to higher living standards
mostly through higher earnings, but the effect was not the same across the income dis-
tribution. As households in the middle and the top of the distribution saw their incomes
rising faster than households at the bottom, education composition effects raised income
inequality (mostly through more unequal earnings distribution). We find no evidence for
a wage ‘compression’ effect. In fact, in the pre-crisis period, income inequality increased
as the HE wage premia grew slightly for white British men in the richest 15% of the
distribution. In the crisis period, we find that the wage returns to HE remained broadly
unchanged with no effect on household incomes.
The inequality-increasing effect from HE expansion is an important policy concern for
equality of opportunity if this is the result of HE expansion benefiting disproportionally
children from more aﬄuent families. Our data do not allow us to answer directly this
question and so, we draw on the related literature: although, as the average level of
education attainment increased, education inequality fell in the 2000s (compared to an
increase in the 1980s and 1990s), there is limited evidence showing that inequality at
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higher levels of education attainment has fallen (Blanden and Macmillan, 2014; Crawford,
2012). Furthermore, the positive link between HE expansion and income inequality may
have implications for social mobility. International comparisons suggest low levels of
intergenerational income mobility in the UK linked to the relatively high level of income
inequality, with education attainment as a key driver for this relationship (Corak, 2013;
Jerrim and Macmillan, 2015). There is also evidence suggesting that social mobility in
the UK is falling (Gregg et al., 2017; Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007) although the links to
changes to income inequality have not been studied so far.
Apart from HE expansion, we find that other forces related to the tax and benefit
system had an important impact on the income distribution. We confirm that, in both
periods 2001-07 and 2007-11, changes to tax and benefit policies – in particular, the
increased generosity of tax credits, higher tax and national insurance rates – worked
towards inequality reduction and offset most of the inequality increase caused by HE
expansion. Furthermore, the automatic stabilisation response of policies to changes in
the underlying distribution of market incomes and population characteristics were also
broadly income-equalising.
Despite the reduction in income inequality in the late 2000s and its subsequent stability
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2017), planned benefit cuts and earnings growth are
projected to raise inequality (Hood and Waters, 2017). With the continuous expansion of
HE, further increases in income inequality may also be expected due to the composition
effect until eventually inequality peaks and starts to fall. On the other hand, it is likely
that the expansion of HE will eventually push down the education wage differential and,
with it, income inequality. It remains to be seen how the changing education distribution
will play out on income inequality in the future.
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1.6 Tables
Table 1.1:
Education shares (in %)
2001 2007 2011
Males
Secondary 62.0 55.2 50.5
College 17.2 18.9 20.4
Undergraduate 10.0 12.8 14.9
Postgraduate 10.8 13.0 14.3
Females
Secondary 61.5 54.1 49.3
College 20.1 21.6 23.1
Undergraduate 10.7 13.1 15.4
Postgraduate 7.7 11.2 12.3
All
Secondary 61.7 54.7 49.9
College 18.7 20.3 21.8
Undergraduate 10.4 13.0 15.1
Postgraduate 9.2 12.1 13.2
Notes: Sample includes individuals aged 15-64. Secondary=in education/left school aged <=16/missing information.
College=in education/left school aged >16 and <=18. Undergraduate=in education/left school aged >18 and <=21.
Postgraduate=in education/left school aged >21.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey for 2001/02 (2001), 2007/08 (2007) and 2011/12 (2011).
Table 1.2:
Level of and changes (in % points) to inequality
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1) Atkinson (2) CV
observed 2001 .277*** .059*** .113*** .205*** .531***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.003)
observed 2007 .274*** .058*** .111*** .201*** .529***
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.004)
observed 2011 .268*** .056*** .106*** .189*** .526***
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.005)
total change in 2001-07 -.003 -.001 -.002 -.004 -.002
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.005)
total change in 2007-11 -.006** -.002** -.005*** -.011*** -.003
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.006)
Notes: HE=higher education. Significance levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 and standard errors
shown in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors after 1,000 replications.
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
Table 1.3:
Decomposing inequality changes (in % points) between 2001 and 2007
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1) Atkinson (2) CV
total change -.003 -.001 -.002 -.004 -.002
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.005)
PCMI effect .010*** .004*** .009*** .016*** .019***
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.005)
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iv) changes to wages .000 .000 .001 .003*** -.004
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.003)
v) changes to returns to HE: wBm .002*** .001*** .001*** .002*** .005***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
vi) changes to returns to HE: nwBm .000 .000 .000 .000 .001
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
vii) changes to returns to HE: wBf -.001*** -.000*** -.000*** -.001*** -.001***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
viii) changes to returns to HE: nwBf .001*** .000*** .001*** .001*** .002***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
ix) changes to education composition .007*** .003*** .006*** .010*** .016***
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.002)
x) residual .001 .000 .001 .001 .001
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.005)
TBP effect -.013*** -.005*** -.011*** -.020*** -.021***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
Notes: HE=higher education; wBm=white British males; nwBm=non-white-British males; wBf=white British females;
nwBf=non-white-British females; PCMI=population characteristics and market incomes; TBP=tax-benefit policies. Sig-
nificance levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses. Bootstrapped
standard errors after 1,000 replications.
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
Table 1.4:
Decomposing inequality changes (in % points) between 2007 and 2011
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1) Atkinson (2) CV
total change -.006** -.002** -.005*** -.011*** -.003
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.006)
PCMI effect .001 .001 .001 -.002 .015**
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.006)
iv) changes to wages .006*** .003*** .004*** .005*** .022***
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.003)
v) changes to returns to HE: wBm .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
vi) changes to returns to HE: nwBm .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
vii) changes to returns to HE: wBf -.000* -.000 -.000 -.000* -.000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
viii) changes to returns to HE: nwBf -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
ix) changes to education composition .002*** .001*** .001*** .002*** .005***
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.002)
x) residual -.006*** -.003*** -.005*** -.009*** -.011**
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.005)
TBP effect -.007*** -.003*** -.006*** -.010*** -.018***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.002)
Notes and Source: see Table 1.3
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1.1: Change in mean incomes between 2001 and 2007 and 2007 and 2011
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Notes: Confidence intervals are estimated using the delta method (Taylor approximations).
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
Figure 1.2: Decomposing the change in mean incomes between 2001 and 2007
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Notes: HE=higher education; wBm=white British males; nwBm=non-white-British males; wBf=white British females;
nwBf=non-white-British females. The light and dark grey lines are the same in all subfigures. The black lines add up to
the dark grey line. Confidence intervals are estimated using the delta method (Taylor approximations).
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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Figure 1.3: Decomposing the change in mean incomes (by income type) due to changes in
PCMI, between 2001 and 2007
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Notes: HE=higher education; wBm=white British males; nwBm=non-white-British males; wBf=white British females;
nwBf=non-white-British females. The bars add up to the black line in each subfigure. Confidence intervals are estimated
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Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
Figure 1.4: Decomposing the change in mean incomes between 2007 and 2011
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Notes and Source: see Figure 1.2.
38
Figure 1.5: Decomposing the change in mean incomes (by income type) due to changes in
PCMI between 2007 and 2011
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Figure 1.6: Decomposing the change in mean incomes between 2001 and 2007 and 2007
and 2011
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Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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1.8 Supplementary materials
1.8.1 Appendix A
In term iv) of equation 1.4, we estimate the impact on the income distribution of changes
to wages, but fixing the HE wage premia and amount of education at their t = 1 levels. To
construct the counterfactual in term iv), wages are hence predicted for the t = 1 sample
of workers by: a) applying the coefficients βˆ0, γˆ0, pi0 and ρˆ0 from the models estimated on
t = 0 data; b) applying the returns to higher education (HE) from the models estimated
on t = 1 data; and c) adjusting the predicted residuals by the ratio of the estimated
standard deviation of the residuals in t = 0 and t = 1:
ln yˆwBmi(h) = x
wBm
i(h1) βˆ0 + e
wBm
i(h1) λˆ1 + ˆi(h1) ∗
σ(ˆi(h0))
σ(ˆi(h1))
ln yˆnwBmi(h) = x
nwBm
i(h1) γˆ0 + e
nwBm
i(h1) δˆ1 + ηˆi(h1) ∗
σ(ηˆi(h0))
σ(ηˆi(h1))
ln yˆwBfi(h) = x
wBf
i(h1)pˆi0 + e
wBf
i(h1)νˆ1 + µˆi(h1) ∗
σ(µˆi(h0))
σ(µˆi(h1))
ln yˆnwBfi(h) = x
nwBf
i(h1) ρˆ0 + e
nwBf
i(h1) θˆ1 + υˆi(h1) ∗
σ(υˆi(h0))
σ(υˆi(h1))
(1.6)
In terms v) to viii) of equation 1.4, we use the same procedure as above but apply the
returns to HE from the models estimated on t = 0 data. The counterfactual wages are:
ln yˆwBmi(h) = x
wBm
i(h1) βˆ0 + e
wBm
i(h1) λˆ0 + ˆi(h1) ∗
σ(ˆi(h0))
σ(ˆi(h1))
ln yˆnwBmi(h) = x
nwBm
i(h1) γˆ0 + e
nwBm
i(h1) δˆ0 + ηˆi(h1) ∗
σ(ηˆi(h0))
σ(ηˆi(h1))
ln yˆwBfi(h) = x
wBf
i(h1)pˆi0 + e
wBf
i(h1)νˆ0 + µˆi(h1) ∗
σ(µˆi(h0))
σ(µˆi(h1))
ln yˆnwBfi(h) = x
nwBf
i(h1) ρˆ0 + e
nwBf
i(h1) θˆ0 + υˆi(h1) ∗
σ(υˆi(h0))
σ(υˆi(h1))
(1.7)
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1.8.2 Appendix B
Education
The FRS has only one education variable (on age completed full-time education, variable
‘tea’) that is consistent across the three years of data used in the paper.8 Therefore, this is
the variable we use in the paper. The variable has been used by other economists (Brewer
and Wren-Lewis, 2015).
Table 1.5 compares the FRS education distribution to the LFS education distribution.
The higher education (HE) variable of the paper consists of 2 categories (undergraduate
and postgraduate). We combine these two categories to make them comparable to the
published LFS statistics. Table 1.5 shows that the FRS and LFS are similar in levels
– the share of people with university degree is about the same in 2007 (28.7% in LFS
vs 27.9% in FRS) and in 2011 (33.2% in LFS vs 31.7% in FRS); in 2001 the share in
LFS is somewhat higher (25.9%) than in FRS (22.1%). As a result, the trends are quite
similar for the 2007-11 period (4.5 percentage points (pp) increase in LFS vs 3.8pp in
FRS) although less so for the 2001-07 period (2.8pp increase in LFS vs 5.8pp in FRS).
This comparison suggests that our results for the impact on the income distribution of
the HE expansion may be overestimated for the period 2001-07 since our HE variable
overstates the HE expansion. Nevertheless, we conclude that our FRS HE variable picks
up the main trends in education and is of reasonable quality.
Furthermore, there are two alternative education variables, which refer to the highest
qualification achieved and that are available but only for two of the three waves in the
analysis: variable ‘edattn’ in FRS 2007/08 and variable ‘hi2qual’ in FRS 2011/12. Edattn
asks about the person’s highest qualification, providing two choices – at degree level or
above; or another kind of qualification. Hi2qual also asks about the highest qualification
level providing 8 options, one of which is degree level or equivalent. Table 1.6 and Table
1.7 compare our education variable with these alternative variables where possible.9 In
contrast to the LFS validation, these both give lower estimates of the share with degree
8The variable on ‘type of school or college attended’ (variable ‘typeed’) also exists in all three waves
but it has about 90% non-response in each wave for the sample of those aged 15-64.
9The comparison is done for the sample of individuals aged 15-64 with non-missing values for both
my education and alternative FRS variables.
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compared to the variable we use in the paper: 34.7% with FRS (our education variable)
vs 28.6% with alternative FRS in 2007 (Table 1.6); and 38.4% with FRS vs 29.8% with
alternative FRS in 2011 (Table 1.7). So, we have a mixed picture with the LFS comparison
showing underestimation but the alternative FRS variables showing overestimation of the
HE education levels.
Table 1.5:
Share of individuals with university degree
shares % points change
2001 2007 2011 2001-07 2007-11
LFS 25.9 28.7 33.2 2.8 4.5
FRS 22.1 27.9 31.7 5.8 3.8
Notes: LFS statistics refer to individuals with ‘tertiary education (levels 5-8)’ which includes: short-cycle tertiary education
(level 5), bachelor’s or equivalent level (level 6), master’s or equivalent level (level 7) and doctoral or equivalent (level 8).
Own derived variable with FRS includes individuals with undergraduate and postgraduate education (i.e. completed full-
time education at the age of 19+). Sample is based on individuals aged 15-64.
Source: LFS statistics: Eurostat website, indicator edat lfse 03, based on the Labour Force Survey.
Table 1.6:
Share of individuals by education attainment in 2007
FRS alternative FRS
not university 65.3 71.4
university 34.7 28.6
Notes: FRS (our education variable): category ‘not university’ includes those with secondary education and college; category
‘university’ includes undergraduate and postgraduate. Alternative FRS (variable ‘edattn’): category ‘not university’ includes
those who answered ‘or another kind of qualification’; category ‘university’ includes those who answered ‘at degree level
or above’. Sample includes individuals aged 15 to 64 and with non-missing values for both variables. Source: Authors’
calculations using the Family Resources Survey for 2007/08 (2007).
Table 1.7:
Share of individuals by education attainment in 2011
FRS alternative FRS
secondary 36.4 41.0
college 25.2 29.2
university 38.4 29.8
Notes: FRS (our education variable): category ‘university’ includes undergraduate and postgraduate. Alternative FRS
(variable ‘hi2qual’): category ‘secondary’ includes O Level/GCSE equivalent (Grade A-C) or O Grade/CSE equivalent
(Grade 1) or Standard Grade level 1-3; GCSE grade D-G or CSE grade 2-5 or Standard Grade level 4-6; No formal qualifi-
cations; category ‘college’ includes Higher educational qualification below degree level; A-Levels or Highers; ONC/National
Level BTEC; Other qualifications (including foreign qualifications below degree level); category ‘university’ includes Degree
level qualification (or equivalent). Sample includes individuals aged 15 to 64 and with non-missing values for both variables.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey for 2011/12 (2011).
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Incomes
Incomes in the FRS are usually reported on a weekly basis but we convert them to monthly
amounts, by multiplication of (52/12). Earnings are based on the variable ‘ugrspay’
(gross weekly pay from a job). The variable includes information on usual gross earnings,
excluding income from odd jobs.
The measure of household net incomes used throughout the paper is:
+ earnings
+ self-employment income
+ investment income
+ private pensions
+ income from rent
+ private transfers paid to minus received from other households (e.g. maintenance
payments)
+ incomes of children aged below 16
+ working families tax credit and disabled person in tax credit (in 2001)
+ working tax credit and child tax credit (in 2007 and 2011)
+ income support
+ pension credit (in 2007 and 2011)
+ housing benefit
+ council tax benefit
+ jobseeker’s allowance (contributory and income-based)
+ student payments
+ student loans
+ attendance allowance
+ disability living allowance
+ disability living (mobility) allowance
+ incapacity benefit
+ contributory ESA
+ industrial injuries pension
+ invalid care allowance
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+ severe disablement allowance
+ statutory sick pay
+ training allowance
+ statutory maternity pay
+ maternity allowance
+ winter fuel allowance
+ child benefit
+ retirement pension
+ occupational pension
+ war pension
+ widow pension
+ any other national insurance or state benefit
- personal income tax (including child tax credit in 2001)
- council tax
- employee and self-employed national insurance contributions
In-kind benefits (and indirect taxes) are disregarded as there is not enough information
in the FRS which would allow to simulate these policies with EUROMOD. The same
reason applies to certain tax deductions such as for mileage/motoring, union fees, loan
repayments or charities which are not taken into account in EUROMOD simulations.
Sample adjustments
We adjust the data by dropping Northern Ireland and dropping the bottom 4% and top
1% of the net income distribution from the 2007/08 and 2011/12 waves. Table 1.8 shows
sample sizes before and after the sample restrictions we impose on the FRS data:
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Table 1.8:
Family Resources Survey
data wave original adjusted
2001/02
n households 25,320 23,805
n individuals 59,499 56,496
2007/08
n households 24,977 21,768
n individuals 56,926 49,875
2011/12
n households 20,759 17,757
n individuals 47,744 41,042
Notes: The adjusted sample is derived after dropping individuals from Northern Ireland (from the 2007/08 and 2011/12
waves) and trimming the bottom 4% and top 1% of the household net income distribution.
1.8.3 Appendix C
In this section, first we show that what we infer about changes in the income distribution
holds, regardless of whether we use simulated incomes (derived from EUROMOD simula-
tions and FRS data) or reported incomes (based on FRS data only). Second, we explain
in what ways our income estimates depart from the HBAI official statistics as well as the
estimates by Jenkins (2017), using HBAI data.
To ensure that the baseline distributions of simulated and reported incomes are very
close to each other, we compare various income statistics derived from reported vs sim-
ulated incomes. To make the comparisons meaningful, first we impose the same sample
restrictions on the distributions of simulated and reported incomes, i.e. we drop house-
holds from Northern Ireland and trim the bottom 4% and top 1% of the respective income
distributions. Second, we compare like with like: as we focus on cash-only incomes in
our analysis, we constructed a variable for cash household net incomes using the FRS.
Despite our best efforts, the definition of household net income is not completely identical
using the simulated vs reported incomes since reported net incomes are net of certain
deductions and tax on dividends and include tax rebates which could not be separated
out from reported incomes and are not part of the simulated incomes.10 We expect that
these differences in the income definition will not cause large discrepancies between the
two income distributions.
10The reason why these components are not simulated with EUROMOD is the lack of information in
the FRS which allows the identification of i) individuals who are liable/entitled to such policies and ii)
the amount which individuals are liable/entitled to.
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In addition, there are other reasons which may lead to larger discrepancies between
the distributions based on simulated and reported incomes. First, for any given year the
policy rules simulated by EUROMOD are as of June, 30. The FRS data, on the other
hand, collects from households information on benefits and taxes throughout the financial
year.11 Second, the FRS reported benefit incomes may be misreported for reasons such
as stigma or recollection error. Third, there may be measurement error in the simulated
incomes for the following reasons: the analyst may have made an error coding the policy
rules; the information used in the calculations of benefits and taxes may suffer from
measurement error (e.g. in earnings which enter benefit income-tests and are levied with
taxes) or may not be available in the underlying FRS data (e.g. fuel expenditures used
to calculate some tax deductions); tax evasion as well as tax avoidance are not taken
into account in the personal tax simulations; benefit non-take-up may not be accurately
modelled.12
Table 1.9 shows various income statistics derived from simulated incomes (EURO-
MOD with FRS) and reported incomes (FRS). As we analyse changes in the income
distribution rather than levels, our primary interest lies with the last two columns of
Table 1.9 which derive the difference in the estimates based on reported vs simulated
incomes for the changes in the two periods (2001-07 and 2007-11) – we will refer to these
as the difference-in-change estimates. We calculated bootstrapped standard errors for the
difference-in-change estimates based on 1,000 replications. A bootstrap sample for each
year is constructed by sampling households with replacement and by drawing samples of
the same size as the raw unweighted data.
The key message from Table 1.9 is that the results for the changes in the income statis-
tics based on both simulated and reported incomes are of very similar magnitude, with
11In contrast to benefits which are collected in much details in the FRS, there is no direct measure of
personal incomes taxes or national insurance contributions in the FRS. The user can infer about their
size by comparing gross with net income figures.
12Benefit calculations by EUROMOD are adjusted for non-take-up to reflect that some benefits
may not be claimed by all entitled individuals/families/households. Different take-up proportions are
applied by benefit and in some cases also by region or household type. Take-up rates are based
on the mid-point estimates on a caseload basis published in the reports by the Department for
Work and Pensions (DWP) and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). DWP reports are
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/income-related-benefits-estimates-of-take-up–
2. HMRC reports are available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/personal-tax-credits-
and-child-benefit-finalised-award-statistics-take-up-rates. Take-up probabilities are randomly calculated
at the household level and applied on the samples of eligible units.
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some exceptions where the difference-in-change estimates are statistically significantly
different from 0. Thus, what we infer about changes in the income distribution holds,
regardless of whether we use simulated or reported incomes. In more detail, in the period
2001-07 the income growth at the bottom quintile/decile derived from simulated incomes
is overstated compared to the estimate based on reported incomes and so does the drop
in the 90/10 and 50/10 quintile ratios. However, if we look at the difference-in-change
estimates for the Gini coefficient, population mean and the rest of quintile/decile medi-
ans, the estimates for the changes derived from simulated incomes are not statistically
significantly different from those derived from reported incomes. For the period 2007-11,
the income growth at the top of the distribution based on simulated incomes is somewhat
overstated compared to the income change based on reported incomes. As a result, the
difference-in-change in the 90/50 quintile ratio is statistically significant and so does the
difference-in-change in the Gini (but only at the 10% significance level).
In the rest of the section, we comment on why our results based on simulated incomes
depart from the official HBAI statistics as well as from the estimates by Jenkins (2017)
using HBAI data. In comparison to us, Jenkins (2017) combines inequality estimates from
HBAI survey and tax returns data to capture better inequality at top incomes. He notes
that HBAI estimates, derived entirely from the FRS data, do not capture changes at the
top of the income distribution which dominated the inequality trends in the 2000s (see
also Jenkins, 2016, Burkhauser et al., 2016 and Belfield et al., 2014). In contrast to us,
Jenkins finds an increase in the Gini between the mid-1990s and 2007 with most of the
change occurring between 2004 and 2007 and driven by increased top income shares (see
also Atkinson et al., 2011). Between 2007 and 2010, he finds a larger drop in inequality
than us that is attributed to the introduction of the 50% marginal tax rate (see HM
Revenue & Customs (2012) for analysis of the income ‘forestalling’ effects induced by the
tax reform).
Our results depart from the official HBAI statistics and the estimates by Jenkins
(2017) for the following reasons: First, we focus only on cash incomes. In comparison, the
definition of household net incomes in HBAI includes the cash value of in-kind benefits
(free school milk and meals and free TV license for those aged 75 and over) and certain
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Table 1.9:
Comparing income statistics based on simulated vs reported incomes
2001 2007 2011
% Δ in
2001-07 
% Δ in
2001-07 2001/02 2007/08 2011/12
% Δ in
2001-07 
% Δ in
2001-07 
quintile medians in £
Quintile 1 174 220 256 26.20 16.06 162 200 233 23.28 16.31 -2.92 *** 0.25
(0.97) (1.20)
Quintile 2 242 299 335 23.22 12.12 236 290 322 22.99 11.23 -0.23 -0.89
(0.65) (0.66)
Quintile 3 (population median) 326 397 435 22.04 9.35 321 394 431 22.51 9.47 0.47 0.12
(0.53) (0.56)
Quintile 4 431 528 576 22.52 9.17 433 535 580 23.61 8.36 1.09 ** -0.81
(0.72) (0.50)
Quintile 5 653 797 865 21.96 8.55 670 825 882 23.05 6.96 1.09 -1.59 **
(0.96) (0.80)
Ratio of top to bottom quintile 
medians (90/10 ratio) 3.74 3.62 3.38 -3.36 -6.46 4.13 4.12 3.79 -0.19 -8.04 3.17 *** -1.57
(0.96) (1.09)
Ratio of top to median quintile 
medians (90/50 ratio) 2.01 2.00 1.99 -0.07 -0.72 2.09 2.09 2.05 0.44 -2.29 0.51 -1.57 **
(0.71) (0.78)
Ratio of median to bottom quintile 
medians (50/10 ratio) 1.87 1.80 1.70 -3.29 -5.78 1.98 1.97 1.85 -0.62 -5.88 2.67 *** -0.10
(0.86) (0.98)
Gini coefficient 0.277 0.274 0.268 -0.93 -2.32 0.295 0.294 0.283 -0.28 -3.73 0.65 -1.41 *
(0.44) (0.84)
decile medians in £
Decile 1 156 191 224 22.64 17.37 138 165 197 19.20 19.58 -3.44 ** 2.21
(1.55) (1.90)
Decile 2 186 234 270 25.77 15.42 174 216 249 23.95 15.46 -1.82 ** 0.04
(0.85) (0.94)
Decile 3 223 277 312 23.89 12.99 215 266 297 23.37 11.91 -0.52 -1.07
(0.80) (0.78)
Decile 4 261 322 358 23.41 11.29 256 314 348 22.78 10.68 -0.62 -0.61
(0.63) (0.61)
Decile 5 303 370 406 22.26 9.72 299 366 402 22.25 9.90 -0.01 0.18
(0.52) (0.57)
Decile 6 349 427 465 22.29 8.96 345 425 463 22.96 9.06 0.67 0.10
(0.54) (0.58)
Decile 7 400 491 536 22.51 9.27 401 493 540 22.97 9.53 0.46 0.26
(0.51) (0.55)
Decile 8 468 573 628 22.37 9.60 473 585 634 23.82 8.36 1.44 *** -1.24 **
(0.49) (0.57)
Decile 9 577 701 764 21.48 9.04 590 724 782 22.54 8.09 1.06 * -0.95
(0.56) (0.67)
Decile 10 803 978 1066 21.89 8.96 831 1018 1081 22.53 6.19 0.64 -2.77 **
(0.94) (1.23)
Population mean in £ 383 469 518 22.58 10.41 383 470 514 22.71 9.21 0.13 -1.21 **
(0.32) (0.60)
simulated incomes (EUROMOD with FRS) reported incomes (FRS)
difference in estimates based on 
reported vs simulated incomes for the:
Δ in 2001-07 Δ in 2001-07 
Notes: Income amounts are weekly and equivalised using modified OECD equivalence scale (couple with no children as the
reference). Significance levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses.
Bootstrapped standard errors after 1,002 replications.
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
tax deductions (for mileage/motoring, union fees, loan repayments or charities) not sim-
ulated with EUROMOD. On the whole, we expect that these differences in the income
concept will not matter much for the results. The next two reasons for departure are
more important: the HBAI official statistics as well as estimates by Jenkins (2017) are
based on the entire household sample of the FRS. To mitigate the risk of measurement
error at the tails, we trim our sample by dropping the bottom 4% and top 1% of the
income distribution. We also focus on households from Great Britain only and exclude
those from Northern Ireland. Furthermore, HBAI incomes include imputations at the
bottom (e.g. negative incomes are recoded to zero) and, more importantly, adjustments
for individuals with very high incomes using the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI). On
the other hand, Jenkins (2017) combines inequality estimates from the HBAI survey and
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SPI data to capture better inequality at top incomes. In contrast, we provide evidence on
the income changes experienced by the middle 95% of the distribution but are oblivious
to what happened at the tails.
1.8.4 Appendix D
This appendix presents the model specification for wages and the OLS regression results.
In the wage models, education level (secondary, college, undergraduate, postgraduate) is
interacted with age group (in 5 year bands). The vector of observable individual and
household characteristics includes x = {1, number of children in the household (1, 2,
3+), number of adults in the household (1, 2, 3+), being the head of the household,
household average level of education, household average age, being in a couple, age group
(in 5-year bands), skill level (low, middle, high), number of hours worked (in bands) and
region}. The estimation sample is restricted to employed workers aged 25 to 65 (males)/60
(females).
When analysing the periods 2001-07 and 2007-11, the regression model estimated on
the workers sample from t = 0 is in fact estimated for lnαyi(ht) where α equals the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and yi(ht) are worker’s earnings. The reason we adjust yi(h0)
by CPI is because we need to bring t = 0 wage levels to t = 1 prices to construct the
wage counterfactuals. Thus, when analysing the period 2001-07, the regression model
for 2001 is in fact estimated on lnαyi(h2001) with α value of 1.1137 while that for 2007
is estimated for ln yi(h2007). When analysing the period 2007-11, the regression model for
2007 is however estimated on lnαyi(h2007) with α equal to 1.1039 and the model for 2011
is estimated on ln yi(h2011).
Table 1.10 and Table 1.11 present the OLS regression results for 2001 and 2007 for
males and females, respectively. Table 1.12 and Table 1.13 show the OLS regression
results for 2007 and 2011 male and female workers, respectively.
Table 1.10:
OLS log-earnings estimation results for males in 2001 and 2007
2001 WB 2007 WB 2001 NWB 2007 NWB
Constant 7.239*** 7.300*** 6.843*** 6.982***
(.054) (.068) (.187) (.158)
no children ref ref ref ref
1 child -.021 .003 -.022 .072
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(.018) (.021) (.057) (.051)
2 children .015 .028 .053 .066
(.022) (.025) (.078) (.061)
3+ children .010 .030 -.102 -.009
(.029) (.040) (.083) (.082)
1 adult ref ref ref ref
2 adults -.017 .027 .119 .125*
(.028) (.029) (.092) (.066)
3+ adults .033 .095*** .123 .136**
(.025) (.028) (.101) (.065)
head of the hh .370*** .398*** .413*** .234***
(.016) (.020) (.060) (.045)
mean hh education: secondary ref ref ref ref
mean hh education:college .095*** .085*** .069 .124**
(.013) (.017) (.062) (.058)
mean hh education:undergrad .201*** .157*** .129 .226***
(.025) (.027) (.079) (.066)
mean hh education:postgrad .294*** .235*** .290*** .321***
(.037) (.037) (.086) (.080)
average age in the hh -.001 -.000 .003 .005*
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.003)
in a couple .095*** .082*** .082 -.007
(.023) (.026) (.092) (.054)
working hours 50+ ref ref ref ref
working hours 1-29 -1.168*** -1.198*** -1.245*** -1.224***
(.048) (.053) (.088) (.074)
working hours 30-39 -.149*** -.185*** -.206*** -.300***
(.014) (.021) (.055) (.048)
working hours 40-49 -.130*** -.141*** -.140** -.206***
(.013) (.020) (.059) (.046)
age 40-44 ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 -.155*** -.115*** -.509* -.165*
(.025) (.030) (.293) (.092)
age 30-34 -.074*** -.116*** -.062 -.093
(.021) (.029) (.084) (.132)
age 35-39 -.054*** -.142*** -.087 -.092
(.018) (.027) (.094) (.092)
age 45-49 -.037* -.076*** .028 -.040
(.019) (.024) (.119) (.110)
age 50-54 -.048** -.095*** -.064 -.086
(.021) (.027) (.099) (.091)
age 55-59 -.097*** -.141*** -.242 .256*
(.026) (.035) (.217) (.131)
age 60-64 -.177*** -.190*** -.210* .145
(.031) (.037) (.116) (.169)
aged 40-45 with secondary education ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 × college -.014 -.118*** .508* .001
(.033) (.037) (.298) (.119)
age 30-34 × college -.045 -.088** -.013 -.017
(.029) (.042) (.106) (.139)
age 35-39 × college .085** .084** -.044 .069
(.041) (.037) (.122) (.102)
age 45-49 × college .022 .057 .002 .083
(.038) (.040) (.156) (.126)
age 50-54 × college .022 .090** -.265 .053
(.047) (.044) (.216) (.168)
age 55-59 × college -.010 .126** .404 -.208
(.082) (.058) (.260) (.206)
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age 60-64 × college -.075 .065 -.200 .184
(.096) (.075) (.211) (.242)
age 25-29 × undergraduate -.105** -.034 .473 .048
(.041) (.053) (.314) (.104)
age 30-34 × undergraduate -.013 -.027 .005 .100
(.038) (.048) (.113) (.145)
age 35-39 × undergraduate .037 .190*** .167 .021
(.047) (.054) (.141) (.126)
age 45-49 × undergraduate .074 .065 -.096 -.035
(.053) (.098) (.199) (.139)
age 50-54 × undergraduate .127* .173** -.267 -.059
(.065) (.069) (.196) (.171)
age 55-59 × undergraduate .033 .195** .308 .098
(.069) (.093) (.340) (.224)
age 60-64 × undergraduate -.053 -.054 .156 -.605*
(.260) (.200) (.150) (.362)
age 25-29 × postgraduate -.152*** -.247*** .365 -.034
(.048) (.047) (.314) (.104)
age 30-34 × postgraduate .010 .038 -.026 .004
(.058) (.048) (.111) (.146)
age 35-39 × postgraduate .128** .246*** .005 .051
(.052) (.054) (.136) (.120)
age 45-49 × postgraduate .147** .202*** -.083 .069
(.066) (.063) (.148) (.160)
age 50-54 × postgraduate .081 .242** -.374 .177
(.059) (.109) (.244) (.175)
age 55-59 × postgraduate .091 .165** .119 -.335
(.081) (.081) (.241) (.252)
age 60-64 × postgraduate .010 .081 -.049 -.092
(.163) (.134) (.157) (.205)
low-skill ref ref ref
undefined .190 .479*** -.388
(.227) (.186) (.431)
mid-skilled .176*** .192*** .149** .119***
(.013) (.017) (.064) (.038)
high-skilled .526*** .518*** .679*** .637***
(.015) (.018) (.052) (.039)
London ref ref ref ref
North East -.297*** -.240*** -.176 -.233
(.030) (.038) (.140) (.203)
North West -.254*** -.284*** -.290*** -.193***
(.025) (.033) (.068) (.056)
Yorks and Humberside -.297*** -.305*** -.151 -.148**
(.025) (.034) (.097) (.062)
East Midlands -.250*** -.272*** -.103 -.232***
(.025) (.034) (.086) (.053)
West Midlands -.237*** -.268*** -.170*** -.140**
(.024) (.036) (.056) (.059)
Eastern -.119*** -.186*** -.091 -.104*
(.025) (.033) (.086) (.056)
South East -.063*** -.128*** .042 -.116**
(.024) (.032) (.054) (.048)
South West -.258*** -.253*** -.373*** -.161**
(.026) (.033) (.098) (.068)
Wales -.303*** -.310*** -.320*** -.170**
(.030) (.037) (.106) (.081)
Scotland -.248*** -.203*** -.645 -.096*
51
(.026) (.030) (.401) (.055)
R-squared .479 .428 .458 .549
N 9012 7572 963 1164
Notes: WB=white British and NWB=non-white-British. Significance levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses. Source: Author’s calculations using
the Family Resources Survey.
Table 1.11:
OLS log-earnings estimation results for females in 2001 and 2007
2001 WB 2007 WB 2001 NWB 2007 NWB
Constant 6.764*** 7.065*** 6.738*** 6.766***
(.097) (.062) (.213) (.191)
no children ref ref ref ref
1 child -.037 -.037* .016 .003
(.029) (.021) (.069) (.062)
2 children -.027 -.044* -.008 -.029
(.025) (.025) (.085) (.079)
3+ children -.069* -.028 .065 .156
(.038) (.047) (.107) (.110)
1 adult ref ref ref ref
2 adults .000 -.012 -.077 .014
(.022) (.022) (.077) (.060)
3+ adults .008 -.015 -.018 .018
(.024) (.024) (.080) (.069)
head of the hh .253*** .259*** .220*** .296***
(.018) (.016) (.046) (.043)
mean hh education: secondary ref ref ref ref
mean hh education:college .090*** .080*** .075 .049
(.020) (.019) (.069) (.065)
mean hh education:undergrad .188*** .159*** .142* .081
(.030) (.031) (.076) (.064)
mean hh education:postgrad .239*** .230*** .291*** .143*
(.041) (.037) (.094) (.081)
average age in the hh .004*** .001 .005 .003
(.001) (.001) (.004) (.004)
in a couple .161*** .179*** .104* .045
(.018) (.019) (.059) (.049)
working hours 40+ ref ref ref ref
working hours 1-15 -1.458*** -1.429*** -1.588*** -1.339***
(.027) (.034) (.111) (.098)
working hours 16-29 -.651*** -.683*** -.780*** -.599***
(.019) (.021) (.073) (.053)
working hours 30-39 -.088*** -.083*** -.038 -.077*
(.016) (.017) (.043) (.044)
age 40-44 ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 -.015 -.064* .100 -.093
(.032) (.035) (.100) (.108)
age 30-34 -.092 -.094*** .133 .054
(.073) (.034) (.123) (.156)
age 35-39 -.018 -.080*** .009 .136*
(.023) (.029) (.126) (.078)
age 45-49 -.065*** -.069*** -.049 .111
(.021) (.025) (.092) (.092)
age 50-54 -.146*** -.104*** -.138 -.064
(.023) (.027) (.127) (.097)
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age 55-59 -.187*** -.144*** -.115 .012
(.030) (.031) (.132) (.136)
aged 40-45 with secondary education ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 × college .010 -.081 -.344*** .121
(.036) (.051) (.130) (.129)
age 30-34 × college .103 -.009 -.053 .102
(.083) (.050) (.110) (.176)
age 35-39 × college .054* .037 .083 -.071
(.031) (.044) (.132) (.087)
age 45-49 × college -.007 .093*** -.166 -.062
(.034) (.035) (.141) (.105)
age 50-54 × college .026 .010 .059 .269*
(.050) (.048) (.139) (.138)
age 55-59 × college -.008 .057 -.040 -.099
(.052) (.047) (.129) (.143)
age 25-29 × undergraduate .012 -.086* -.067 .223*
(.043) (.050) (.089) (.122)
age 30-34 × undergraduate .100 .099** -.327** -.017
(.088) (.048) (.140) (.160)
age 35-39 × undergraduate -.012 .169** -.029 -.089
(.075) (.072) (.151) (.092)
age 45-49 × undergraduate .137*** .067 -.036 .025
(.051) (.063) (.138) (.173)
age 50-54 × undergraduate .109** .082 -.022 .158
(.053) (.056) (.142) (.129)
age 55-59 × undergraduate .207*** .141* .046 -.119
(.059) (.072) (.190) (.154)
age 25-29 × postgraduate -.098** -.126** -.307*** -.112
(.048) (.051) (.103) (.138)
age 30-34 × postgraduate .259*** .140*** -.030 .083
(.088) (.054) (.134) (.167)
age 35-39 × postgraduate .200*** .162*** -.086 .028
(.064) (.056) (.177) (.124)
age 45-49 × postgraduate .221*** .145** -.034 -.150
(.064) (.069) (.133) (.148)
age 50-54 × postgraduate .173*** .159* .157 .137
(.060) (.083) (.151) (.170)
age 55-59 × postgraduate .108 .187** -.005 -.021
(.138) (.090) (.244) (.163)
low-skill ref ref ref
undefined .405** .415*** .332**
(.187) (.114) (.158)
mid-skilled .221*** .221*** .164*** .303***
(.020) (.017) (.050) (.043)
high-skilled .593*** .553*** .614*** .715***
(.015) (.016) (.052) (.045)
London ref ref ref ref
North East -.212*** -.224*** -.129 -.168*
(.074) (.034) (.116) (.087)
North West -.203*** -.263*** -.244*** -.270***
(.069) (.032) (.081) (.091)
Yorks and Humberside -.189*** -.261*** -.198** -.132
(.071) (.033) (.082) (.093)
East Midlands -.185*** -.241*** -.202** -.283***
(.071) (.033) (.084) (.063)
West Midlands -.219*** -.230*** -.136** -.223***
(.070) (.032) (.064) (.065)
Eastern -.122* -.204*** -.057 -.057
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(.069) (.033) (.072) (.062)
South East -.106 -.123*** -.041 -.152***
(.068) (.031) (.060) (.053)
South West -.220*** -.276*** -.078 -.271***
(.070) (.035) (.078) (.092)
Wales -.229*** -.347*** -.278** -.247***
(.070) (.039) (.128) (.075)
Scotland -.186*** -.217*** -.114 -.196***
(.068) (.029) (.157) (.050)
R-squared .527 .621 .621 .567
N 8583 7221 851 1023
Notes: WB=white British and NWB=non-white-British. Significance levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations using the Family Resources Survey.
Table 1.12:
OLS log-earnings estimation results for males in 2007 and 2011
2007 WB 2011 WB 2007 NWB 2011 NWB
Constant 7.399*** 7.389*** 7.081*** 7.043***
(.068) (.080) (.158) (.176)
no children ref ref ref ref
1 child .003 .001 .072 .074
(.021) (.026) (.051) (.051)
2 children .028 .060 .066 .129*
(.025) (.040) (.061) (.072)
3+ children .030 .044 -.009 -.081
(.040) (.045) (.082) (.094)
1 adult ref ref ref ref
2 adults .027 .090** .125* -.079
(.029) (.039) (.066) (.076)
3+ adults .095*** .105*** .136** -.076
(.028) (.036) (.065) (.070)
head of the hh .398*** .367*** .234*** .323***
(.020) (.030) (.045) (.042)
mean hh education: secondary ref ref ref ref
mean hh education:college .085*** .036* .124** .189***
(.017) (.021) (.058) (.070)
mean hh education:undergrad .157*** .149*** .226*** .328***
(.027) (.031) (.066) (.075)
mean hh education:postgrad .235*** .250*** .321*** .288***
(.037) (.042) (.080) (.081)
average age in the hh -.000 -.000 .005* .005
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.003)
in a couple .082*** .023 -.007 .070
(.026) (.031) (.054) (.053)
working hours 50+ ref ref ref ref
working hours 1-29 -1.198*** -1.136*** -1.224*** -1.262***
(.053) (.056) (.074) (.073)
working hours 30-39 -.185*** -.206*** -.300*** -.301***
(.021) (.025) (.048) (.064)
working hours 40-49 -.141*** -.167*** -.206*** -.260***
(.020) (.026) (.046) (.063)
age 40-44 ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 -.115*** -.212*** -.165* -.401**
(.030) (.045) (.092) (.165)
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age 30-34 -.116*** -.168*** -.093 .046
(.029) (.037) (.132) (.104)
age 35-39 -.142*** -.102*** -.092 -.170*
(.027) (.038) (.092) (.097)
age 45-49 -.076*** .001 -.040 -.048
(.024) (.030) (.110) (.099)
age 50-54 -.095*** -.033 -.086 .152
(.027) (.035) (.091) (.096)
age 55-59 -.141*** -.037 .256* -.081
(.035) (.039) (.131) (.131)
age 60-64 -.190*** -.128*** .145 -.129
(.037) (.041) (.169) (.148)
aged 40-45 with secondary education ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 × college -.118*** -.060 .001 .310*
(.037) (.056) (.119) (.187)
age 30-34 × college -.088** .036 -.017 -.296**
(.042) (.048) (.139) (.124)
age 35-39 × college .084** .031 .069 -.002
(.037) (.054) (.102) (.122)
age 45-49 × college .057 .020 .083 .074
(.040) (.048) (.126) (.135)
age 50-54 × college .090** .143** .053 -.297**
(.044) (.058) (.168) (.126)
age 55-59 × college .126** .123** -.208 -.244
(.058) (.060) (.206) (.159)
age 60-64 × college .065 -.088 .184 -.116
(.075) (.124) (.242) (.209)
age 25-29 × undergraduate -.034 -.019 .048 .214
(.053) (.056) (.104) (.172)
age 30-34 × undergraduate -.027 .087 .100 -.303***
(.048) (.059) (.145) (.116)
age 35-39 × undergraduate .190*** .049 .021 -.044
(.054) (.068) (.126) (.126)
age 45-49 × undergraduate .065 .142* -.035 .045
(.098) (.084) (.139) (.156)
age 50-54 × undergraduate .173** .090 -.059 -.204
(.069) (.074) (.171) (.185)
age 55-59 × undergraduate .195** -.000 .098 .030
(.093) (.108) (.224) (.181)
age 60-64 × undergraduate -.054 .024 -.605* -.204
(.200) (.113) (.362) (.206)
age 25-29 × postgraduate -.247*** -.133** -.034 .231
(.047) (.065) (.104) (.172)
age 30-34 × postgraduate .038 .080 .004 -.102
(.048) (.066) (.146) (.115)
age 35-39 × postgraduate .246*** .275** .051 .223*
(.054) (.131) (.120) (.124)
age 45-49 × postgraduate .202*** .071 .069 .064
(.063) (.086) (.160) (.153)
age 50-54 × postgraduate .242** .394*** .177 -.399*
(.109) (.086) (.175) (.222)
age 55-59 × postgraduate .165** .093 -.335 -.406**
(.081) (.074) (.252) (.182)
age 60-64 × postgraduate .081 .054 -.092 -.017
(.134) (.134) (.205) (.251)
low-skilled ref ref ref ref
undefined .479*** .099 -.388 .734***
(.186) (.093) (.431) (.072)
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mid-skilled .192*** .171*** .119*** .159***
(.017) (.020) (.038) (.040)
high-skilled .518*** .520*** .637*** .682***
(.018) (.022) (.039) (.042)
London ref ref ref ref
North East -.240*** -.320*** -.233 -.195**
(.038) (.051) (.203) (.087)
North West -.284*** -.245*** -.193*** -.160***
(.033) (.040) (.056) (.059)
Yorks and Humberside -.305*** -.259*** -.148** -.143*
(.034) (.042) (.062) (.080)
East Midlands -.272*** -.292*** -.232*** -.044
(.034) (.045) (.053) (.065)
West Midlands -.268*** -.265*** -.140** -.230***
(.036) (.041) (.059) (.063)
Eastern -.186*** -.123** -.104* -.161***
(.033) (.058) (.056) (.061)
South East -.128*** -.149*** -.116** .036
(.032) (.042) (.048) (.054)
South West -.253*** -.227*** -.161** -.081
(.033) (.042) (.068) (.086)
Wales -.310*** -.320*** -.170** -.157
(.037) (.047) (.081) (.103)
Scotland -.203*** -.187*** -.096* -.102
(.030) (.038) (.055) (.073)
R-squared .428 .426 .549 .580
N 7572 5915 1164 1106
Notes: WB=white British and NWB=non-white-British. Significance levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations using the Family Resources Survey.
Table 1.13:
OLS log-earnings estimation results for females in 2007 and 2011
2007 WB 2011 WB 2007 NWB 2011 NWB
Constant 7.164*** 6.990*** 6.864*** 6.786***
(.062) (.100) (.191) (.193)
no children ref ref ref ref
1 child -.037* -.083*** .003 -.013
(.021) (.026) (.062) (.057)
2 children -.044* -.023 -.029 -.062
(.025) (.039) (.079) (.090)
3+ children -.028 -.227*** .156 .008
(.047) (.053) (.110) (.119)
1 adult ref ref ref ref
2 adults -.012 .097*** .014 .132*
(.022) (.030) (.060) (.078)
3+ adults -.015 .116*** .018 .045
(.024) (.032) (.069) (.079)
head of the hh .259*** .334*** .296*** .285***
(.016) (.025) (.043) (.043)
mean hh education: secondary ref ref ref ref
mean hh education:college .080*** .022 .049 -.041
(.019) (.059) (.065) (.071)
mean hh education:undergrad .159*** .167*** .081 .108
(.031) (.056) (.064) (.080)
56
mean hh education:postgrad .230*** .330*** .143* .183*
(.037) (.085) (.081) (.095)
average age in the hh .001 .001 .003 .006*
(.001) (.002) (.004) (.003)
in a couple .179*** .167*** .045 .047
(.019) (.024) (.049) (.050)
working hours 40+ ref ref ref ref
working hours 1-15 -1.429*** -1.324*** -1.339*** -1.395***
(.034) (.041) (.098) (.123)
working hours 16-29 -.683*** -.629*** -.599*** -.700***
(.021) (.030) (.053) (.065)
working hours 30-39 -.083*** -.049** -.077* -.069
(.017) (.022) (.044) (.045)
age 40-44 ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 -.064* -.153*** -.093 -.113
(.035) (.053) (.108) (.207)
age 30-34 -.094*** -.138** .054 .048
(.034) (.062) (.156) (.134)
age 35-39 -.080*** -.092** .136* -.071
(.029) (.040) (.078) (.095)
age 45-49 -.069*** -.107*** .111 .136
(.025) (.035) (.092) (.116)
age 50-54 -.104*** -.091*** -.064 -.237*
(.027) (.034) (.097) (.125)
age 55-59 -.144*** -.205** .012 -.113
(.031) (.092) (.136) (.104)
aged 40-45 with secondary education ref ref ref ref
age 25-29 × college -.081 -.002 .121 -.041
(.051) (.068) (.129) (.249)
age 30-34 × college -.009 .054 .102 -.013
(.050) (.075) (.176) (.149)
age 35-39 × college .037 .064 -.071 .284*
(.044) (.058) (.087) (.148)
age 45-49 × college .093*** .060 -.062 -.106
(.035) (.050) (.105) (.127)
age 50-54 × college .010 .116** .269* .354**
(.048) (.054) (.138) (.148)
age 55-59 × college .057 .107 -.099 -.187
(.047) (.129) (.143) (.167)
age 25-29 × undergraduate -.086* -.046 .223* -.166
(.050) (.065) (.122) (.219)
age 30-34 × undergraduate .099** .115 -.017 -.054
(.048) (.076) (.160) (.170)
age 35-39 × undergraduate .169** .069 -.089 .043
(.072) (.068) (.092) (.128)
age 45-49 × undergraduate .067 .207*** .025 .048
(.063) (.066) (.173) (.157)
age 50-54 × undergraduate .082 .147** .158 .090
(.056) (.064) (.129) (.164)
age 55-59 × undergraduate .141* .271** -.119 .028
(.072) (.135) (.154) (.130)
age 25-29 × postgraduate -.126** -.175** -.112 -.078
(.051) (.084) (.138) (.218)
age 30-34 × postgraduate .140*** .013 .083 -.055
(.054) (.091) (.167) (.164)
age 35-39 × postgraduate .162*** .026 .028 .191
(.056) (.084) (.124) (.123)
age 45-49 × postgraduate .145** .266*** -.150 -.077
57
(.069) (.080) (.148) (.173)
age 50-54 × postgraduate .159* -.004 .137 .020
(.083) (.107) (.170) (.178)
age 55-59 × postgraduate .187** .135 -.021 -.052
(.090) (.151) (.163) (.179)
low-skilled ref ref ref
undefined .415*** .332** -.591
(.114) (.158) (.580)
mid-skilled .221*** .239*** .303*** .218***
(.017) (.027) (.043) (.051)
high-skilled .553*** .582*** .715*** .622***
(.016) (.025) (.045) (.046)
London ref ref ref ref
North East -.224*** -.219*** -.168* -.110
(.034) (.043) (.087) (.154)
North West -.263*** -.277*** -.270*** -.116
(.032) (.061) (.091) (.074)
Yorks and Humberside -.261*** -.210*** -.132 -.057
(.033) (.042) (.093) (.085)
East Midlands -.241*** -.216*** -.283*** -.210**
(.033) (.040) (.063) (.082)
West Midlands -.230*** -.200*** -.223*** -.287***
(.032) (.038) (.065) (.096)
Eastern -.204*** -.121** -.057 -.184**
(.033) (.053) (.062) (.073)
South East -.123*** -.153*** -.152*** -.068
(.031) (.038) (.053) (.049)
South West -.276*** -.247*** -.271*** -.233**
(.035) (.040) (.092) (.114)
Wales -.347*** -.225*** -.247*** -.202*
(.039) (.046) (.075) (.115)
Scotland -.217*** -.161*** -.196*** -.071
(.029) (.037) (.050) (.094)
R-squared .621 .447 .567 .563
N 7221 5810 1023 962
Notes: WB=white British and NWB=non-white-British. Significance levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations using the Family Resources Survey.
1.8.5 Appendix E
In this section, we explore the change in mean household equivalised net incomes across
subgroups in 2001-07 (Table 1.14) and 2007-11 (Table 1.15). Between 2001 and 2007, all
subgroups (apart from lone father households) saw their real incomes rising on average
but some benefited more than others (Table 1.14). The largest income gains were for
children (10%), pensioners including single households and pensioner couples (11-13%),
and lone mother households (13%).
For most subgroups the TBP effect was positive (with a small negative effect only for
couples without children) but the gains were always outweighed by the PCMI effect (with
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the exception of lone father households). The average income gain (column ‘all’) from
the PCMI effect was 8% (compared to 0.3% due to tax-benefit policy changes) and the
largest gains of more than 9% were enjoyed by children, couples with children, pensioners
and pensioner couples. The average for the population income gain due to wages was
2.4% with the biggest income increases of more than 3% for couples without children.
On the other hand, compared to other groups which were favoured by TBP changes, this
subgroup lost slightly from the changes to tax-benefit policies. As a result, their relative
position in the income distribution worsened, or in other words, tax-benefit policies helped
narrowing the gap between them and the other relatively poorer subgroups.
The gains from education composition changes were somewhat bigger at 3.8% for
the total population and for most groups exceeding the gains from wages as the positive
education effects not only fed through wages but also other sources of gross market income
such as investment income and private pensions. For example, although pensioners did
not benefit from the real growth in wages, they benefited from HE expansion as the higher
number of more educated pensioners meant also higher pensions (despite the short time
span of 7 years we are looking at). In particular, looking at individuals aged 50 and
above (capturing early retirees as well), the share of those with post-secondary education
increased by 30% while the share of HE degree holders rose by 38% between 2001 and 2007.
HE expansion raised by more than 4% the incomes of couples with children and children
(since we look at equivalised household incomes), non-white-British and Londoners.
As the HE income gains – mostly through higher earnings – for working-age females
and non-white-British exceeded the gains for working-age males and white British respec-
tively, income inequality between sex and ethnic groups fell, all else being equal. Hence,
although education composition changes increased overall inequality, they pushed down
between-inequality among some subgroups.
In contrast to the boom period when almost all subgroups gained on average, the
crisis period 2007-11 is a mixed picture of gainers and losers (Table 1.15). Despite no
change in the population mean household income, there was quite a lot of heterogeneity
among subgroups. The biggest gainers with a real income increase of more than 4% were
pensioners, including single female households and pensioner couples, lone mother and
59
lone father households. For these subgroups, changes to TBP and PCMI both worked
to increase their incomes. On the other hand, for all losers (with the largest statistically
significant loss of 2.5% for couples without children) it was the PCMI effect which reduced
their incomes. Although the returns to individual and household characteristics with
respect to wages (apart from those to HE) fell throughout most of the income distribution,
they did not affect average incomes. Increase in HE attainment continued to benefit all
subgroups in the crisis years. The average income gain was slightly lower at 3% compared
to average 3.8% income gain in the growth period. Interestingly, the same subgroups as
in the earlier period continued to experience among the largest income gains, i.e. children
and couples with children, non-white-British and Londoners. Finally, in both periods
the wage returns to HE remained broadly constant with no effect on subgroup average
incomes.
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Chapter 2
Europe Through the Crisis:
Discretionary Policy Changes and
Automatic Stabilisers1
(co-authored with Alari Paulus)
Abstract
Tax-benefit policies affect changes in household incomes through two main channels: discre-
tionary policy changes and automatic stabilisers. Although a large body of literature has stud-
ied the impact of tax-benefit policy changes on incomes, little is known about the link between
automatic stabilisers and the income distribution. We contribute to the literature by studying
in detail the contribution of automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy changes to income
changes in the EU countries between 2007 and 2014. Our results show that, discretionary policy
changes and the automatic stabilisation response of policies more often worked to reduce rather
than increase inequality of net incomes, and so helped offset the inequality-increasing impact
1Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Mike Brewer, Paul Fisher, Kitty Stewart, Holly Suther-
land and Philippe Van Kerm for their useful comments and gratefully acknowledge all feedback received
from the participants of the EUROMOD 20th anniversary conference, the 6th World Congress of the
International Microsimulation Association, 3rd Workshop of EC Community of Practice on Fairness and
seminars in ISER, LISER, Bank of Estonia, VATT and JRC, Seville. We also thank Kostas Manios
for EUROMOD-related technical support. The results presented here are based on EUROMOD version
H0.13. EUROMOD is maintained, developed and managed by ISER at the University of Essex, in col-
laboration with national teams from the EU member states. The process of extending and updating
EUROMOD is financially supported by the European Union Programme for Employment and Social
Innovation ’Easi’ (2014-2020). We make use of microdata from the EU Statistics on Incomes and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC) made available by Eurostat (59/2013-EU-SILC-LFS); the EU-SILC for Greece
together with national variables provided by the national statistical office; the national EU-SILC PDB
data for Spain, Italy, Austria and Slovakia made available by respective national statistical offices; and
the Family Resources Survey for the UK made available by the Department of Work and Pensions via
the UK Data Service. The results and their interpretation are our own responsibility.
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of a growing disparity in gross (pre-tax) market incomes. Inequality reduction was achieved
mainly through benefits using both routes. On the other hand, policy changes to and the au-
tomatic stabilisation response of taxes and social insurance contributions raised inequality in
some countries and lowered it in others.
Keywords: automatic stabilisers, discretionary policy changes, income distribution, de-
composition
JEL codes: D31, H23, E63
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2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-08 and the subsequent Great Recession posed serious economic
challenges to Europe. Substantial increases to unemployment, losses to wages and self-
employment income, increase in governments debt and fall in GDP put strain on fiscal
budgets and households finances.2 In response to such economic challenges, tax-benefit
policies have important implications for household net incomes. They affect incomes
through two main channels: discretionary policy changes and automatic stabilisers.
Automatic stabilisers characterise the policies’ in-built flexibility to absorb shocks to
earnings and people’s characteristics (Pechman, 1973). They reduce, ceteris paribus, the
need for discretionary policy actions which take time to design and implement and can be
particularly important if the scope for discretionary fiscal policies is limited, e.g. in the
eurozone (Mabbett and Schelkle, 2007). They are viewed as a crucial tool for reducing
macroeconomic volatility (e.g. Blanchard et al. 2010). In particular, income taxes and
unemployment insurance benefits in the US, Canada and Europe have received a lot of
attention from the micro and macro literature as important stabilisers of fluctuations
of aggregate output as well as of disposable income and household consumption (e.g.
Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Browning and Crossley, 2001; Kniesner and Ziliak, 2002;
Auerbach, 2009; Dolls et al., 2012; Salgado et al., 2014; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2016;
McKay and Reis, 2016; Hsu et al., 2018).
There is less consensus on the size and direction of impact of discretionary fiscal
policies on economic stability (e.g. Taylor, 2000; Feldstein, 2002; Blanchard and Perotti,
2002; Fata´s and Mihov, 2003; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Caggiano et al., 2015;
Miyamoto et al., 2018). But a large body of micro literature has shown their impor-
tance for the income distribution, for example, Clark and Leicester (2005), Sefton and
Sutherland (2005), Sutherland et al. (2008) and Bargain (2012b) for the UK; Decoster
et al. (2015) for Belgium; Hills et al. (2019), Paulus et al. (forthcoming), Matsaganis
and Leventi (2014), De Agostini et al. (2016) and Bargain et al. (2017) for selected EU
2Between 2007 and 2014, GDP fell in 10 EU countries although it increased in the EU-28 on average
(+1.5%). Government debt as % of GDP increased in every EU member state and overall by a staggering
51%. The effect on households was equally severe: the share of unemployed (as a % of the population)
increased in all EU countries, except Germany, and overall by 44%. Real wages and salaries, the main
source of household income, fell by 4.4%, while income from self-employment dropped by nearly 10% on
average. See Eurostat database.
countries. A decomposition approach combined with a tax-benefit calculator and house-
hold micro-data has enabled researchers to identify the direct (non-behavioural) impact
of policy changes on the income distribution. The estimate for the policy effect has often
been compared with the contribution of ‘other’ factors, which encompass the combined
(net) effect of changes to market incomes and population characteristics, and automatic
stabilisers (e.g. Bargain and Callan, 2010; Bargain et al., 2015, 2017). For the early
crisis years (2007-11), the literature agrees that policy changes were broadly poverty-
and inequality-reducing in most/all countries but their redistributive effect became more
heterogeneous across countries between 2011 and 2014.
In contrast, there is little empirical evidence on the redistributive power of automatic
stabilisers. For several Southern EU countries and Ireland, Callan et al. (2018) find that
automatic stabilisers – mainly through benefits – reduced income inequality between 2007
and 2013. For Great Britain, Tasseva (2018) (Chapter 1 in this thesis) finds that pro-
rich income gains due to education changes were mitigated by automatic stabilisers. For
hypothetical earnings shocks, on the other hand, benefits and taxes are shown to stabilise
mostly the incomes of households at the bottom and top of the distribution, respectively
(European Commission, 2017); while Dolls et al. (2011) find that households located at
the bottom of the distribution are least protected by policies against shocks.
We aim to contribute to improved understanding of the link between automatic sta-
bilisers and the income distribution by providing an in-depth account of the relative
impact of automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy changes on household incomes
in the EU in recent years (2007-2014), covering the latest economic crisis and post-crisis
economic developments. We seek to decompose observed changes in the income distri-
bution into changes due to: i) discretionary tax-benefit policy changes, ii) the automatic
stabilisation response of tax-benefit policies, and iii) gross (pre-tax) market incomes and
population changes. Keeping fixed gross market incomes and population characteristics,
tax-benefit policy changes encompass changes to the design of the tax-benefit system and
the statutory uprating of/discretionary (ad-hoc) changes to monetary parameters, such
as benefit amounts and tax thresholds. Our definition of policy changes is consistent
with the decomposition literature (e.g. Bargain and Callan 2010 and Paulus et al. forth-
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coming). Automatic stabilisers capture the automatic changes to benefit entitlements
and tax liabilities in response to changes in the distribution of gross market incomes and
population characteristics, holding constant the tax-benefit rules.
In more detail, we construct counterfactual income distributions, which represent what
would have happened to household incomes in the absence of changes to a certain fac-
tor – either to tax-benefit policies or to market incomes and population characteristics.
Comparing the observed and counterfactual distributions allows us to quantify the con-
tribution of each factor to the change in incomes. Our decomposition approach builds
on and extends the method by Bargain and Callan (2010). We use the EU tax-benefit
model EUROMOD to calculate actual and counterfactual entitlements to cash benefits
and direct income taxes and social insurance contributions (SIC) for each household in
the micro-data. The micro-data contain information on population characteristics and
market incomes and come from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC) and, for the UK, from the Family Resources Survey (FRS).
Between 2007 and 2014, market incomes became more unequally distributed in more
than a third of countries. In the rest of countries, there was no statistically significant
change in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. Our results show that, dis-
cretionary policy changes in 21 countries lowered inequality, consistent with the existing
evidence. Our decomposition by tax-benefit policy adds to the evidence by showing that
the reduction was achieved mainly through increased generosity of benefit entitlements,
rather than through taxes/SIC. In some countries the impact of benefit changes was en-
hanced by inequality-reducing tax changes, while in others, benefit changes offset a rise
in inequality due to tax changes (e.g. due to the introduction of a flat tax in Bulgaria and
Hungary or the reduction in top marginal tax rates in Denmark). Among the countries im-
plementing progressive policy changes overall were not only those where the welfare state
expanded in size but also countries, which implemented fiscal consolidation measures in
the economic downturn.
Automatic stabilisers also contributed in nearly half of the countries to lower inequal-
ity. Although discretionary policies were more often inequality-reducing, the magnitude
of the two types of effect was broadly similar when it comes to narrowing the gap between
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the rich and the poor. A further decomposition of the automatic stabilisation effect shows
that the effect of benefit stabilisation was to reduce inequality in most countries, whereas
taxes/SIC had a mixed effect. The impact on net income of the stabilisation response
of taxes/SIC was negatively associated with changes to market incomes/population char-
acteristics across countries. However, there was effectively no country-level correlation
between the stabilisation response of benefits and market income/population changes.
This suggests that – unlike taxes/SIC – benefits are overall more responsive to changes in
the population structure (such as household composition changes) than changes in market
income.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 explains the decomposition
methodology and provides our refinements and extensions to it. Section 2.3 describes
the data and the tax-benefit model EUROMOD. Section 2.4 presents and discusses the
results and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
The central question of the paper is which factors contributed to household income changes
in the EU countries between 2007 and 2014. In particular, we aim to disentangle the con-
tribution of discretionary tax-benefit policy changes, automatic stabilisers and changes
to market incomes and population characteristics. Section 2.2.1 presents and refines the
decomposition approach formalised by Bargain and Callan (2010) – BC hereafter – which
allows us to identify the direct effect of policy changes (i) from all ‘other effects’. Sec-
tion 2.2.2 extends the BC approach by splitting the ‘other effects’ into automatic stabilisers
(ii) and changes to the distribution of market incomes and population characteristics (iii).
2.2.1 Decomposing discretionary policy changes vs other effects
We separate the direct effect of discretionary policy changes from all other factors by
means of counterfactual simulations. Intuitively, we can think of it in this way: we
start with the actual end-period income distribution (in 2014) and create intermediate
counterfactual scenarios in which we change one factor of interest at a time, until we arrive
at the actual start-period income distribution (in 2007). A comparison of the actual and
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counterfactual distributions unveils how much of the income change that is observed is due
to policy changes and how much due to other effects. We use the decomposition approach
by BC, which combines household micro-data with a tax-benefit calculator.3 We refine the
methodology by identifying a broader range of combinations and explicitly distinguishing
between scale-variant and scale-invariant measures of the income distribution.
Following BC, denote with I(·) a functional of the distribution of household income,
such as the Gini coefficient or mean income. Household net incomes in period t are ex-
pressed in the form of dt(pt, yt) of which: d is the structure of tax-benefit policies (e.g.
means-tested vs universal child benefit), p are the tax-benefit parameters (e.g. e 1,000
family income-test threshold), y is a matrix containing information on gross market in-
comes (e.g. earnings and investment income) and household/individual characteristics,
and d transforms p and y into household net income. The change in the composite indi-
cator I between two periods (t = 0, 1), calculated for the distribution of household net
incomes, is given by
∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I[d0(p0, y0)] (2.1)
Next, we add and subtract an (intermediate) counterfactual distribution to separate
the contribution of policy changes (d0, p0 → d1, p1) from changes in market incomes
and population characteristics (y0 → y1). For example, such a counterfactual can be
constructed using the tax-benefit structure and policy parameters from the start-period
in combination with gross market incomes and population characteristics from the end-
period, yielding the following identity:
∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I[d0(p0, y1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes (nominal)
+ I[d0(p0, y1)]− I[d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effects (nominal)
(2.2)
The difference between the actual distribution of the end-period (t = 1) and the coun-
terfactual gives the direct effect due to discretionary policy changes. It gives an answer
3There is a well-established strand in the economic literature which focuses on decomposing the
distribution of individual earnings, e.g. Juhn et al. (1993), DiNardo et al. (1996), Lemieux (2002), Fields
(2003), Yun (2006), see Fortin et al. (2011) for an overview. However, this strand overlooks the role of
taxation and ignores other income components. Bourguignon et al. (2008) take a step further by looking
at household level income which includes market incomes, private transfers and retirement income but
still excludes taxes and non-retirement benefits. The classical source decomposition of income inequality
by Shorrocks (1982) accounts for all income components; but does not allow isolating the effects due to
policy changes from effects due to market income changes, or decomposing incomes in nominal terms.
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to the question: given the distribution of market incomes and population characteristics
in t = 1, what would have been the impact on the income distribution if we were to re-
introduce the tax-benefit policies from t = 0. If the answer is that the outcome of interest,
e.g. income inequality, would have been higher (compared to the observed outcome in
t = 1), it means that all else being equal, discretionary policy changes reduced the level
of inequality. The difference between the counterfactual and the observed income distri-
bution in the start-period (t = 0) unveils the contribution of the other effect, i.e. changes
in market incomes and the characteristics of the population (e.g. employment) as well as
the reaction to these of the tax-benefit policies from t = 0. The other effects also contain
any changes to market incomes and population as a result of a behavioural response to
the tax-benefit policy changes.4
In equation 2.2, tax-benefit policy amounts such as tax income thresholds or benefit
amounts from the start-period (p0) are applied on market incomes from the end-period
(y1). To make nominal amounts from the two periods comparable, policy parameters
are in the next step adjusted by a factor α, which accounts for developments in nominal
levels (e.g. prices, wages) or some other relevant counterfactual benchmark. Price indices
appear most appropriate when the aim is to study how people’s real living standards have
changed, while changes in market incomes are more relevant for understanding shifts in
the fiscal balance. In our analysis, we base α on growth in prices (Consumer Price Index):
∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I[d0(αp0, y1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes (real)
+ I[d0(αp0, y1)]− I[d0(αp0, αy0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effect (real)
+ I[d0(αp0, αy0)]− I[d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal effect
(2.3)
As a result, in equation 2.3 there are two different counterfactuals that allow us to
estimate in real terms the effect due to discretionary policy changes and other effects, as
well as a pure scaling effect referred to as a nominal effect . For scale-invariant measures,
such as the Gini coefficient, the nominal effect is zero as long as the tax-benefit system is
4Throughout the decomposition we are faced with an endogeneity problem: policy decisions may have
been affected by the changes in the market and society and vice versa, the market and society may have
been affected by policy changes. We do not estimate separately any behavioural responses to changes in
the attributes, see Bargain (2012a) for estimating labour supply responses to the policy changes.
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linearly homogeneous5, which means that changing the nominal units of market incomes
and tax-benefit policy parameters simultaneously would not affect the relative position
of households in the income distribution.6 For scale-variant measures of income, such as
mean income, the nominal effect is non-zero as long as α is different from 1.7
The policy component captures both changes to the structure of the tax-benefit system
as well as the effect of statutory uprating of/discretionary changes to monetary parame-
ters, relative to α.8 Thus, if tax-benefit parameters were only changed in line with CPI in
practice, our analysis would consider the outcome neutral against our chosen benchmark
indexation factor and the measured impact would be zero. If actual tax-benefit parame-
ters were increased slower (faster) than prices, tax liabilities would go up (down) due to
bracket creep and benefit entitlements would fall (rise) due to benefit erosion. See Paulus
et al. (forthcoming) for more discussion on the choice of α and its implications for the
measured policy effect.
Going back to equation 2.3, the decomposition is path-dependent, meaning that the
order of decomposing the effects matters and there are alternative combinations. Building
on BC, we derive six strictly symmetrical combinations (permutations) for three compo-
nents, whereas they suggested four combinations because of their pairing of the other effect
with the nominal effect.9 Similar to BC, we distinguish between two types: Type I shows
the effect of discretionary policy changes conditional on end-period market incomes and
population characteristics (PI) and the other effect conditional on start-period tax-
5That is, homogeneous of degree one: d0(αp0, αy0) = αd0(p0, y0).
6BC argue that tax-benefit systems are approximately linearly homogeneous, showing it explicitly for
France and Ireland, and therefore omit the nominal effect as they focus on distributional measures rather
than income changes explicitly.
7The nominal effect is approximately (α − 1)I[d0(p0, y0)] or (α − 1) · 100% in relative terms. Notice
also that the other effect for decomposing changes in mean disposable income is approximately zero if
α = y¯1/y¯0, i.e. α is based on changes in average market income.
8To get a better understanding of government actions, Paulus et al. (forthcoming) extend the de-
composition framework by distinguishing between the effect of changing the structure of the tax-benefit
system (structural effect) from adjusting the tax and benefit monetary levels (indexation effect). Their
analysis for 7 EU countries between 2001 and 2011 shows that overall, the indexation effect worked to re-
duce poverty and inequality in that period, stressing the importance of indexation of tax-benefit amounts
in practice to avoid benefit erosion and fiscal drag. Structural reforms, on the other hand, worked in
both ways – to reduce but also increase poverty and inequality.
9In principle, one could also consider first deflating I1 (or inflating I0) and then decomposing the real
value of ∆I, as done e.g. in Herault and Azpitarte (2016), but this implies invoking the assumption of
linear homogeneity from the very beginning. For example, denote an inflation factor with i and consider
d1(p1, y1) − id0(p0, y0) = d1(p1, y1) − d0(ip0, iy0) = [d1(p1, y1) − d0(ip0, y1)] + [d0(ip0, y1) − d0(ip0, iy0)],
which is identical to eq. 2.3 but without the nominal effect (if i = α). However, linear homogeneity is
assumed already in the second step here, while it was not evoked (yet) in eq. 2.3.
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benefit policies (OI). Type II presents the effect of discretionary policy changes condi-
tional on start-period market incomes/population (PII) and the other effect conditional
on end-period policies (OII). Distinguishing between Type I and II has a clear practical
relevance. While full decomposition can only be carried out once household micro-data
become available for the whole period (which inevitably occurs with a time lag), Type II
assessments for policy effects only require start-period household data and can be carried
out before the policy changes have occurred, hence providing the basis for ex ante policy
evaluation.
As there is no obvious reason to prefer a particular combination over the others, BC
suggest following the Shorrocks-Shapley line of arguments. This essentially implies av-
eraging the marginal contribution of decomposition terms across all combinations. We
hence calculate the average effect due to discretionary policy changes, other and nominal
effects using all six combinations, distinguishing between scale-variant and scale-invariant
measures, defined as I[αdt(pt, yt)] = αI[dt(pt, yt)] and I[αdt(pt, yt)] = I[dt(pt, yt)], respec-
tively. In the following, the observed income distributions in t = 0, 1 (baselines) are
denoted with Bt = I[dt(pt, yt)] and the counterfactuals as Ct = I[d1−t(p1−t, α1−2tyt)]. As-
suming linear homogeneity of the tax-benefit function d(p, y), the average effect due to
discretionary policy changes (P ), other (O) and nominal (N) effects, combining Type I
and Type II decompositions for scale-variant measures are as follows:
P =
1
2
[PI + PII ] =
1
6
[(
1
α
+ 2
)
(B1 − αC1) + (2 + α)
(
1
α
C0 −B0
)]
(2.4)
O =
1
2
[OI +OII ] =
1
6
[
(2 + α)(C1 −B0) +
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(B1 − C0)
]
(2.5)
N =
α− 1
6
[
2
α
B1 + 2B0 + C1 +
1
α
C0
]
(2.6)
For scale-invariant measures , these expressions simplify further and the average effect due
to discretionary policy changes (P ) and the average other effect (O) (with the nominal
effect (N) being 0) are:
P =
1
2
[PI + PII ] =
1
2
[B1 − C1 + C0 −B0] (2.7)
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O =
1
2
[OI +OII ] =
1
2
[C1 −B0 +B1 − C0] (2.8)
For details on the derivation of the effects, see Appendix 2.7.1.
We also split the impact on the income distribution of discretionary policy changes by
benefits and taxes/SIC (estimating their joint distribution). Changes in mean income can
be expressed simply as a sum of (simultaneous) changes to benefit entitlements and to
tax/SIC liabilities, keeping gross market incomes fixed. For changes in income inequality
(Gini coefficient), we quantify changes in the redistributive impact of benefits and taxes,
keeping gross market incomes fixed. The redistributive impact of benefits is measured
by calculating the difference between the Gini coefficients based on gross market income
versus pre-tax income (gross market income + benefits). The redistributive impact of
taxes/SIC is measured by calculating the difference between the Gini coefficients based
on pre-tax income versus net income (pre-tax income – taxes/SIC).
2.2.2 Decomposing the other effects: market income/population
effect vs automatic stabilisers
In addition to the direct effect of policy changes, tax-benefit policies can affect the income
distribution through automatic stabilisers. They capture the extent to which changes
(shocks) in the distribution of gross market income and population characteristics (e.g.
changes to earnings, varying rate of returns to human and financial capital etc.) translate
into changes in the distribution of disposable income. We extend the BC decomposi-
tion method by decomposing the other effect and separating out the changes in market
incomes/population characteristics from the automatic stabilisation effect of policies.
To show the contribution of automatic stabilisers to the changes in the income dis-
tribution, first we need to distinguish between gross and net incomes. Similar to Figari
et al. (2015), we define dt(pt, yt) = yt + f(dt, pt, yt) where f denotes net transfers (i.e.
benefits less taxes). Using the term for the other effect from equation 2.3, we can rewrite
it as I[y1 +f(d0, αp0, y1)]−I[αy0 +f(d0, αp0, αy0)]. The automatic stabilisation effect can
then be derived as the difference between the other effect and the contribution of market
income/population changes.
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To distinguish between the contribution due to market income/population changes
and automatic stabilisers, the measure I needs to be additively decomposable by income
source (y and f). While this is a straightforward application to some indicators (e.g.
mean income), it is not for all functionals of the income distribution such as the Gini
coefficient.10 Using the expression for the other effect from equation 2.3, we can rewrite
it in general terms as (I[y1] + I[f(d0, αp0, y1)]) − (I[αy0] + I[f(d0, αp0, αy0)]) + , where
 is a residual term. The value of the residual is zero for decomposing income changes
but may be non-zero for decomposing other composite functions of income, which are not
additively decomposable by income source. Hence, our decomposition of changes to mean
incomes unveils the pure contribution of market income/population changes and auto-
matic stabilisers. When we decompose changes in income inequality our decomposition
shows the joint effect of the automatic stabilisers and the residual term.11
We denote as B∗t = I[yt] the observed (baseline) distribution of gross market incomes
and population characteristics in t = 0, 1 and as C∗t = I[α
1−2tyt] the counterfactual
distribution. For scale-variant measures, the market income and population effect (M),
averaged across all Type I and II combinations, equals:
M =
1
2
[MI +MII ] =
1
6
[
(2 + α)(C∗1 −B∗0) +
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(B∗1 − C∗0)
]
(2.9)
The difference between the other and market income/population effects gives the effect
of automatic stabilisers (A):
A =
1
2
[AI + AII ] =
=
1
6
[
(2 + α)(C1 −B0 − (C∗1 −B∗0)) +
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(B1 − C0 − (B∗1 − C∗0))
] (2.10)
In equation 2.10, the tax-benefit rules and parameters are fixed either at t0 (for AI) or
at t1 (for AII), while assessing the effect of changes in the distribution of gross market
incomes and population characteristics. In other words, the effect of automatic stabilisers
10Some methods for decomposing inequality measures link the contribution of a given income source to
overall income inequality with the inequality of the income source itself, its share in total income and/or
correlation with total income (Shorrocks, 1982; Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985; Silber, 1993).
11Callan et al. (2018) similarly separate the impact of automatic stabilisers on the Gini coefficient and
have a residual term as well.
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captures the automatic change in benefit entitlements and tax/SIC liability in response
to the change in market incomes and population characteristics.
For scale-invariant measures, the average market income/population effect is
M =
1
2
[MI +MII ] =
1
2
[C∗1 −B∗0 +B∗1 − C∗0 ] (2.11)
and the effect due to automatic stabilisers is
A =
1
2
[AI + AII ] =
1
2
[C1 −B0 − (C∗1 −B∗0) +B1 − C0 − (B∗1 − C∗0)] (2.12)
For details on the derivation of the effects, see Appendix 2.7.1.
Furthermore, we break down the change in mean incomes and in inequality due to
automatic stabilisers by benefits and taxes/SIC. For changes in mean income, we estimate
the automatic change to benefit entitlements and tax/SIC liabilities. As with discretionary
policy changes, we make use of different income concepts to quantify their contribution
to income inequality: gross market income, pre-tax income and net income.
Finally, standard errors are provided for the change in mean incomes based on Taylor
approximations and for the change in income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient
by bootstrapping the micro-data samples 1,000 times.
2.3 Data and the tax-benefit model EUROMOD
The household survey data come from the European Union Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and, for the UK, from the Family Resources Survey (FRS).
Both surveys are purpose-built income surveys. For most countries, we use SILC waves
for 2008 and 2015 (with income reference period 2007 and 2014) and for the UK FRS
waves for 2008/09 and 2014/15 incomes, i.e. the most recent waves available. Due to
data availability, income reference years are 2011 and 2014 for Croatia; 2007 and 2013
for Germany; 2008 and 2014 for Malta; and 2006 and 2014 for France. The data are
cross-sectional and contain rich information on household and individual incomes and
characteristics for a nationally representative sample of households. The data collection
77
and production of EU-SILC in the EU member states have been made as consistent as
possible to enable cross-country comparative analysis.
For baseline (counterfactual) simulations, we apply tax-benefit policies – structure
and parameters – from one period to the household data on gross market incomes and
population characteristics from the same (another) period. This is done by combining
the household data with the EU-wide tax-benefit model EUROMOD. Using tax-benefit
routines, EUROMOD contains information on the tax-benefit rules in a specific period
for a given country. The model then reads the household survey data and based on the
information in the data, it identifies who should pay an income tax/SIC or receive a benefit
(e.g. the family or individual), and how much needs to be paid in taxes/contributions
and received in benefit entitlements. The model then combines the information on gross
market incomes from the household data with the calculated tax liabilities and cash benefit
entitlements to derive household net incomes. Similar to the household data, EUROMOD
simulations have been made as consistent as possible across all countries for the purpose
of cross-country comparative research.
EUROMOD simulation results for each policy year included in the model are validated
extensively against administrative data on benefit recipients/tax payers and benefit spend-
ing/tax revenues. Simulation routines (e.g. assumptions or limitations), data imputations
and validation of the results are documented in detail in Country Reports made available
online.12 In addition, summary reports containing validation and discussion of EURO-
MOD baseline distributional statistics are published on an annual basis.13 EUROMOD
has been used extensively to address various economic and social policy research ques-
tions, see Sutherland and Figari (2013) and Figari et al. (2015) for literature reviews. In
particular, the need for a comparative microsimulation model for decomposing changes in
the income distribution has made EUROMOD an invaluable tool in the related literature.
We deal with cash household net incomes which comprise the sum of gross market
incomes (earnings, self-employment income, investment income, income from rent and
private transfers), pensions, means-tested and non-means-tested benefits net of personal
income taxes and employee and self-employed SIC. Means-tested, universal and some con-
12https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports
13For the latest issues, see Tammik (2018) and EUROMOD (2018). The latter report relies on a
EUROMOD tool, which was developed as part of this paper.
78
tributory insurance-based benefits as well as direct income taxes and contributions are
calculated by EUROMOD while information on the rest of incomes is taken from the
household data. Although public pensions are not simulated (due to insufficient informa-
tion on contributory history in the data), the policy change is approximated through the
official indexation factor used by governments to adjust nominally pension amounts over
time. In absence of large compositional changes in the population (the period we consider
is relatively short), the indexation factor serves as a good proxy for the policy change. In
our analysis of distributional changes, the remaining changes in pension amounts such as
those due to changing pension age – not captured through indexation – is included in the
component of ‘market income/population effect’.
In cases where there is evidence for benefit non take-up or tax non-compliance, the
simulation results are adjusted to account for it. Adjustments are done for benefit non-
take-up in Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal,
Romania and the UK; and for tax non-compliance in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Romania
(see Appendix 2.7.2).
The analysis is based on household equivalised incomes. Incomes are equivalised based
on the assumptions that individuals share resources equally with other household members
and economies of scale occur within the household. Incomes are adjusted by the modified
OECD equivalence scale, assigning a value of 1 to the head, 0.5 for each other individual
aged >=14 and 0.3 for each individual aged <14.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Changes in mean incomes
The changes to net incomes between 2007 and 2014 are decomposed into the changes
due to discretionary policies, automatic stabilisers, changes to gross market incomes and
population characteristics as well as the nominal effect. Using the CPI-based benchmark
indexation factor, the latter component reflects how prices developed and allows other
components to be interpreted in real terms. In the first step, we present the combined
effect of automatic stabilisers and changes to gross market incomes and population char-
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acteristics as in Bargain and Callan (2010), labelled ‘other effect’. We then extend the
standard decomposition approach by distinguishing between the two sub-components.
While average net incomes increased in nominal terms in the majority of countries,
real incomes fell in half of countries and rose in the other half, with the change ranging
from -37.8% (Greece) to +33.2% (Bulgaria). Figure 2.1 ranks countries by the real change
in mean household net incomes (black circle); the nominal effect is not shown here as it
corresponds closely to the CPI reported in Table 2.1.14 Some of these changes are very
substantial and it is remarkable that the extremes occurred in neighbouring countries.
Among the countries experiencing a drop in real income were the ones hit badly by the
crisis in the late 2000s such as Southern European countries, Ireland and Latvia, while the
countries with the highest real income growth include some Eastern European countries
as well as Malta, France and Sweden.
Similarly, countries are roughly split by whether changes in market incomes and pop-
ulation characteristics (here also including automatic stabilisers) and discretionary policy
effects made a positive or negative contribution to household incomes on average. The
two effects went in the same direction in almost all countries, in other words, discretionary
policies largely reinforced market and population dynamics. The positive relationship be-
tween the two components at the country level suggests that in the cases where economic
conditions were favourable – i.e. incomes growing due to ‘other effects’ – governments’
tax-benefit policies boosted household disposable incomes as well. In contrast, coun-
tries experiencing economic contraction implemented fiscal consolidation measures, which
squeezed further household budgets. Of course, such a positive correlation is expected at
least in the long-term as governments ought to balance their budgets over the business
cycle. We return to this point below.
Our results for discretionary policy changes are consistent with those by De Agostini
et al. (2016). Focusing on policy changes only, they show further that Southern European
countries implemented fiscal consolidation measures in both the crisis period (2008-11)
as well as in the aftermath (2011-14), reinforcing the drop in mean incomes. On the
other hand, they show that the large rise in incomes due to discretionary policy changes
14The sum of all components together with the nominal effect corresponds to the total nominal change
in incomes.
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Figure 2.1: Decomposing the change in mean net income: discretionary policy changes vs other
effects
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: Countries are ranked by the total real change in equivalised household
net incomes. Income changes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
in Bulgaria, Sweden, Poland and Denmark was due to fiscal stimulus measures being
implemented in both periods.
Next, to unveil the effect of automatic stabilisers, we apply our extension to BC
method and decompose in Figure 2.2 the ‘other effect’ into the components due to changes
in market incomes and population characteristics (grey bars) and automatic stabilisation
response of policies (dark blue bars). Our decomposition clearly reveals that changes in av-
erage incomes in this period have been driven by market incomes and population changes.
In progressive tax-benefit systems, such as the ones in EU countries, a shock to gross
market incomes should be smoothed by fiscal policies. Confirming this, in all countries
automatic stabilisers worked in the opposite direction to the market income/population
effect. Thus, in countries where average gross market incomes fell, part of the negative
shock was offset by automatic increases in benefit entitlements and reductions in tax lia-
bilities and social insurance contributions (SIC); conversely, gains in gross market incomes
were lowered through automatic reductions to benefits and increases in taxes/SIC. This
can be seen more clearly in Figure 2.3, plotting automatic stabilisation effect and discre-
tionary policy changes against market income and population effect. More than half of
countries are situated in the left upper section of the left panel in Figure 2.3, highlighting
the importance of the tax-benefit system to cushion the adverse income shocks households
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endured in the crisis. We estimate a correlation of -0.95 between the effect of automatic
stabilisers and the market income/population effect across countries.
Figure 2.2: Decomposing the change in mean net income: discretionary policy changes vs
automatic stabilisers
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: Countries are ranked by the total real change in equivalised household
net incomes. Income changes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
The correlation between discretionary policy changes and changes in gross market
income and population characteristics is 0.59 (right panel of Figure 2.3). This reflects
governments’ resource constraints in broad terms (as already briefly discussed above).
However, the result only relates to cash benefits and taxes/SIC affecting household dis-
posable incomes directly. It is conceivable that governments may have counterbalanced
these effects through other means, in particular, through adjusting spending on social
protection in-kind and public services like health and education as well as changes to in-
direct taxation. To check that, we have plotted our measure of discretionary (cash) policy
changes against these four items (Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.7.3). We use Eurostat data
available on total government spending on social protection in-kind, health and education
and calculate changes in spending per capita between 2007 and 2014 in 2007 incomes (as
a percentage of per capita disposable income estimated with EUROMOD). The effects
of changes to indirect taxation are limited to changes in standard VAT rate, which we
approximate by assuming that all income is spent on goods and services subject to the
standard rate of VAT. We find that the correlation with all four items is positive (stronger
in the case of spending measures), suggesting that across countries changes in these policy
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measures complemented rather than offset the effects of discretionary cash policies.
Figure 2.3: Correlation of automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy changes against the
market income/population effect
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: The vertical axis shows the % change in mean net income due
to automatic stabilisers or discretionary policy changes. The horizontal axis shows the % change in mean net income due to the market
income/population effect. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and
2011-2014 for Croatia.
As such, the positive correlation between discretionary policy changes and the market
income/population effect (right panel of Figure 2.3) suggests that when the economy
grows, governments have more financial resources at their disposal, through larger tax
revenues, and so, they increase their spending overall. However, this result should not be
interpreted as evidence for pro-cyclical policy changes, i.e. that the net public spending
(benefit spending net of tax revenues) increases (decreases) faster than the economy grows
(contracts). To understand how the structural balance of governments’ finance varies with
the business cycle, we need to measure the effect of policy changes viz-a-viz growth in
the economy. We do this by estimating the policy effects relative to the growth in mean
gross market incomes (labelled as Market Income Index or MII). For policy actions to
be fiscally neutral towards household disposable incomes, the net contribution of benefits
and taxes to household disposable incomes on average should remain constant over time
(as a share of total income). A raising share of benefits would mean that policies have
become more generous, while a declining share would reflect fiscal tightening. Figure 2.4
plots discretionary policy changes (assessed with MII) against changes in gross market
incomes (assessed with CPI) – our proxy for economic growth excluding the effect of
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policy measures – revealing a weak negative correlation. This suggests that changes in
fiscal balances due to direct taxes and cash benefits were, if anything, counter-cyclical.
Figure 2.4: Correlation of discretionary policy changes (assessed against MII-benchmark)
against the market income/population effect (assessed against CPI-benchmark)
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: The vertical axis shows the % change in mean net income due to
discretionary policy changes. The horizontal axis shows the % change in mean net income due to the market income/population effect.
Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. Discretionary policy changes are assessed against MII (growth in average market incomes).
The market income/population effect is assessed against CPI. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for
Croatia.
2.4.2 Changes in mean incomes by policy instruments and in-
come deciles
The impact on incomes due to discretionary policy changes and automatic stabilisers is
further decomposed by benefits and taxes/SIC policies (Figure 2.5). It clearly shows that
automatic responses were mainly realised through taxes and SIC and, on average, benefits
played only a modest part. Furthermore, changes to net income due to taxes/SIC as auto-
matic stabilisers were negatively associated with changes to market incomes/population
characteristics (correlation of -0.96), while there was effectively no correlation between
the stabilisation response of benefits and market income/population changes (-0.14) (Fig-
ure 2.10 in Appendix 2.7.3). This suggests that overall changes in benefits are driven
by changes to population characteristics (such as household composition changes) rather
than to market incomes. On the other hand, the composition of discretionary policy ac-
tions was more balanced and most of the income gains were due to benefits (Figure 2.5).
Unlike with automatic stabilisers, the correlation between discretionary policy changes
and market income/population effect was stronger in the case of benefits compared to
taxes/SIC (cf. Figure 2.11 in Appendix 2.7.3). Detailed results on the decomposition of
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changes to mean incomes can be found in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.5: Decomposing the change in mean net income by type of policy
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: dpc=discretionary policy changes; as=automatic stabilisers. The total
change and market income/population effect are omitted. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014
for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
We also examine how similar are the impacts of fiscal policies and shocks to the econ-
omy on household incomes across the income distribution. We find that the patterns
of total change in incomes varied greatly and were neither continuously progressive nor
regressive in majority of cases (Figure 2.12 in Appendix 2.7.3). We repeat the decompo-
sition by income decile and by country. The effect of discretionary policy changes was
pro-poor in most countries, with Hungary and Denmark as the main exceptions (Fig-
ure 2.13 in Appendix 2.7.3). In these two countries, the richest decile groups benefited
relatively more than households in the rest of the distribution through the introduction of
a flat income tax (Hungary) and a reduction in tax rates (Denmark). Overall, changes to
taxes and SIC had a mixed effect on the income distribution. On the other hand, policy
changes to benefits tended to be pro-poor and resulted mainly in income gains across the
distribution. There were exceptions where benefit cuts and/or deterioration in the real
value of benefits led to income losses, mostly born by the poorer (in Croatia, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and the UK). With the exception of Greece, the indexation
of public pensions – generally higher than price inflation – was clearly pro-poor across
countries, leading to larger relative income gains at the bottom than at the top of the
distribution. In Greece, pension cuts led to larger income losses at the bottom and middle
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than the top of the distribution.
Benefits as automatic stabilisers responded to market income and population changes
primarily at the bottom part of the distribution (Figure 2.14 in Appendix 2.7.3). This
is not surprising as many benefits in EU countries are means-tested and are targeted
by design at lower-income households. Insurance-based unemployment benefits are also
designed to respond to losses in earnings and the latter could push individuals towards
the bottom of the distribution. As in many countries households at the bottom saw their
market incomes falling, benefits automatically cushioned part of the income loss mak-
ing their contribution to income changes mostly progressive. Although the impact on
the population-mean income of benefits was small in most countries, they contributed to
substantial income gains among poorer households (e.g. of more than 5% for the bot-
tom decile in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France,
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia). Nevertheless, across all decile groups
we estimate a weak correlation between changes in gross market incomes and the sta-
bilisation response of benefits.15 This result supports our hypothesis that benefits are
more responsive than taxes/SIC to changes in the population characteristics, which may
not be fully visible in changes to market incomes. For instance, universal benefits would
not provide any stabilisation towards income shocks per se but they could reduce income
fluctuations which result from changes to household characteristics. An example is the
entitlement to universal child benefits in the presence of a child in the household.
In the middle and top of the distribution, income taxes had the biggest stabilisation
response, which was regressive in some and progressive in other countries. Where market
incomes fell throughout most of the income distribution, the automatic stabilisation re-
sponse was regressive as households from the middle/top benefited more than the bottom
from the reductions in taxes (in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands,
Portugal and the UK). In other countries, increases in gross market incomes at the top of
the distribution were mitigated by increases in taxes, making their contribution progres-
sive (in Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, Malta and Sweden) (Figure 2.14 in
Appendix 2.7.3).
15Our estimates vary between 0 and -0.27 for all decile groups, apart from the fourth decile where the
correlation is estimated at -0.49.
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Across all decile groups, with the exception of the bottom one, market income and
population changes were strongly and negatively correlated with the stabilisation response
of income taxes.16 As the income tax schedule – whether progressive or flat – includes a
tax free allowance in all EU countries, households from the bottom decile group pay no or
very little taxes as a share of their income.17 Therefore, income taxes are less responsive
to changes in market incomes at the bottom than middle or top of the distribution.
Similarly, we find that SIC as automatic stabilisers are less strongly correlated with
changes in market incomes in the bottom decile (estimate of -0.43).18 Furthermore, we
estimate a weaker correlation (of -0.69) for the top decile group than for the preceding
eight deciles, which can be due to a higher share of unearned private income and the
presence of the upper limit on the contribution base in most countries. With the latter,
if earnings are above the maximum threshold, SIC are levied on the maximum instead of
actual earnings, making them non-responsive to changes in earnings in this income range.
In the rest of the income distribution, the automatic response of SIC to market income
changes was similar in relative terms as SIC are usually levied as a flat rate on earnings
(Figure 2.14 in Appendix 2.7.3). The distributional changes are further summarised in
the next section.
2.4.3 Changes in income inequality
After studying changes along the income distribution, we turn to income inequality mea-
sured by the Gini coefficient. Figure 2.6 ranks the EU-28 countries by the inequality
change between 2007 and 2014 and decomposes it into the same components as previ-
ously. Inequality changes ranged from -2.7 percentage points (Latvia) to +5.1 percentage
points (Cyprus), increasing roughly in about half of the countries and decreasing in the
rest, though the overall changes in inequality are relatively small and not statistically
significant in many cases.
16Our estimate is -0.33 for the first decile group, -0.72 for the second and varies between -0.78 and
-0.91 for the rest of the distribution.
17After the flat tax reform of 2008, only in Bulgaria individuals start paying income taxes from the
first unit of income they earn. However, there are several tax deductions (e.g. for families with children)
that act as a tax free allowance for certain household types. Furthermore, our decomposition results show
the stabilisation response averaged over the 2007 and 2014 policies and thus they reflect the combined
response of the progressive (2007) and flat (2014) tax schedule.
18For deciles 2-9, we estimate a correlation between -0.71 and -0.88.
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Figure 2.6: Decomposing the change in Gini
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: Countries are ranked by the total change in Gini. Changes to incomes
are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
However, the way different factors contributed to the total change in Gini was remark-
ably similar across countries. First, changes to the distribution of market incomes and
population characteristics raised income inequality in nearly all countries (and were statis-
tically significant in more than a third), with the change reaching 8.4 percentage points in
Cyprus. Second, our results show that what helped to offset (part of) these increases was
the tax-benefit system. Consistent with the previous literature on discretionary policy
changes (e.g. Paulus et al., forthcoming; De Agostini et al., 2016; Bargain et al., 2017), we
find that, albeit small in size, they lowered inequality in almost all countries. De Agostini
et al. (2016) show that in most EU countries inequality fell due to discretionary policy
changes in the crisis years (2008-11) as well as in its aftermath (2011-14). In addition, our
results show that countries where inequality fell (Figure 2.6) were not only those where
the welfare state expanded but also included those which implemented fiscal consolidation
(Figure 2.2).
Moving to the effect of automatic stabilisers, we can establish that they had a sta-
tistically significant impact in about half of the countries, lowering inequality in most of
them (Figure 2.6). We find a negative correlation between automatic stabilisers and the
gross market income/population effect (see the left graph of Figure 2.7). However, this
correlation is not as strong as with changes in mean incomes. This is expected as auto-
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matic stabilisers are foremost a tool for income stabilisation and not designed to directly
react to changes in the distribution of incomes but income changes at the individual level.
Hence, the sign of the relationship between automatic stabilisers and income inequality
is ambiguous. In a few countries, the direction of inequality change due to automatic
stabilisers was the same as for the change due to the market income/population effect
(Latvia, UK, Slovakia, France, Bulgaria and Romania).19
Figure 2.7: Correlation of automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy changes against the
market income/population effect
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: The vertical axis shows the % points change in Gini due to automatic
stabilisers or discretionary policy changes. The horizontal axis shows the % points change in Gini due to the market income/population effect.
Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
Next, we break down discretionary policy changes and automatic stabilisers by benefits
and taxes/SIC (Figure 2.8). We find that the inequality reduction due to policy changes
was achieved mainly with benefits. In comparison, Callan et al. (2018) analysing the
Southern EU countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and Ireland, find small or no
changes to Gini due to benefit changes, which is also consistent with our results for these
countries. In about a third of the EU countries, the inequality-reducing impact of benefit
changes was enhanced by tax/SIC changes. In the remaining third, it offset the rise in
inequality due to tax changes, e.g. due to the introduction of a flat tax in Bulgaria and
Hungary or reduction in top marginal tax rates in Denmark. Moreover, in the countries
19It is also possible that compared to household net incomes, the effect of automatic stabilisers on
inequality is measured less precisely due to the residual term discussed in Section 2.2.2. However, the
fact that our main conclusions for changes to mean incomes and inequality are similar, suggests that the
residuals have no critical role.
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where benefit changes raised income inequality this was (at least partly) the result of
erosion in the real value of benefits as their growth lagged behind growth in prices (e.g.
in Germany, Hungary, Ireland and the UK).
Figure 2.8: Decomposing the change in Gini by type of policy
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: dpc=discretionary policy changes; as=automatic stabilisers. The total
change and market income/population effect are omitted. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014
for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
In their role as automatic stabilisers, benefits also reduced inequality in more countries
than taxes/SIC did. They were the main stabilising source among the Southern EU coun-
tries and Ireland, consistent with the analysis by Callan et al. (2018) for these countries.
At times when market incomes of the poor fall, means-tested benefits, at least partly,
mitigate their losses. Increases in the unemployment rate, which are linked to an increase
in the share of low-income households, triggers a similar response from insurance-based
unemployment benefits. Such provision of pro-poor income stabilisation contributes to-
wards narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. However, it also means that when
market incomes of the poor grow, benefit withdrawals would lower these gains, increasing
the disparity between the bottom and the top of the distribution. How the response of
benefits to changes in population characteristics impacts the income distribution is con-
voluted and depends on the type of population changes and where they occur along the
distribution.
For income taxes, their distributional impact as automatic stabilisers generally de-
pends on the size and direction of the income shock across the distribution, the progres-
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sivity of the tax schedule and the concentration of people across the tax schedule. Finally,
the distributional impact of SIC as automatic stabilisers is more limited as in most coun-
tries a flat rate is applied on labour earnings.20 Detailed results on the decomposition of
changes to Gini can be found in Table 2.2.
2.5 Conclusions
Tax-benefit policies can affect the income distribution through two main channels: dis-
cretionary policy changes and automatic stabilisers. Although a large body of literature
analyses the impact of tax-benefit policy changes on household incomes, little is known
about the link between automatic stabilisers and the income distribution. We contribute
to the literature by studying in detail the contribution of automatic stabilisers and dis-
cretionary policy changes to income changes in the EU countries between 2007 and 2014.
We find that, first, discretionary policy changes raised incomes on average in about
two thirds of countries and lowered them in the remaining third. In comparison, on av-
erage automatic stabilisers – responding to changes to market incomes and population
characteristics – led to income gains in about a third, losses in another third of coun-
tries and no statistically significant changes in the remaining third. In terms of income
inequality, discretionary policy changes lowered it in more than two thirds of countries.
Progressive policy changes were implemented not only in countries where the welfare state
expanded in size but also in countries, which implemented fiscal consolidation measures
in the economic downturn. Automatic stabilisers had a statistically significant impact on
inequality in about half of countries, lowering inequality in most of them.
Second, discretionary policy changes to benefits – by increasing their level – and the
automatic stabilisation response of benefits – mostly to income losses at the bottom of
the distribution – were the main instruments raising the incomes of low-income house-
holds and narrowing the gap between rich and poor. Policy changes to and the automatic
stabilisation response of taxes/SIC had a mixed effect on the income distribution of EU
20We estimate a weak and positive correlation of +0.1 between the impact of SIC as automatic stabilis-
ers and the market income/population effect, on the Gini. In comparison, for the automatic stabilisation
effect of taxes and benefits on the Gini, our estimates yield a correlation of -0.48 and -0.53, respectively,
with the market income and population effect.
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countries. While we find that changes in net income due to the stabilisation response
of taxes/SIC were negatively associated with changes to market incomes and population
characteristics, the correlation between the stabilisation response of benefits and mar-
ket income/population changes was much weaker. This suggests that benefits are more
responsive than taxes/SIC to changes in the population structure such as household com-
position changes.
Third, in terms of prevalence, discretionary policy changes lowered inequality in more
countries than automatic stabilisers. But in terms of the size of the effects, we cannot
conclude that policy changes contributed to inequality reduction more than automatic
stabilisers, or vice versa. Thus, our findings show the importance of both discretionary
policy changes and automatic stabilisers to redistribute incomes.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Change (%) in prices (CPI) and market incomes (MII)
CPI MII
AT 15.983 16.696
BE 15.376 13.954
BG 23.700 53.029
CY 14.548 -11.593
CZ 16.461 17.292
DE 10.726 9.174
DK 13.409 14.887
EE 29.263 43.178
EL 12.660 -33.578
ES 13.388 .658
FI 18.429 13.597
FR 13.407 39.665
HR 5.480 9.132
HU 29.035 36.329
IE 3.693 -8.655
IT 14.430 -5.299
LT 27.553 29.080
LU 16.957 12.783
LV 26.169 10.599
MT 11.902 42.110
NL 12.757 6.024
PL 21.037 39.144
PT 10.079 -1.830
RO 38.332 47.440
SE 10.562 24.279
SI 16.684 12.109
SK 15.608 46.576
UK 17.119 7.431
Notes: The value of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is in fact equal to % change in prices based on the Harmonised Index
of Consumer Prices. The value of the Market Incomes Index (MII) equals the growth in average unequivalised gross market
incomes. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
Source: For HICP, Eurostat database (indicator prc hicp aind). For MII, authors’ calculations using EU-SILC and FRS
data.
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Table 2.2: Decomposing the (% points) change in the Gini coefficient
total mipe discretionary policy changes automatic stabilisers
change benefits taxes & SIC total benefits taxes & SIC total
AT -.117 .943 -.163*** -.156*** -.319*** -.533* -.208 -.742*
(.6) (.9) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.2) (.2) (.3)
BE -.739 .354 -.787*** -.080*** -.867*** -.177 -.050 -.227
(.5) (.7) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.2) (.2)
BG 1.535 3.744*** -4.004*** 1.523*** -2.481*** .073 .200 .273
(.9) (1.0) (.1) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.2)
CY 5.110*** 8.382*** -.368*** -.651*** -1.019*** -1.837*** -.416 -2.253***
(1.1) (1.3) (.1) (.0) (.1) (.2) (.3) (.3)
CZ .503 .231 -.426*** .536*** .110** -.055 .218 .163
(.5) (.7) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.2) (.1) (.2)
DE .826 .003 .077*** .182*** .259*** -.179 .743*** .564*
(.4) (.6) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.2) (.1) (.2)
DK 2.056** 2.586* -.811*** 1.449*** .638*** -.510 -.658** -1.168*
(.7) (1.0) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.4) (.2) (.5)
EE 2.899*** 4.323*** -1.164*** .145*** -1.019*** -.169 -.236** -.405**
(.7) (.7) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.1)
EL -1.035 -.208 .114* -.900*** -.785*** -.817*** .775*** -.042
(.7) (.8) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.2)
ES 4.337*** 6.597*** -.004 -.603*** -.606*** -1.342*** -.312** -1.654***
(.4) (.5) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.2)
FI -1.554** .036 -.258*** -.586*** -.844*** -.656*** -.090 -.746***
(.5) (.5) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.2) (.1) (.2)
FR 1.520** 2.480** -.347*** -.766*** -1.113*** .246 -.093 .153
(.6) (.8) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.2) (.2) (.3)
HR .016 .273 .235*** -.340*** -.105*** .092 -.243 -.151
(.6) (.8) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.3) (.2) (.3)
HU 4.090*** -.575 1.077*** 2.728*** 3.805*** .412* .448 .860*
(.5) (.7) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.2) (.3) (.4)
IE .760 6.526*** .324*** -1.634*** -1.310*** -4.028*** -.428 -4.456***
(.7) (1.1) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.6) (.3) (.7)
IT .660 2.523*** .022 -1.683*** -1.662*** -.224*** .023 -.202
(.4) (.4) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.0) (.1) (.1)
LT 3.167 4.408* -.550*** .605*** .055 -.682** -.614*** -1.296***
(1.7) (1.7) (.1) (.0) (.1) (.2) (.2) (.3)
LU -.363 1.101 -.415*** -.800*** -1.215*** -.247 -.003 -.250
(.8) (1.1) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.3) (.2) (.4)
LV -2.724** -1.325 -.472*** -.426*** -.898*** -.146 -.355* -.501*
(.9) (.9) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.2)
MT -.269 .807 -.338*** .253*** -.085 -.185 -.806*** -.991
(1.0) (1.2) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.4) (.2) (.5)
NL -1.559** -.151 -.441*** .166*** -.274*** -.819*** -.315 -1.134***
(.6) (.7) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.2) (.2) (.3)
PL -.235 -.197 -1.369*** 1.173*** -.197*** .166** -.007 .160
(.5) (.6) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.1)
PT -1.471 1.116 .117** -2.214*** -2.097*** -.675*** .185 -.490
(.8) (1.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.2) (.2) (.3)
RO 2.979 2.898 -1.813*** .692*** -1.121*** .939*** .262 1.201***
(2.7) (2.3) (.3) (.0) (.3) (.2) (.2) (.3)
SE 1.198** 1.269* -.269*** .305*** .035 .400** -.506** -.106
(.5) (.6) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.2) (.3)
SI .371 1.133* -.292*** -.179*** -.471*** -.444*** .153 -.291
(.3) (.5) (.0) (.0) (.0) (.1) (.2) (.2)
SK -.632 .622 -1.879*** .413*** -1.466*** -.029 .240 .212
(.5) (.7) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.2) (.2) (.2)
UK -1.840 -.956 .397*** -.631*** -.234*** -.922*** .272 -.650*
(1.3) (1.5) (.0) (.1) (.1) (.2) (.3) (.3)
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Notes: mipe=market income/population effect. Bootstrapped standard errors after 1,000 replications. Significance levels
indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014
for Croatia.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Type I and Type II decompositions
Type I
Under Type I decomposition, the effect due to discretionary policy changes is derived
based on gross market incomes from end-period (y1) while the other effect is based on
policies from start-period (d0, p0). In addition to equation 2.3 (decomposing discretionary
policy changes, other and nominal effects in that order) which falls under Type I , due to
symmetry the total change in I can be also decomposed in this order: discretionary policy
changes, nominal effect, other effect (equation 2.13) as well as nominal effect, discretionary
policy changes, other effect (equation 2.14):
∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I[d0(αp0, y1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes
+ I[d0(αp0, y1)]− I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal effect
+ I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I[d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effect
(2.13)
∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1,
1
α
y1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal effect
+ I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1,
1
α
y1
)]
− I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes
+ I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I[d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effect
(2.14)
Following on this, we can derive the effect due to discretionary policy changes, other and
nominal effects averaged over equations 2.3, 2.13 and 2.14. Thus, the average effect of
discretionary policy changes conditional on end-period gross market incomes is:
2
3
[
I[d1(p1, y1)]− I
[
αd0(p0,
1
α
y1)
]]
+
1
3
[
I
[
1
α
d1(p1, y1)
]
− I
[
d0(p0,
1
α
y1)
]]
(2.15)
103
The other effect conditional on start-period policies becomes:
1
3
[
I
[
αd0(p0,
1
α
y1)
]
− I[αd0(p0, y0)]
]
+
2
3
[
I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I[d0(p0, y0)]
]
(2.16)
Finally, the nominal effect is:
1
3
[I [αd0(p0, y0)]− I[d0(p0, y0)]] + 1
3
[
I
[
αd0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]]
+
1
3
[
I [d1(p1, y1)]− I
[
1
α
d1(p1, y1)
]] (2.17)
Type II
Under Type II decomposition, the effect of discretionary policy changes is conditional
on gross market incomes from start-period (y0) while the other effect is conditional on
policies from end-period (d1, p1). Under Type II decomposition (as with Type I) there
are three ways to decompose the total change: nominal effect, other effect, discretionary
policy changes (equation 2.18); other effect, nominal effect, discretionary policy changes
(equation 2.19); and other effect, discretionary policy changes, nominal effects (equation
2.20):21
∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1,
1
α
y1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal effect
+ I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1,
1
α
y1
)]
− I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1, y0
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effect
+ I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1, y0
)]
− I[d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes
(2.18)
21A special Policy Effects Tool was developed in the tax-benefit model EUROMOD that generates all
counterfactual permutations and allows the estimation of discretionary policy changes and other effects
on the income distribution. At the time of writing, a simplified version of the tool is publicly available
for research and policy uses.
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∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I [d1(p1, αy0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effect
+ I[d1(p1, αy0)]− I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1, y0
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal effect
+ I
[
d1
(
1
α
p1, y0
)]
− I[d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes
(2.19)
∆I = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I[d1(p1, αy0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effect
+ I[d1(p1, αy0)]− I[d1(αp0, αy0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes
+ I[d1(αp0, αy0)]− I[d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal effect
(2.20)
To derive the average effect of discretionary policy changes, other and nominal effects
for Type II decomposition, we take the arithmetic average over equations 2.18–2.20. As a
result, the average effect of discretionary policy changes conditional on start-period gross
market incomes becomes:
2
3
[
I
[
1
α
d1(p1, αy0)
]
− I [d0(p0, y0)]
]
+
1
3
[I [d1(p1, αy0)]− I [αd0(p0, y0)]] (2.21)
The average other effect conditional on end-period policies equals:
1
3
[
I
[
1
α
d1(p1, y1)
]
− I
[
1
α
d1(p1, αy0)
]]
+
2
3
[I [d1 (p1, y1)]− I[d1(p1, αy0)]] (2.22)
Finally, the average nominal effect is:
1
3
[
I [d1(p1, y1)]− I
[
1
α
d1(p1, y1)
]]
+
1
3
[
I [d1 (p1, αy0)]− I
[
1
α
d1 (p1, αy0)
]]
+
1
3
[I [αd0(p0, y0)]− I[d0(p0, y0)]]
(2.23)
Average effects for scale-variant and scale-invariant measures
In this subsection, we use the linear homogeneity property to derive the average effect of
discretionary policy changes, other and nominal effects as well as the effect of automatic
stabilisers and market income/population effects. We do this first for scale-variant and
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then for scale-invariant measures.
Scale-variant measures
The baselines (the observed) income distributions in t = 0, 1 are denoted with Bt =
I[dt(pt, yt)]; the counterfactuals are denoted with Ct = I[d1−t(p1−t, α1−2tyt)]. Beginning
with scale-variant measures, for Type I decomposition, we can simplify equation 2.15 to
present the average effect of discretionary policy changes conditional on end-period gross
market incomes as:
PI =
1
3
(
1
α
+ 2
)
I[d1(p1, y1)]− (2α + 1)I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
=
1
3
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(B1 − αC1)
(2.24)
Similarly, equation 2.16 can be simplified to show the average other effects conditional on
start-period policies as:
OI =
2 + α
3
(
I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I [d0 (p0, y0)]
)
=
2 + α
3
(C1 −B0) (2.25)
Simplifying equation 2.17 gives the average nominal effect:
NI =
(
α− 1
3
)(
B0 + C1 +
1
α
B1
)
(2.26)
Let us denote as B∗t = I[yt] the baseline (the observed) distribution of gross market
incomes and population characteristics in t = 0, 1 and as C∗t = I[α
1−2tyt] the counterfac-
tual distribution of gross incomes. We can then present the effect of automatic stabilisers
as the difference between the other effects and the market income/population effect. The
market income/population effect is:
MI =
2 + α
3
(
I
[
1
α
y1
]
− I [y0]
)
=
2 + α
3
(C∗1 −B∗0) (2.27)
Thus, the effect of automatic stabilisers equals:
AI =
2 + α
3
(
I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I [d0 (p0, y0)]−
(
I
[
1
α
y1
]
− I [y0]
))
=
=
2 + α
3
(C1 −B0 − (C∗1 −B∗0))
(2.28)
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For Type II decomposition, the average effect of discretionary policy changes conditional
on start-period gross market incomes becomes based on equation 2.21:
PII =
1
3
(
2
α
+ 1
)
I[d1(p1, αy0)]− (2α + 1)I [d0 (p0, y0)] = 2 + α
3
(
1
α
C0 −B0
)
(2.29)
Simplifying equation 2.22 shows the average other effect conditional on end-period policies
as:
OII =
1
3
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(I [d1 (p1, y1)]− I [d1 (p1, αy0)]) = 1
3
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(B1 − C0) (2.30)
By simplifying equation 2.23, the average nominal effect becomes:
NII =
(
α− 1
3
)(
1
α
B1 +
1
α
C0 +B0
)
(2.31)
Decomposing the other effects into the market income/population and automatic stabili-
sation effects yields the following identities:
MII =
2 + α
3
(
I
[
1
α
y1
]
− I [y0]
)
=
2 + α
3
(C∗1 −B∗0) (2.32)
AII =
1
3
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(I [d1 (p1, y1)]− I [d1 (p1, αy0)]− (I [y1]− I [αy0])) =
1
3
(
1
α
+ 2
)
(B1 − C0 − (B∗1 − C∗0))
(2.33)
Scale-invariant measures
For scale-invariant measures, the nominal effect is zero. The average effect of discretionary
policy changes, other effect, market income/population effect and effect of automatic
stabilisers – first for Type I and then Type II decomposition – can be presented as follows:
PI = I[d1(p1, y1)]− I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
= B1 − C1 (2.34)
OI = I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I [d0 (p0, y0)] = C1 −B0 (2.35)
MI = I
[
1
α
y1
]
− I [y0] = C∗1 −B∗0 (2.36)
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AI = I
[
d0
(
p0,
1
α
y1
)]
− I [d0 (p0, y0)]−
(
I
[
1
α
y1
]
− I [y0]
)
= C1 −B0 − (C∗1 −B∗0)
(2.37)
PII = I[d1(p1, αy0)]− I [d0 (p0, y0)] = C0 −B0 (2.38)
OII = I [d1 (p1, y1)]− I [d1 (p1, αy0)] = B1 − C0 (2.39)
MII = I [y1]− I [αy0] = B∗1 − C∗0 (2.40)
AII = I [d1 (p1, y1)]− I [d1 (p1, αy0)]− (I [y1]− I [αy0]) = B1 − C0 − (B∗1 − C∗0) (2.41)
2.7.2 Adjustments for benefit non-take-up and tax non-compliance
in EUROMOD
Benefit non-take-up
Benefit non-take-up can have important implications for the income distribution. Benefits
need to be claimed to reach the intended population and to mitigate income fluctuations
that households experience. Due to incomplete take-up, reforms to benefits cannot achieve
their intended impact on the income distribution either. Assuming full take-up, the
number of benefit recipients would be overstated and the effect of policy changes to
and the stabilisation response of benefits overestimated. To account for partial take-
up, adjustments have been made in EUROMOD to the simulation of some benefits, for
which there is (suggestive) evidence for incomplete take-up. Such adjustments are done in
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania
and the UK for the baseline simulations and maintained in our counterfactual simulations
as well.
More specifically, fixed take-up probabilities are applied randomly on the sample of
individuals/households simulated by EUROMOD to be eligible for means-tested benefits
in: Belgium (income support), France (solidarity labour income), Greece (unemployment
assistance, social dividend, food stamps and rent allowance), Ireland (family income sup-
plement), Portugal (social solidarity supplement for the elderly) and the UK (housing
benefit, council tax benefit, pension credit, income support, child and working tax cred-
its). Take-up probabilities for specific benefits are applied at the household level, so that
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individuals within a given household, who are eligible for the same benefit, have the same
take-up behaviour.
For Belgium, France, Greece and Portugal, take-up rates are estimated based on the
ratio between the number of benefit recipients reported by official statistics and the num-
ber of eligible cases according to EUROMOD simulations. In Ireland, the take-up rate is
based on external estimates. In the UK, non-take-up rates for number of recipients are
based on estimates published by the Department for Work and Pensions and HM Revenue
and Customs.
In Estonia, it is assumed that small entitlements to the social assistance (either in
absolute or relative to the household’s other income) are not claimed.
In Finland, it is assumed that, although they can, grown-up children do not apply
for income support separately from their parents. Also, households headed by the self-
employed are assumed to not take up their entitlements.
In Latvia (paternity benefit) and Poland (housing benefit), simulated benefit enti-
tlements are set to zero for those who do not report benefit receipt in the EU-SILC
micro-data. Furthermore, to overcome the lack of information in EU-SILC on assets,
needed to identify entitlement to the temporary social assistance, take-up is conditional
on an estimated expected probability to be entitled to the benefit.
Tax non-compliance
Tax non-compliance raises similar concerns as benefit non-take-up: if individuals fail to
pay their tax liabilities, the distributional impact of taxes and tax reforms is affected. Also,
non-compliance means that taxes cannot cushion shocks to earned income. Assuming
full tax compliance, the number of tax payers and the stabilisation response of taxes
would be overstated. To account for this, adjustments have been made to the income tax
simulations in several countries in EUROMOD, where tax non-compliance may be most
prevalent. Such adjustments are done in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Romania for the
baseline simulations and maintained in our counterfactual simulations as well.
In Bulgaria, the adjustment is done based on a comparison between gross and net
reported earnings. If identical, the assumption is that the person does not pay income tax
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and social insurance contributions. In Greece, adjustments are made based on external
estimates for the extent of average underreporting of earnings and some types of self-
employment income to the tax authorities. In Italy and Romania, adjustments are made
to the extent people underreport self-employment income to the tax authorities.
For more details on the benefit non-take-up and tax non-compliance adjustments in
EUROMOD, see the respective EUROMOD Country Reports available at https://www.
euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports/f3-g4.
2.7.3 Decomposing income changes
Figure 2.9: Correlation of discretionary cash policy changes against changes to expenditure on
in-kind benefits and VAT
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FRHRHU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV MTNL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
corr=.55-10
0
10
20
-10 -5 0 5 10
change in in-kind social protection
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FRHRHU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV MTNL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
corr=.64-10
0
10
20
-10 -5 0 5 10
change in public education spending
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FRHRHU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV MTNL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
corr=.34-10
0
10
20
-4 -2 0 2 4
change in public health spending
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
D
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FRHRHU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV MTNL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
corr=.26-10
0
10
20
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
change in standard VAT rate
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
 c
as
h 
po
lic
y 
ch
an
ge
s 
(%
)
Source: Eurostat data on government spending on social protection (in-kind benefits) (indicator spr exp eur); health and education (indicator
gov 10a exp); population size for the respective country (indicator demo pjan). The % change in mean income due to discretionary policy
changes are based on authors’ calculations using EUROMOD and EU-SILC and FRS data. Notes: Change in expenditures are presented in
real terms per capita and as % of disposable income. The effect of the change in standard VAT rate is calculated assuming all income is spent
on goods and services subject to the standard rate of VAT. The data on health and education includes both cash and in-kind payments. To
calculate the change in per capita spending, total spending is divided by the population size for the respective country and year. The change
in mean income due to discretionary policy changes is based on per capita income. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The
reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
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Figure 2.10: Correlation of automatic stabilisers by benefits and taxes/SIC against the market
income/population effect
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: as=automatic stabilisers. The vertical axis shows the % change in mean
net income due to automatic stabilisers. The horizontal axis shows the % change in mean net income due to the market income/population
effect. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
Figure 2.11: Correlation of discretionary policy changes to benefits and taxes/SIC against the
market income/population effect
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Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS. Notes: dpc=discretionary policy changes. The vertical axis shows the %
change in mean net income due to discretionary policy changes. The horizontal axis shows the % change in mean net income due to the
market income/population effect. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007-2014 for nearly all countries
and 2011-2014 for Croatia.
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Chapter 3
Evaluating the Performance of
Means-Tested Benefits in Bulgaria1
(published in 2016 in the Journal of Comparative Economics)
Abstract
Using household survey data and microsimulation techniques, we analyse the performance of
three means-tested benefits in Bulgaria. We find that the transfers reach a small proportion
of households with incomes below a relative poverty line, they have high non-take-up rates,
and large proportions of the recipients are neither poor nor entitled to receive the benefits.
Unsurprisingly, although an important income source for poor households, the benefits have a
very small impact on reducing the poverty rates. We show that our results are robust to potential
underreporting of benefit receipt in the household survey. Finally, we analyse the effect of five
reform scenarios, one of which fiscally neutral, on poverty and find that there is a large scope
for policy improvement.
Keywords: benefit non-take-up; leakage; means-tested benefits; poverty; microsimula-
tion
JEL codes: D04, D63, I38
1Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Mike Brewer, Paul Fisher, Chrysa Leventi, Renee Luthra,
Alari Paulus, Steve Pudney, Holly Sutherland, Mark Taylor, participants at the International Microsimu-
lation Association conference in 2011, EUROMOD research workshop in 2011 and the Institute for Social
and Economic Research seminar in 2012 for their useful comments. I am grateful for the helpful sug-
gestions from an anonymous referee. I am indebted to all past and current members of the EUROMOD
consortium. The version of EUROMOD used here is G1.4 and is in the process of being extended, up-
dated, and financed by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities
of the European Commission [Progress grant no. VS/2011/0445]. I make use of microdata from the
EU-SILC for Bulgaria made available by Eurostat under contract EU-SILC/2009/17 and variables from
the Bulgarian version of the SILC made available by the National Statistical Institute in Bulgaria. Any
errors, results produced, interpretations or views are my responsibility.
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3.1 Introduction
In recent years, poverty has been increasing in Bulgaria, rising in relative terms from 14
percent in 1999 to 21 percent in 2012 and in absolute terms from 1.2 million individuals
in 1999 to 1.5 million individuals in 2012, despite a fall in the total population. In 2012,
relative poverty in Bulgaria was among the highest in the EU, with an average poverty
rate across the 28 member states of 17 percent. One of the reasons is the small impact
that social transfers in Bulgaria have on poverty, estimated to be among the lowest in the
EU. This poor performance of the social transfers may in turn partly reflect low levels
of expenditures on social protection – in 2011 the total spending on social protection in
Bulgaria was 16.9 percent of GDP, compared to an EU average of 28.3 percent, while the
spending on means-tested benefits was only 0.7 percent of GDP in Bulgaria relative to 3
percent of GDP on average in the EU (Eurostat, 2014)2 – but may also be due to poor
design or implementation.
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the performance of means-tested
benefits in Bulgaria using household survey data and microsimulation methods. We look
at the largest three means-tested benefits in Bulgaria – the heating allowance (HA),
guaranteed minimum income (GMI) and child allowance (CA) – and evaluate their perfor-
mance in terms of targeting and poverty reduction. Several targeting issues are addressed.
We measure the degree to which benefits are not taken-up by the entitled population (non-
take-up) and to which non-entitled are among the benefit recipients (leakage). For those
benefits which are means-tested, and therefore ought to target individuals on low incomes
by design, we estimate how many of the poor are not being awarded with a benefit (ex-
clusion of the poor) and how many among the recipients are in fact not poor (inclusion
of the non-poor).3 We show that our results on targeting are robust to underreporting of
benefit receipt in the household survey data. Finally, we estimate the effect of the benefits
on poverty.
Addressing targeting issues and thus understanding why benefits are not claimed by
2All figures from Eurostat database, ‘At-risk-of-poverty rate by poverty threshold, age and sex (in-
dicator: ilc li02)’; ‘At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers (pensions included in social transfers)
by poverty threshold, age and sex (indicator: ilc li09)’; ‘Expenditure – Tables by functions, aggregated
benefits and grouped schemes – in % of the GDP (indicator: spr exp gdp)’.
3The definition of being poor is defined with respect to the relative poverty line, which is 60% of the
median equivalised household disposable income.
the entitled (or why they are received by the non-entitled) is important because this
affects programme implementation and limits the extent to which policy goals can be
achieved. Furthermore, if the reasons for not receiving are involuntary, such as imperfect
information, high transaction costs or stigma, the groups intended to be targeted are not
being treated equally by the welfare state (see, for a discussion, Oorschot, 1991). Equity
issues will also arise if unintended and non-poor beneficiaries are awarded with a benefit,
while the entitled and poor are excluded.4 If such issues are present, policy makers cannot
anticipate the true effect of policy interventions.
The paper enriches the analysis on the performance of means-tested benefits in Eu-
rope by providing some of the first estimates of non-take-up and leakage for an Eastern
European country. Although there is a variety of means-tested benefits in Bulgaria to
protect those at risk of poverty, to date there has been little empirical evidence on how
successful these benefits are in reaching and protecting them (although see World Bank,
2009).5 In particular, the ability of the programmes to target specific population groups
(those entitled to the benefits) has remained unknown. Although there is a large litera-
ture estimating non-take-up of means-tested benefits and trying to understand the drivers
of this behaviour (see, for example, Mangiavacchi and Verme, 2013; Bargain, 2012; Mat-
saganis et al., 2010), leakage rates have been rather neglected in the literature (for some
exceptions see Benitez-Silva et al., 2004, and Kleven and Kopczuk, 2011).
In this analysis, we make use of household survey data combined with a tax and benefit
microsimulation model. The former, namely the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), tell us which households are receiving benefits in 2007;
the latter allows us to identify the households in the EU-SILC that are entitled to receive
means-tested benefits (as well as estimate the financial value of these entitlements). The
tax-benefit microsimulation model used here is the Bulgarian component of the EU-wide
microsimulation model EUROMOD (for more information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland
and Figari, 2013). In addition, after analysing the status quo, we simulate five reform
4Depending on the policy rules, the entitled and poor can be overlapping groups but not necessarily
the same. The same is valid for the non-entitled and non-poor.
5To the best of our knowledge, this is the only extensive empirical analysis on social assistance benefits
in Bulgaria. The study provides an evaluation of the performance of social transfers in Bulgaria and it
finds low levels of coverage among the poor with high levels of inclusion of non-poor recipients. However,
the analysis does not provide any estimates on benefit non-take-up and leakage, i.e. the number of entitled
who do not claim the benefits or the number of non-entitled among the benefit recipients.
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scenarios to the existing benefits (one of which fiscally-neutral) as a way to explore the
impact of policy changes on poverty and the scope for policy improvement.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that most of the spending and ben-
eficiaries of the social assistance benefits, HA and GMI, come from the left tail of the
income distribution. However, the programmes reach a very small proportion of the
households with incomes below the relative poverty line. Recipients of the child benefit,
CA, are distributed almost evenly across the deciles of the income distribution, due to
its generous income-test. However, the benefit fails in providing income support to all
poor households with families with children, leaving 30 percent of them unreached by the
transfer. Second, we find that more than 40 percent of the intended beneficiaries of HA
and GMI, and 30 percent of the intended beneficiaries of CA, do not take up benefits
to which they are entitled.6 We also find that a large proportion of beneficiaries report
incomes which exceed the income-test threshold, and so should have disqualified them
from entitlement. These results raise serious concerns about the quality of programme
implementation. Third, the three benefits have negligible effect on the poverty rate: less
than a 1 percentage point reduction. Moreover, we show that poverty rates would remain
broadly unchanged even under a scenario of 100 percent benefit take-up and no leakage
to the non-entitled. These results put Bulgaria among the worst performers in the region
in terms of targeting the vulnerable and reducing poverty (see Avram, 2016). Finally, we
consider the effect of five reform scenarios on poverty. Even a fiscally neutral scenario
proves to be more effective than the current system in reducing poverty, showing that
there is scope for policy improvement.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a summary of the three
means-tested benefits in Bulgaria. Section 3.3 describes the definitions of targeting, the
methodology we adopt, the household survey data from EU-SILC and the tax-benefit
microsimulation model EUROMOD. It also discusses the implications of benefit under-
reporting in the survey data on the results and other data and microsimulation-related
issues. Section 3.4 shows the results for targeting and poverty reduction. Section 3.5
6Reasons for non-take-up of benefits come from both the demand and supply side. Due to stigma, high
transaction costs (long waiting time, queues etc.), and the low level of the benefits, entitled individuals
could consider the application process too complicated or too costly and decide not to apply for the social
transfers (Moffitt, 1983). On the supply side, excessive bureaucracy or complicated programme design
can mean that benefits are not provided to the intended population (see Currie, 2006).
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presents five alternative policy scenarios and analyses their effect on poverty. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Means-tested benefits in Bulgaria
This section describes the details of the three benefits under study. These are the heating
allowance, guaranteed minimum income and child allowance. The three benefits amount
to 84 percent of the total budget for means-tested benefits in 2007 (see Boshnakov et al.,
2012 and Eurostat, 2014).7 Although there is a range of other means-tested cash and
in kind benefits, they are not part of the analysis because their role in terms of income
support provision is smaller or information on them is missing from the household survey
data.
The heating allowance (HA) is given to the household and is intended to cover
various groups of the population: single-person households, elderly, orphans, lone parents,
families with children, students and individuals with disabilities. The benefit is paid
each month for a period of 5 months during the winter. The applicant needs to fulfil
conditions related to various demographic and economic characteristics such as age, health
status, employment status, and household size, as well as assets. Furthermore, entitlement
requires household income to be below a certain threshold where the threshold varies by
individual characteristics and household type. This threshold is calculated as a percentage
of a guaranteed minimum income level (gmil), which is defined as a minimum level for
survival and amounts to 55 BGN per month in 2007 (28 EUR). The percentage rate varies
from 120 percent for an adult living with her spouse to 240 percent for an elderly person.
The benefit is paid at a rate common to all households (but varying by the heating source
used by the household – electricity, central heating, natural gas or coal). The average
benefit amount in the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) used for the analysis is 17 BGN per month (9 EUR or 8 percent of the relative
poverty line).
The guaranteed minimum income benefit (GMI) is granted to households with
7For information on the total spending on means-tested benefits see Eurostat database, ‘Tables by func-
tions, aggregated benefits and grouped schemes – in MIO of national currency’ (indicator: spr exp nac).
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low incomes. Entitlement is defined in a similar way as for HA. The allowance is granted
to households, which fulfil certain requirements related to demographic and economic
characteristics, household size, assets8 and whose household income is below a certain
threshold. The threshold ranges from 30 percent of gmil for a child aged between 7 and
16 years, to 165 percent for an elderly person. If a household comprises of more than
one individual, the sum of all thresholds for all individuals in the household represents
the threshold for the whole household. The amount of the benefit equals the difference
between the total household threshold and the gross household income; that is, the benefit
is withdrawn with income. It is paid for 12 months. The household average monthly
benefit amount in EU-SILC is 63 BGN (32 EUR or 30 percent of the poverty line).
The monthly child allowance for bringing up a child until completion of secondary
school (CA) targets low income families with children. It is paid to families with child(ren)
up to the age of 18 (or 20 if the child is enrolled in secondary school). The value of the
income test in 2007 is 200 BGN per month (100 EUR) per family member. The benefit
is provided to the family on a monthly basis. In 2007, its value is 18 BGN for the first
child, 20 BGN for the second child and 20 BGN (in total) for the third and all subsequent
children. The average monthly benefit amount per family in the EU-SILC is 24 BGN (12
EUR or 12 percent of the poverty line).
The income sources used in the income-test of the three benefits are: employment
income, self-employment income, income from rent, public pensions, contributory benefits
(for unemployment, sickness, pregnancy and childbirth, and maternity), and education
scholarships. The benefits HA and GMI also enter the income-test for CA and vice versa.
The application for the benefits is based on self-reported income (and other information).
Applicants have to attach an income declaration issued by a relevant person or institution
(e.g. the employer) as evidence. However, no evidence needs to be attached if zero income
is reported in the application.
The objective of HA and GMI, as defined in the Law on Social Assistance (2012) (LSA),
is to supplement or replace incomes and cover individuals basic needs defined as sufficient
8According to the conditions for the asset-test for both HA and GMI, the benefit claimant should: live
in a dwelling composed of maximum 1 room per household member; not possess assets that can represent
a source of income, except for the belongings that serve the usual needs of the family; not have contracts
for a transfer of property in return for support and care (e.g. caring for lone elderly owners); not have
acquired property through purchase or donation during the last 5 years.
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amount of food, clothing and housing to survive. CA has the goal of providing income
support for families with children. We could not find documentation on the methodology
used to determine the value of the gmil, the thresholds for the various population groups
or benefit levels. There are also no indexation rules in place for gmil and the size of the
benefits.
3.3 Methodology and data
This section starts with the different definitions of targeting: non-take-up, leakage, ex-
clusion of the poor and inclusion of the non-poor. After that, we explain our approach
of combining household survey data with a tax-benefit microsimulation model, followed
by a detailed description of the data and the model. We then focus on the issue of ben-
efit underreporting in the survey data and describe the robustness checks we undertake.
Finally, we validate the reported benefits in the household survey data and simulated ben-
efit entitlements produced by the tax-benefit model using data from official administrative
records.
3.3.1 Definitions of targeting
Our approach is to assess the extent of vertical and horizontal targeting efficiencies. They
imply that only the poor, and all the poor, should be awarded with a means-tested benefit.
We measure two targeting errors related to these concepts: the rate of inclusion of the
non-poor, and exclusion of the poor. Additionally, two more types of targeting errors are
calculated: benefit non-take-up (two definitions are considered following Brewer (2003)
and Bargain et al. (2012)) and leakage to non-entitled households.
Starting with the last two definitions, estimating benefit non-take up and leakage
rates is crucial in assessing the performance of transfer programmes because they affect
programme implementation and policy goals achievement. Non-take-up can be measured
in two ways. First, it can be the fraction of people entitled to receive a benefit, but not
provided with it.
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Rnon-take-up1 =
Nentitled,not in receipt
Nentitled
(3.1)
where Nentitled,not in receipt is the number of entitled households (or households with entitled
families as in the case of CA) who did not receive the benefit and Nentitled is the total
number of intended beneficiaries (those in receipt and not in receipt).
The second type of non-take-up rate:
Rnon-take-up2 =
Nentitled,not in receipt
Nin receipt +Nentitled,not in receipt
(3.2)
expresses the total number of households eligible for the benefit, but not in receipt of
it, as a percentage of the sum made up of those receiving the benefits (whether entitled
or non-entitled) and those entitled but not reporting receipt. This definition of non-
take-up acknowledges that some of the recipients may not be assessed as entitled due to
error in identifying them or that some of the recipients may be truly non-entitled due
to leakage. The denominator of the second non-take-up rate is equal or larger than the
denominator of the first non-take-up rate and so estimates for this indicator are equal
or lower, respectively, than for the first definition. In the literature, these two rates are
combined to show in a way an upper (definition 1) and lower (definition 2) bounds of
non-take-up (see Brewer (2003) and Bargain et al. (2012)).
The leakage rate is defined as the non-entitled households who receive a social transfer
(Nnon-entitled,in receipt) as a proportion of all beneficiaries (Nin receipt):
Rleakage =
Nnon-entitled,in receipt
Nin receipt
(3.3)
To calculate the extent of exclusion of the poor, and inclusion of the non-poor among
beneficiaries, we use a poverty line of 60% of the median equivalised household disposable
income, and denote individuals in households with incomes lower than the poverty line
as being poor. Regarding horizontal equity, the definition of the exclusion error refers to
the proportion of poor not in receipt of a social transfer. This rate estimates the capacity
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of the programmes to correctly identify the poor. The exclusion error equals:
Rexclusion of the poor =
Npoor,not in receipt
Npoor
(3.4)
Npoor,not in receipt is the number of households with income below the relative poverty line
who did not receive the benefit and Npoor is the total number of poor households below
the relative poverty line (or poor households with families with children as in the case of
CA).
The inclusion error looks at how many of the programme recipients were not poor
before receiving the benefit. The rate is equal to the following fraction:
Rinclusion of the non-poor =
Nnon-poor,in receipt
Nin receipt
(3.5)
where Nnon-poor,in receipt is the number of non-poor households who receive the benefit.
To be able to estimate benefit non-take up and leakage, we require information at
the individual or household level on 1) who actually receives the benefit and 2) who is
legally entitled to receive it. Information on the former can be found in the data from
the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) used for the
analysis, where households report different sources of incomes. However, EU-SILC, similar
to any other survey, does not ask households/individuals if they are entitled to a benefit.
This information can be only acquired through a tax-benefit microsimulation model which
calculates entitlements based on information on household circumstances available in the
survey data and knowledge of the benefit legislation. We discuss our approach in more
detail below.
3.3.2 Data description
The household survey data are from the European Union Survey on Income and Liv-
ing Conditions (EU-SILC). EU-SILC is the largest and most detailed household income
survey existing at the moment in Bulgaria. It is used by the National Statistical In-
stitute for official statistics on social inclusion and living conditions. The data are na-
tionally representative and contain individual and household level information on de-
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mographic and socio-economic characteristics and incomes from various sources such as
(self-)employment, pensions and benefits. The data we use are collected in 2008 with
income reference period 2007. EU-SILC used in this analysis is a combination of the User
Data Base SILC, which contains aggregate information about benefits, and some national
SILC variables, which provide data about the separate benefit components. For a detailed
data description, see Appendix 1.
3.3.3 EUROMOD
The entitlements to means-tested benefits for each household in the EU-SILC are calcu-
lated by EUROMOD. The model consists of components for each EU member state. It
operates based on nationally representative household survey data. By using informa-
tion on household and individual characteristics and market incomes taken from the data
and combining it with country-specific legislation rules, the model calculates (simulates)
household and individual-level benefit entitlements, tax and social insurance liabilities
as well as household disposable income (for a detailed model description, see Sutherland
and Figari, 2013). EUROMOD has been widely used in the economics literature (for
recent publications see e.g. Bargain et al., 2014; Dolls et al., 2012). It has also been
used to estimate non-take-up rates in Greece and Spain (Matsaganis et al., 2010). To
calculate benefit non-take-up and leakage rates, we compare information on receipt of the
three means-tested benefits observed in the survey data with simulated entitlements to
the same three benefits as calculated by EUROMOD, all for a given household.
The definition of household disposable income used throughout the analysis includes
the sum of market income (income from employment, self-employment, property (rent),
net private transfers (private transfers received minus maintenance payments), interest,
other (income received by children under 16)), pension income (benefits for old-age, sur-
vivor and disability), other benefits (for unemployment, maternity, sickness, family, social
assistance, housing, education), income from agricultural and own production, minus in-
come tax, property tax and social insurance contributions.
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3.3.4 Accounting for benefit underreporting
When using household survey data and microsimulation techniques, five issues could bias
the results. Measurement error in the data and the simulations may drive the bias in
different directions. First, EU-SILC does not collect enough information on assets to allow
the simulation of all eligibility criteria for HA and GMI. In the absence of data, we assume
the household meets that particular criterion. As a result, the following two biases may
arise: First, if non-entitled recipients are misclassified as entitled recipients, the numerator
in the calculation of leakage will go down while the denominator in the calculation of non-
take-up based on the first definition only will go up which would result in both leakage
and non-take-up being underestimated. Second, if non-entitled non-recipients are wrongly
classified as entitled non-recipients, the numerator in the formula for non-take-up based
on both definitions will increase (more relatively to the denominator) and non-take-up
will be overestimated.
Second, a known problem of survey data on incomes is that it may fail to cover
individuals at the very bottom of the income distribution (e.g. people not living in
households). In this case then our results may be biased in either direction, depending
on the size of the excluded population and the number of (non-)entitled (non-)recipients
among them.
Third, a general sort of error can occur if there are errors in the calculations done by
the microsimulation model (for example, a mismatch between the data reference period
in the survey data and the time period when the income-test has been applied); these
could cause biases in any direction.9
Fourth, we typically think the prevailing measurement issue in survey data is income
underreporting (see for a recent analysis Brewer et al. (2017) and Meyer et al. (2015)).
Underreporting of those sources of income, that are used to assess entitlements to benefits,
could result in the following biases (similar to the biases described under the first point): If
non-entitled recipients underreport incomes, so they are misclassified as entitled recipients,
9For GMI and HA, the income-test refers to incomes from previous month. There is no information in
the data, on when benefit receipt started and the available data are only for 2007. For the income-test,
we used therefore average monthly incomes for 2007, although there might have been fluctuations over
the months, which are not considered, and the income-test might have referred to incomes from 2006,
which are not observed. It is not clear, though, in which direction the results will be biased.
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then both non-take-up based on the first definition and leakage will be underestimated
(the denominator in the formula for non-take-up will increase, while the numerator in the
leakage rate will decrease). If non-entitled non-recipients underreport incomes, so they
look like entitled non-recipients, then the numerator in the calculation of non-take-up
(both definitions) will increase more relatively to the denominator and so, non-take-up
will be overestimated. There will be no impact on these rates if households entitled
recipients or entitled non-recipients are not misclassified even though they underreport
incomes. Appendix 1 gives more details on the EU-SILC data, and a comparison between
EU-SILC and national accounts data. To sum up, we find limited evidence on the extent
of income underreporting in EU-SILC and among the recipients of HA, GMI and CA.
This does not allow us to measure the direction or size of a potential bias in the results.
Finally, an important concern for the validity of the results is the issue of benefit
underreporting (see Lynn et al. (2012) on the incidence of benefit underreporting and
ways of reducing it in panel data). Benefit underreporting may refer either to a household
reporting a lower amount of the received benefit or to a household declaring falsely that
it has not received a benefit at all. When calculating non-take-up and leakage only the
second type of benefit underreporting may bias our results: If the benefit of interest has
been underreported only by entitled households, then non-take-up and leakage will be
overestimated. However, if the benefit has been underreported only by the non-entitled
(i.e. there genuinely is leakage but it is underreported in the survey), then results for
leakage will be underestimated while non-take-up based on the second definition will be
overestimated.
Due to lack of administrative data, none of these biases can be measured and so the
magnitude of the error is, in general, not verifiable. However, we can address the issue
of benefit underreporting, i.e. not reporting to have received a benefit, which we believe
may be one of the largest concerns.
We proceed by noting two discrepancies. First, the total number of reported benefit
recipients in the EU-SILC data is lower than the total number of households that are
simulated to be entitled (by EUROMOD). Second, the total number of reported benefit
recipients in the EU-SILC data is also lower than the total number of recipients according
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to administrative figures (see next subsection). Let us assume that this is entirely due
to benefit underreporting in EU-SILC. Thus, the magnitude of underreporting can be
quantified according to either the first or second discrepancy.
We consider the following five scenarios: a baseline scenario with no correction for
underreporting, and scenarios for which we assume that benefits have been underreported
in EU-SILC by non-recipients who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled, iii) poor, or iv) non-
poor. We impute benefit receipts (by random selection) for each scenario separately, so
that non-recipients are transformed into recipients. As a result, there is an increase in
the number of recipients in EU-SILC who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled, iii) poor, or
iv) non-poor. The number of imputed benefit receipts depends on the two discrepancies:
according to the first one, the number of benefit recipients in EU-SILC would equal the
number of households with a simulated entitlement; according to the second one, the
number of benefit recipients in EU-SILC would match the number of recipients from
administrative statistics. Scenarios i) to iv) represent the extremes and we have selected
these to calculate lower and upper bounds around the targeting error rates. Scenarios
i) and ii) provide bounds around non-take-up and leakage, while scenarios iii) and iv)
provide bounds around the rates of exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the non-poor.
The imputations under scenario i) will provide a lower bound for benefit non-take-up
and leakage: as the number of entitled recipients goes up, the numerator in the formu-
lae for non-take-up (i.e. the number of entitled non-recipients) will go down and so,
non-take-up will fall. In terms of leakage, the denominator in the formula (i.e. all recip-
ients) will increase and so, the rate will fall. Scenario ii) will provide us with an upper
bound for leakage: the numerator in the leakage rate (i.e. the number of non-entitled
recipients) will increase more relatively to the denominator (i.e. all recipients) and so,
leakage will increase. Non-take-up based on the first definition will not change because
of non-accountability of non-entitled in the calculation. Non-take-up based on the sec-
ond definition will fall as the denominator (i.e. the number of recipients plus entitled
non-recipients) will increase.
Under scenario iii) a lower bound for the rates of exclusion of the poor and inclusion of
the non-poor will be calculated: as the number of poor recipients among all poor increases,
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the rate of exclusion of the poor will go down. In addition, the denominator in the rate
of inclusion of the non-poor (i.e. all recipients) will also increase and so, the rate will go
down.
Finally, under scenario iv) an upper bound for the rate of inclusion of the non-poor
will be generated: the numerator in the rate (i.e. the number of non-poor recipients)
will increase more relatively to the denominator (i.e. all recipients) and so, the rate of
inclusion of the non-poor will increase. The rate of exclusion of the poor will remain the
same, because non-poor are not taken into account in the calculation.
3.3.5 Data comparisons and related issues
In this subsection, we validate the simulated benefit entitlements produced by the EU-
ROMOD model and reported benefits in EU-SILC using data from official administrative
records with a view to understand if there is benefit non-take-up or leakage. Table 3.1
compares the number and total amount of simulated entitlements (calculated by EURO-
MOD) with the number of benefit recipients and total spending recorded in EU-SILC,
and the corresponding totals of recipients and spending recorded in administrative data.
We observe that the number of simulated social assistance entitlements is less than the
number of recipients from administrative figures (the ratio is 0.69 for HA and 0.73 for
GMI, see ratio (1/2) in panel A); this could be an indication that part of the benefits
may be distributed to non-entitled recipients (i.e. there is benefit leakage). In contrast,
the number of simulated CA entitlements is higher than the number of CA recipients
from administrative figures (the ratio is 1.11): this discrepancy points to the possibility
of benefit non-take-up.
Comparing the number of benefit recipients from EU-SILC with those from the admin-
istrative figures (ratio (4/2)) in panel A suggests that all benefits might be underreported
in EU-SILC. On the other hand, the number of recipients from EU-SILC is lower than the
number of simulated entitlements, which could also indicate benefit non-take-up. Moving
on to panel B of Table 3.1, ratio (1/2) shows the total amount of simulated entitlements
from EUROMOD over the total spending from administrative figures. As the ratios for
HA and GMI are lower than 1, this indicates that the spending of the two benefits has
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been undersimulated by EUROMOD; the ratio for CA is 1.07 meaning that the total
spending for CA is slightly oversimulated. This is in line with the findings in the para-
graphs above. In the case of the three benefits, ratio (1/2) is higher than ratio (4/2),
implying that the average simulated entitlements are higher than the average amount of
benefit receipt reported in the underlying micro data EU-SILC.
[place Table 3.1 here]
Table 3.2 compares the mean monthly values of the benefit entitlements, separately
for those reporting positive amounts in EU-SILC and for those simulated to be entitled
by EUROMOD. In the case of HA, which is paid at a rate common to all households, the
average reported value of the benefit and simulated entitlements are close to identical.10
GMI and CA are not paid at a common rate to all households: the GMI amount depends
on household incomes, while the CA amount depends on the number of children. Table 3.2
shows that the mean simulated unclaimed entitlement (for those simulated eligible but not
reporting a positive amount) for both benefits is lower than the mean simulated claimed
entitlement (for those simulated eligible and reporting a positive amount). This is in line
with the idea that a higher entitlement to benefits helps offset the (actual or opportunity)
costs of claiming benefits, e.g. the cost of collecting necessary application documents,
long waiting times and stigma.
[place Table 3.2 here]
3.4 Results
This section presents the main results and assesses the performance of the benefits across
several dimensions. It starts with looking at the benefit incidence across the income
distribution. The analysis moves on to targeting issues, by providing estimates for benefit
non-take-up, leakage to non-entitled claimants, exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the
non-poor among the benefit recipients. The results are demonstrated to be robust to
an adjustment for benefit underreporting in the data if the adjustment is based on the
10The small discrepancy can be explained as the average benefit duration assumed by EUROMOD is
the maximum possible and it is slightly higher than the average benefit duration reported in the data.
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difference between the number of reported claimants in EU-SILC and the total number
of simulated entitlements by EUROMOD. If the adjustment is based on the difference
between the number of recipients in EU-SILC and administrative figures, the bounds of
the estimates for social assistance increase and the results become less robust, while the
opposite is true for the child benefit. The final part of the section compares the pre-
transfer and post-transfer poverty figures, providing a discussion on the impact of the
benefits on poverty in Bulgaria.
3.4.1 Benefit incidence
This subsection shows the incidence of the three benefits across the income distribution.
Individuals are ranked based on their equivalised household disposable income before
receiving each one of the transfers in turn.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of spending on HA, GMI and CA as reported in EU-
SILC (the grey lines) alongside the total amount of simulated entitlements by EUROMOD
(the black lines). The figure shows that based on EU-SILC, all three benefits target the
poor well. GMI performs best with 77 percent of its spending going to the poorest two
deciles. A similar picture emerges for HA with 69 percent of the budget going to the
poorest two deciles of the income distribution. In terms of CA spending, 26 percent
is transferred to the bottom two income deciles. This is in line with the design of the
benefit high income-test which aims at reaching families from the higher tail of the
income distribution.
[Figure 3.1 here]
Figure 3.2 repeats the exercise but for benefit receipt: 74 percent of GMI and 69
percent of HA recipients come from the bottom two income deciles, but CA reaches the
poor to a lesser extent as only 25 percent of CA recipients come from the poorest two
deciles. Contrasting this to Figure 3.1, the results suggest that the mean value of GMI
is slightly higher for the lower 2 deciles than for the rest of the distribution. The value
of HA is equal across recipients, given that it is a uniform benefit paid at the household
level. The mean value of CA is larger for the poorer deciles because of larger number of
children in poorer households.
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[Figure 3.2 here]
Turning to the results of the simulated benefit entitlements, we see that the distri-
bution of the simulated GMI and HA is even more concentrated in the first two income
deciles, making them more progressive than the benefits reported in EU-SILC. The dis-
tribution of the simulated CA is also more concentrated at the bottom part of the dis-
tribution making it appear more progressive than actual receipt as reported in EU-SILC.
Assuming that there are no programme implementation errors, one would expect that
the distribution of the reported benefits and simulated entitlements (both spending and
recipients) to be identical. The next subsection addresses this puzzle.
3.4.2 Targeting
The previous indicators offer only limited information about the performance of the ben-
efits in terms of targeting, the extent to which the actual distribution of a benefit cor-
responds to the desired distribution. Given that the benefits are aimed at satisfying the
basic living needs of the individuals, it is important to see what proportion is given to the
entitled and/or poor and what proportion is given to the non-entitled and/or non-poor.
The estimates for the targeting errors i.e. non-take-up, leakage, exclusion of the poor
and inclusion of the non-poor, together with their standard errors, are shown in Table 3.3.
Based on the first definition of non-take-up (the proportion of entitled non-recipient over
all entitled households), the non-take-up rate amounts to large 66 percent for HA and 73
percent for GMI, and 39 percent for CA. The substantial non-take-up rates of HA and GMI
are in line with the qualitative analysis in Bogdanov and Zahariev (2009) which suggests
that the high complexity of the programmes causes confusion for the social workers, who
are forced to deal with an enormous amount of paper work. This could result in incorrectly
turning down applications by otherwise entitled households. Similarly, claimants of social
assistance report that the application process is very long and cumbersome and that the
benefit amount is too low to provide sufficient income support.
When we compare the estimates for the first definition with the ones for the second
definition of non-take-up (the proportion of entitled non-recipient over all recipient and
entitled non-recipient households), some key differences between the two are revealed. In
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line with the non-take-up rates under definition 1, the rates under definition 2 are the
highest for HA and GMI (41 percent and 47 percent, respectively). However, in contrast
to CA, there is substantial difference under the two definitions for HA and GMI. This
suggests a potentially large leakage to the non-eligible population for these two benefits.
In comparison to non-take-up of means-tested benefits in other countries, the estimated
rates in Bulgaria are relatively high. Non-take-up for social assistance is of similar size to
the rates (definition 1) in Germany (63 percent for Social Assistance in 1993 (Riphahn,
2001)) and Greece (63 percent for pensioner social solidarity benefit and 38 percent for
pension to uninsured elderly in 2004 (Matsaganis et al., 2010)). In Spain, Australia and
Finland, on the other hand, benefit non-take-up is smaller compared to the estimates for
HA and GMI: based on definition 1, 22 percent for supplements to reach the minimum
and 44 percent for non-contributory old-age pensions in 2004 in Spain (Matsaganis et al.,
2010); 15 percent for Income Support and 29 percent for Parenting Payment in 2002 in
Australia using definition 1 (Mood, 2006); and between 43 percent (definition 2) and 51
percent (definition 1) for social assistance in 2003 in Finland (Bargain et al., 2012). In the
UK, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has been publishing benefit take-up
estimates ranges until 2009/10. We have translated these into non-take-up rates based on
definition 2 and the extent of the issue varies depending on the benefit: 11-23 percent for
Income Support and Employment and Support Allowance, 20-27 percent for Guarantee
Credit, and 16-22 percent for Housing Benefit (DWP, 2012). The evidence about the USA
is also somewhat mixed, depending on the benefits (see Currie (2006) for an overview).
Moving to leakage, the proportion of non-entitled recipient over all recipient house-
holds, the rate equals 64 percent for HA and 68 percent for GMI. Although recipients
are mostly in the first two income deciles, the estimate of leakage is high because the
programmes are targeted at the first income decile only. Thus, whilst we see high non-
take-up rates for HA and GMI amongst the targeted population, a substantial number of
households who do not fulfil the income-test are in receipt of social assistance. In contrast,
the estimated leakage rate for CA is lower at 19 percent reflecting the fact that a larger
share of the population is eligible for the benefit.
We consider three possible channels through which the high leakage of HA and GMI
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could occur. First, the confusion among social workers due to the complex benefit rules
(see Bogdanov and Zahariev, 2009) could not only result in falsely rejecting applications
by entitled households but also accepting applications by ineligible households. Second,
corruption through bribes could be another channel through which benefits are transferred
to non-entitled households. Although there are no estimates on the size of corruption in
Bulgaria, a few studies suggest very high public perception levels.11 The third channel
could be related to the informal economy in Bulgaria in terms of underdeclaring income
to authorities in order to avoid the payments of taxes or to receive benefit entitlements.
Although there is no conclusive evidence on the size of informal economy in the country,
again there is evidence on high public perception levels.12
Worryingly, the results also show that very large numbers of the poor are excluded
from the social assistance benefits: 77 percent for HA and 94 percent for GMI or in
other words, only 23 percent and 6 percent of the poor receive HA and GMI, respectively.
In comparison, the results for 2007 by the World Bank (2009) show similarly that the
exclusion error of HA and GMI is equal to 87.9% and 88.6%, respectively.13 Although
HA and GMI are mainly provided to the poor, their coverage is very low. Avram (2016)
estimates the percentage of poor receiving social assistance for 8 Central and Eastern
European countries using the cross-sectional component of EU-SILC for 2008. She finds
very low coverage of the poor in the three Baltic countries, Estonia (8 percent), Latvia
(16 percent) and Lithuania (20 percent). In the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and
11For example, for a study on public perceptions of corruption levels see Eurobarometer report (2008):
‘The attitudes of Europeans towards corruption’, Special Eurobarometer 291, available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_291_en.pdf. The study shows that in 2007 92% of
the respondents agree with the statement that corruption is a major problem in Bulgaria. This puts
the country on place 5 (out of 27) with EU27 average score of 75%. Between 82% and 85% of the
respondents agree with the statement that there is corruption at local, regional or national institutions
(with EU27 average score of 73% to 77%). Bulgaria also scores about two times the EU27 average
on the question if ‘giving and taking of bribes, and the abuse of positions of power for personal gains
are widespread among’: the people working in the judicial, police or custom services, public health or
education sectors. For other studies which show high levels of perceived corruption in Bulgaria, see
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2007/0/.
12For a study on employers and employees perceptions on the size of informal econ-
omy in Bulgaria see Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association (2012): ‘The first moni-
toring report on the informal economy and progress achieved in its prevention’, avail-
able in Bulgarian at: http://www.ikonomikanasvetlo.bg/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=
cc8fb441-d183-42a5-b4b9-14241cf5cd76&groupId=55360. There is also a study by Buehn and Schnei-
der (2012) which estimates the size of shadow economy in Bulgaria in 2007 at high 32.7%.
13The discrepancy in our and the World Bank (2009) results are likely to be due to differences in the
survey data used in the analysis, in the definition of household disposable income and as a result, in the
value of the relative poverty line.
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Slovenia, the coverage rate varies between 26 percent and 37 percent, while in Hungary it
is found to be 46 percent. The findings suggest that social assistance benefits in Bulgaria,
despite having the aim of covering basic needs and providing income support to the poor,
have a low coverage of the poor similar (or worse) to the ones in the Baltic countries.
The exclusion of poor households (with families with children) is 30 percent for CA,
showing that it has a better coverage. We see that the smallest coverage of the poor
occurs among the benefits with the highest leakage. This is an important finding, as it
suggests that the coverage of the poor could be improved, by better targeting the benefits
on poor households only (at no additional cost).
The results for the inclusion of the non-poor are 34 percent for HA and 27 percent
for GMI. In regard to this indicator, Bulgarian benefits are characterized with lower error
in comparison to their counterparts in the other countries; the inclusion errors estimated
by Avram (2016) are 30 percent for social assistance benefits in Lithuania, around 38
percent in the Czech Republic, 37 percent in Slovakia, 44 percent in Poland, 49 percent in
Estonia, 54 percent in Latvia, and more than 60 percent in Slovenia and Hungary. This
might well be due to the higher income-test and larger population coverage of the schemes
in the other Central and Eastern European countries Avram (2016). The inclusion of the
non-poor is significantly higher for CA: the rate is estimated at 78 percent. This supports
the above evidence showing substantial room for poverty reduction, by better targeting
the available funds to the poor.
The results are remarkable because the programmes are characterised by both high
non-take-up and leakage, and both inclusion and exclusion errors. Elderly, people of
working age, children, lone parents, parents of small children, and people with disabilities
are targeted according to the programmes’ design, and, yet, the coverage of the entitled
and poor remains low, while leakage and inclusion of the non-poor is high.
[Table 3.3 here]
3.4.3 Robustness checks
In Section 3.3, Table 3.1 showed that for the three benefits, the number of observed receipts
in the EU-SILC data is lower than both the total number of simulated entitlements by
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EUROMOD and the number of recipients from administrative figures. We assume that
these differences are entirely due to benefit underreporting, i.e. not reporting to have
received a benefit (as opposed to reporting lower benefit amounts), in EU-SILC. In this
way, we test the sensitivity of our results on the targeting error rates: non-take-up, leakage,
exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the non- poor.14
As described in detail in Section 3.3, we look at the following five scenarios: the
baseline scenario with no correction for underreporting, and scenarios where the benefits
have been underreported in EU-SILC by non-recipients who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled,
iii) poor, or iv) non-poor. We impute benefit receipts for each scenario separately, so that
non-recipients are transformed into recipients. As a result, there is an increase in the
number of recipients in EU-SILC who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled, iii) poor, or iv) non-
poor. Scenarios i) and ii) provide bounds around non-take-up and leakage, while scenarios
iii) and iv) provide bounds around the rates of exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the
non-poor. The number of imputations is such that the total number of benefit receipts
(both reported and imputed) in EU-SILC matches in the first case, the total number
of simulated entitlements by EUROMOD and in the second case, the total number of
benefit receipts according to administrative figures. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 report how
the targeting error rates change according to the first and second case, respectively.
[Table 3.4 here]
[Table 3.5 here]
The range of the bounds for HA and GMI in Table 3.4 is much smaller than in
Table 3.5: this is because the discrepancy between the number of benefit receipts reported
in EU-SILC and entitlements calculated by EUROMOD is smaller than the discrepancy
between the number of receipts in EU-SILC and according to administrative records. The
opposite is true for CA. Table 3.4 shows that after accounting for benefit underreporting
the results remain robust with one exception in the case of CA the lower bound for the
exclusion of the poor equals 0.
14In addition, Appendix 2 reports the results from another sensitivity check based on simulations of
measurement error in the income data. The results provide some limited evidence that suggests that the
estimates on non-take-up and leakage in this analysis cannot be explained by measurement error in the
data. We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to implement these simulations.
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In Table 3.5, the rate of non-take-up 1 for HA and GMI is within a much larger range
than as shown in Table 3.4. In Table 3.4, the range is between 60-66 percent for HA and
56-73 percent for GMI. In Table 3.5, the bounds increase to 16-66 percent for HA and
20-73 percent for GMI. There is also a substantial discrepancy between the lower and
upper bounds for the rate of inclusion of the non-poor for both benefits. In Table 3.4, the
estimates range between 32-38 percent for HA and 23-39 percent for GMI. These increase
to 22-57 percent for HA and 17-56 percent for GMI in Table 3.5. The variation in the
rates is also large for the leakage of HA and GMI in Table 3.5, 42-77 percent for HA and
41-80 percent for GMI; in contrast, in Table 3.4 it is only 60-66 percent for HA and 56-73
percent for GMI. However, the exclusion of the poor rate shows relatively close bounds
for HA and GMI according to both tables.
The estimated bounds for CA are much narrower in Table 3.5 than in Table 3.4.
Furthermore, the lower limit for the exclusion of the poor while being 0 percent in Table 3.4
is 18 percent in Table 3.5.
It should be stressed that the two tables show ranges based on the extreme assumption
that benefit underreporting is the (only) reason why the number of benefit receipts in
EU-SILC is lower than the number of entitlements calculated by EUROMOD and the
number of benefit receipts from administrative data. Despite larger variations in some
of the estimates for HA and GMI in Table 3.5 and CA in Table 3.4, we can see that
the issues of targeting errors are persistent and suggest flaws in the benefit design and
implementation.
3.4.4 Impact on poverty
Means-tested benefits are an important income source for the poor households, who receive
them. In EU-SILC, for recipients in the poorest 10 percent of the population, GMI
provides on average 67 percent of household disposable income, HA provides 46 percent,
and CA 33 percent (all conditional on receipt). Across those in receipt of at least one
benefit, the benefit share of household income is, on average, 51 percent for the bottom
income decile group. These proportions fall quickly as income rises, although benefits
remain a significant income source up to the third decile (or the fourth decile in the case
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of CA) for those receiving them.
Although an important income source for some of those in poverty, the benefits have a
very small impact on reducing the poverty rates. Table 3.6 shows the estimated poverty
figures based on the pre-transfer (column 2) and post-transfer (including reported benefits,
column 3; or including simulated entitlements, column 5) equivalised household income.
The effect of the transfers is measured by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) (1984)
poverty indicators: poverty headcount, gap and severity. The headcount ratio is the
share of people with equivalised income below the poverty line. The poverty gap is the
per capita amount of money, as a percentage of the poverty line, needed to be transferred
to the poor to be lifted above the poverty threshold. The poverty severity shows the
poverty variation by taking the square of the poverty gap relative to the poverty line.
First, comparing pre-transfer and post-transfer estimates (columns 2 and 3 in Ta-
ble 3.6): The poverty rate in 2007 based on the pre-transfer equivalised income is 18.1
percent, and the estimated reduction is only 0.1 percentage points (pp) (or 0.6 percent).
The pre-transfer poverty gap is 6.3 percent (1.2 billion BGN). However, the total budget
of the three means-tested benefits represents only 28 percent of the gap (Boshnakov et al.,
2012), while the spending on all means-tested benefits provide 34 percent of the gap (Eu-
rostat, 2014); thus, even assuming that all poor would be reached by the transfers, these
programmes would reduce the gap by around one third. Due to large targeting errors
found in the previous subsection, the estimated reduction in the poverty gap after the
provision of the transfers is only 0.6pp (or about 9 percent).
We can compare these results with evidence for other European countries. Sainsbury
and Morissens (2002) discuss the impact of means-tested benefits on poverty reduction
across several European countries at the beginning and in the mid-90s. In the later period,
the largest absolute poverty reduction effect is observed in the Czech Republic, Sweden,
Finland, UK and Poland with absolute poverty reduction equal to 4.2pp, 5.5pp, 5.1pp,
8.5pp and 4pp, respectively. In Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, France, Belgium and
Italy, the effect is much smaller (2.7pp, 2.6pp, 1.8pp, 1.7pp, 0.8pp and 0.2pp, respectively),
however, still larger than in Bulgaria.
Avram (2016) shows that the poverty reducing effect of social assistance in 2007 in the
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Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia is also larger than in Bulgaria.
These results can be explained by the much larger coverage of the programmes among
the poor population and the larger spending as a share of the poverty gap. Furthermore,
in the three Baltic countries, where both coverage and spending are smaller, the poverty
reduction effect is still slightly larger than the one we observe in Bulgaria.
If we compare the pre-transfer with post-transfer poverty figures, based on the simu-
lated benefits (columns 2 and 5 in Table 3.6), the simulated benefits reduce the headcount
by 0.1pp (0.7 percent), and the gap and severity both by 1.4pp (22 percent and 43 per-
cent, respectively). Importantly, the simulated results demonstrate that with error-free
programme implementation the benefit payments would reduce the poverty gap and sever-
ity around 3 times as much as the observed benefits do. These findings suggest that there
is scope for policy improvement. And yet, poverty rates do not change dramatically,
showing that the generosity of the benefits is too low for them to contribute to a large
poverty reduction.
[Table 3.6 here]
3.5 Reform scenarios
The findings on targeting errors and poverty reduction raise concerns about the effec-
tiveness of the benefit programmes, and suggest the need to explore policy alternatives
which could result in better targeting and higher poverty reduction. In this section we
explore the poverty reducing effect of five different reform scenarios by using EUROMOD
to calculate benefit entitlements under hypothetical policy rules. We assume full take-up
and no leakage throughout.
The first reform, called the income-test reform, alters the income-test only, while
leaving the rest of the policy rules the same, with the aim to improve targeting of the
poor. The reformed income-test is based on equivalised household disposable income,
instead of per capita gross family (CA) or household (HA and GMI) income, as embedded
in the current legislation.
The remaining four reform scenarios illustrate the abolition of the three means-tested
benefits and the introduction of only one benefit which will be equal either to a flat
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rate, or to the shortfall between the poverty threshold and the equivalised household
disposable income. The arguments in favour of such reforms are that administering only
one programme instead of three implies fewer costs to government agencies; simplifying
and decreasing the number of eligibility criteria could lead to an increase in the take-up
rate; better targeting of benefit resources towards the poor could increase the poverty
reduction effect of the transfers.
A budget-neutral scenario would involve a flat rate of 12.7 BGN per month being given
to individuals with equivalised household disposable income below the 60 percent of the
median poverty line. The other three scenarios differ from each other in the definition of
the poverty line: it is in turn 40 percent (40pl), 50 percent (50pl) or 60 percent (60pl) of
the median equivalised household disposable income. In terms of total cost, the 40pl and
income-test reforms will be cheaper than the existing systems, with a budget of 49 percent
and 84 percent, respectively, of the budget for existing benefits. However, the number
of benefit entitlements will be also significantly smaller, only 30 percent and 43 percent,
respectively, of the number of the 2007 benefit recipients. The budget-neutral, flat-rate
benefit will have nearly the same number of benefit entitlements, 89 percent. The other
two scenarios, 50pl and 60pl suggest higher spending, equal to 1.03 and 1.96 times the
2007 budget. Both scenarios will provide fewer entitlements, 57 percent and 89 percent,
respectively.
Table 3.7 shows that, under the cheapest scenario, the 40pl reform, the reduction in
the poverty gap and severity (0.9pp (equal to 14 percent) and 1.1pp (equal to 32 percent),
respectively) would be greater than by the observed in the EU-SILC 2007 benefits (but less
than by the simulated entitlements). The next cheapest option, the income-test reform,
would have a larger reduction effect on the rates (larger than by the observed benefits
as well as simulated entitlements). After the changes, the benefits would reach more
households below the poverty threshold and provide them with higher benefit amounts.
As a result, the headcount would be reduced by 0.4pp (2 percent), and the poverty gap and
severity both by 1.6pp (26 percent and 48 percent, respectively). These results highlight
once again that the level of the benefits is too low and that there is potentially room for
improvement.
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The budget-neutral, flat rate reform would have much larger headcount reducing effect
of 2.9pp (16 percent). The effect on both poverty gap and severity would be around 2-3
times higher than the effect of the 2007 observed benefits (although the effect on poverty
severity will be lower compared to the effect of the simulated entitlements). Thus, at the
same cost, policy effectiveness in terms of poverty reduction can be significantly increased.
The 50pl reform would have a larger effect on the gap and severity (1.8pp (equal to
28 percent) and 1.7pp (equal to 50 percent) reduction, respectively) but no effect on the
headcount (the same as the 40pl reform). Finally, the 60pl reform would have the largest
poverty reducing effect leading to the headcount, gap and severity falling by 3.4pp (19
percent), 3.1pp (50 percent) and 2.2pp (66 percent), respectively.15
[Table 3.7 here]
The results in this section are purely illustrative. By exploring five reform scenarios we
show that there is a large scope for policy improvement which, if further explored, could
contribute to better targeting of the benefits to those in need, more adequate income
support, and a significant reduction in poverty.
3.6 Conclusion
In recent years, poverty has been increasing in Bulgaria, rising from 14 percent in 1999
to 21 percent in 2012. One of the explanations for this is the small impact that social
transfers have on poverty, which could in turn partly reflect low levels of expenditures on
social protection but may also be due to poor policy design or implementation.
We provide a comprehensive assessment of the performance of the three largest means-
tested benefits in Bulgaria combining household survey data with estimates of entitlements
to benefits produced by the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD. We measure
their performance in terms of targeting by estimating rates of benefit non-take-up, leakage,
exclusion of the poor, inclusion of the non-poor and the extent to which they reduce
poverty. The paper contributes to the existing literature by providing some of the first
15It should be noted that poverty rates are not reduced by 100% because the definitions of the income-
test and the equivalised income used for estimating the poverty indicators differ.
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measures of non-take-up and leakage for an Eastern European country and of the benefits
under study.
The analysis finds very high rates of non-take-up, leakage of the benefits to non-entitled
households, exclusion of a large part of the poor, and inclusion of non-poor households
and families mainly positioned in higher income deciles. Depending on the definition of
benefit non-take-up, we find that more than 40 percent of the households entitled for
HA and GMI do not claim the benefits. Although GMI is a benefit intended to have
a widespread coverage of the population, due to the very low income-test and, possibly,
due to stigma, it has the smallest number of entitled and, together with HA, the highest
rate of non-take-up. In contrast, the child benefit CA, the entitlement to which is mainly
defined based on the age of the children and a higher income-test, has a higher take-up,
suggesting lower associated stigma with claiming the benefit or lower information costs.
Furthermore, a large proportion of the beneficiaries have incomes exceeding the income-
test which should disqualify them from entitlement. This high rate of leakage could be
explained by a failure of the social workers to administer the programmes correctly, by
corruptions of civil servants through bribes or by under-declaring of claimants’ incomes
to the tax authorities. In either case, the very low performance of the benefits raises seri-
ous concerns about the quality of the programme implementation. We consider possible
biases in the results that would arise if benefit receipt were underreported in EU-SILC,
and calculate upper and lower bounds around the rates: the findings of the paper remain
robust to these checks.
In addition, despite the objectives of the programmes to cover basic needs and provide
income support to the vulnerable, the level of the benefits and the coverage of the poor
population are too low to have a significant poverty-reducing effect.
Taking a longer-term perspective, since 2007, not much has been done in terms of
reforming the Bulgarian means-tested benefit system. The main changes have been to
income-thresholds and benefit levels although we should note that statutory indexation
rules are missing and the increases have lagged growth in prices and/or earnings (see
Boshnakov et al., 2012 and Boshnakov et al., 2014). Given that the three benefits form
the bulk of the social security budget spent on the poor, and given the increase in poverty
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in Bulgaria over the last decade, the results show that there is a need for policy improve-
ment. We consider five potential reform scenarios and show that, even without increasing
spending, the government could achieve the provision of more adequate income support
and a significant reduction in poverty.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Distribution of benefit spending over the income distribution
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Source: Authors calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. Notes: The income distribution is based on equivalised
household incomes before receiving each one of the transfers in turn. The unit of analysis is the household.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of benefit recipients over the income distribution
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1:
A comparison between EUROMOD, administrative figures and EU-SILC
 EUROMOD  (1) 
Admin 
figures (2) 
Ratio 
(1/2) 
EU-SILC  
 (4) 
Ratio 
(4/2) 
A. NUMBER OF SIMULATED BENEFIT ENTITLEMENTS/REPORTED RECIPIENTS (IN 
THOUSANDS) 
HA 208 300 0.69 195 0.65 
GMI 56 77 0.73 46 0.60 
CA 927 835 1.11 808 0.97 
B. TOTAL SPENDING (IN MILLION BGN)    
HA 47 83 0.56 39 0.47 
GMI 57 66 0.87 35 0.53 
CA 206 193 1.07 140 0.73 
 
Source: EUROMOD: Authors calculations using EUROMOD. Administrative figures: Boshnakov et al. (2012). EU-SILC:
EU-SILC 2008 for Bulgaria.
Notes: EUROMOD number of simulated entitlements and EU-SILC number of recipients refer to households (GMA and
HA) or children (CA). In the administrative figure, the number of GMI recipients equals the monthly-average number of
recipients. The administrative figure for HA shows the total number of paid benefits, while for CA it refers to the number
of children receiving the benefit. EUROMOD and EU-SILC figures are weighted.
Table 3.2:
Value of benefit entitlement for those entitled to
and in receipt of the benefits
 HA  GMI  CA  
Mean value of benefit:    
Reported 17 63 24 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + 
reporting a positive amount  19 121 33 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + not 
reporting a positive amount  19 72 25 
Sample size:    
Reported 364 71 774 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + 
reporting a positive amount  119 23 587 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + not 
reporting a positive amount  238 76 290 
 Source: Authors calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD.
Notes: All rates are calculated at the household level. The mean benefit value is in the local currency, BGN. The reported
benefits are taken from the EU-SILC data while eligibility and size of benefit entitlements (claimed and unclaimed) are
simulated by EUROMOD.
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Table 3.3:
Targeting error rates
Benefit Indicator Rates 
Standard 
error 
95% conf.  interval 
2.5% 97.5% 
HA Non-take-up 1 66.4 3.0 60.6 72.2 
 Non-take-up 2 41.4 2.3 37.0 45.9 
 Leakage 64.2 3.1 58.2 70.2 
 Exclusion of the poor 77.3 1.5 74.4 80.1 
 Inclusion of the non-poor 33.9 2.9 28.1 39.6 
GMI Non-take-up 1 73.2 5.4 62.6 83.8 
 Non-take-up 2 46.9 4.8 37.4 56.4 
 Leakage 67.6 6.4 55.2 80.1 
 Exclusion of the poor 94.0 1.0 92.2 95.9 
 Inclusion of the non-poor 27.1 5.9 15.6 38.7 
CA Non-take-up 1 38.8 1.8 35.2 42.4 
 Non-take-up 2 33.9 1.7 30.6 37.1 
 Leakage 19.4 1.7 16.0 22.8 
 Exclusion of the poor 30.0 3.4 23.5 36.6 
 Inclusion of the non-poor 77.9 1.7 74.5 81.2 
 
Source: Authors calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD.
Notes: All rates are calculated at the household level. Bootstrap procedure has been used to calculate the standard errors
and confidence intervals. The bootstrap is based on 1,000 replications of the total household sample.
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3.9 Appendix 1
Appendix 1 describes in detail the characteristics of the underlying household survey
data from the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The
response rate of the EU-SILC survey is 66.6%. Household non-response is mainly due to
the following three reasons. First, 7.3% of the households did not respond because e.g.
it was not possible to contact them at their address. Second, 26% of the households that
were contacted did not complete the interview due to refusal to cooperate, absence of
household members or entire household, objective inability to respond, etc. Furthermore,
due to person’s non-response and inability to impute the missing data, 5 households
were dropped from the sample. Children born after the income reference period were
also excluded. The final sample size consists of 4,339 households represented by 12,148
individuals.
The National Statistical Institute (NSI) in Bulgaria, responsible for the collection
of the data, has carried out various data cleaning and imputation procedures in case
of income misreporting and unit non-response. For example, all gross income values
have been checked against their net values. Lower and upper bounds based upon the
national legislation have been also used as a check on most of the recorded social benefits
and pensions. Administrative data from the National Social Security Institute, other
administrative sources and data from previous waves of the longitudinal EU-SILC have
been used for a comparison against extreme income values.
An example of the checks carried out by the NSI is in regard to the contributory
family-related benefits. If an individual receives such benefits she is generally not eligible
for non-contributory social assistance benefits. NSI checks for consistency and makes data
adjustments accordingly. Other adjustments are carried out if reported benefit amounts
exceed the maximum possible payments, e.g. in the case of benefits for unemployment,
old-age, survivor, sickness and disability benefits. The data have also been corrected for
possible double-reporting of income components.
In regard to the two social assistance benefits, HA (Q30.1) and GMI (Q30.3), the ques-
tion asked in the household EU-SILC questionnaire is: ‘Q.30 Have you or another member
of the household received some of the following social benefits during 2007 for: Q30.1 assis-
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tance payments for heating; Q30.2 monthly assistance payments for rent; Q30.3 monthly
monetary benefit for low income, Q30.4 lump-sum social aid for satisfying accidentally
occurred health, educational, communal, household and other needs.’ The respondent
has to give answers for each of the benefits. If in receipt of the benefit, the respondent
has to provide information on the duration of receipt and benefit amount.
For the CA (Q32.3), the question in the survey is: ‘Q32 Have you or another member
of the household received some of the following monthly family/children benefits during
2007 for: Q32.1 monthly benefits for bringing up a child younger than 1; Q32.2 monthly
benefit for bringing up child with permanent disabilities; Q32.3 monthly child benefits
till 18 years of age; Q32.4 monthly child benefits till 20 years of age with permanent
disability’. Here as well, the respondent has to give answer on the duration and amount
of each of the benefits.
The three benefits in the analysis are among the largest and most popular means-
tested benefits in Bulgaria and their names are distinctive from each other suggesting
they target different types of needs (provision of minimum income level, cash support for
heating and support for children). Therefore, we do not have any reason to believe that
respondents might not be aware of the name of the benefit if they receive it or that they
have misreported it under a different benefit.
In terms of validating the income variables reported in EU-SILC, we did extensive
checks as part of validating the entitlements simulations done by EUROMOD. We com-
pared information on market incomes, benefits, pensions and taxes and social insurance
contributions (number of recipients/contributors and aggregate amounts) with data from
national accounts, Household Budget Survey estimates, and administrative data from the
National Social Security Institute and Agency for Social Assistance. Where there were
deviations between EU-SILC reported data, EUROMOD simulation results and data from
external sources, these were carefully studied and explained by Boshnakov et al. (2012).
For employment income, Boshnakov et al. (2012) report that EU-SILC, relative to
national accounts data, overestimates both the number of individuals with employment
income (by 32.5 percentage points) and the total employment income (by 13.9 percentage
points) which they explain could be due to informal employment and wages not accounted
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for in the national accounts. The average employment income in the survey is, however,
14.1 percentage points lower than the national accounts average which could be explained
by the extra employees in EU-SILC reporting low amounts of income on average (this
could reflect informal earnings or underreporting of amounts in EU-SILC; there is no
evidence of the relative size of either issue).
For self-employment income, there are discrepancies between the definition of self-
employed in EU-SILC and the one in the national accounts data which makes the com-
parison between the two sources problematic. Nevertheless, a comparison between the
two sources shows the following: The number of self-employed in EU-SILC is exactly half
the number reported in national accounts (see Boshnakov et al., 2012). The national
accounts data for the total amount of self-employment income is captured in the category
‘Net operating surplus and net mixed income’ for the households. The total amount of
self-employment income reported by respondents in EU-SILC is only 32.5% of the figure
on ‘Net operating surplus and net mixed income’ from the national accounts data (see
here: http://nsi.bg/en/content/5547/annual-data). For rent, the national accounts
figure which captures officially declared rents shows a very small amount compared to the
one reported in EU-SILC.
Public pensions and other benefits that enter the income-test for the three benefits
studied in the paper seem to be well captured by EU-SILC. For more detailed information
on EU-SILC data and EUROMOD simulations, see Boshnakov et al. (2012).
To sum up, we find limited evidence on the extent of income underreporting in EU-
SILC and among the recipients of HA, GMI and CA. This does not allow us to measure
the direction or size of a potential bias in the results.
3.10 Appendix 2
To explore the possibility that our results on non-take-up and leakage can be explained
by measurement error in the income data, we performed a simulation. As Hernandez and
Pudney (2007) argue, estimating jointly the extent of measurement error and non-take-
up based purely on data on incomes that contains measurement error is very challenging.
Nevertheless, we present the results for illustrative purposes.
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First, we simulated income data which is log-normally distributed and identical in their
statistical moments (mean and variance by income centiles) to the income data observed
in EU-SILC and based on which benefit entitlements are assessed. As this exercise is for
illustrative purposes we assumed that the simulated income data represent true incomes as
opposed to the EU-SILC data which contain measurement error. Second, as the targeting
measures are assessed at the household level, the number of observations in the simulated
data equals the number of households in EU-SILC. Third, we simulated entitlement to
the three benefits HA, GMI and CA assuming full take-up and no leakage. We added to
the (log of the) simulated income data a random term with a mean of 0 which is normally
distributed. In summary, the simulations show that such type of measurement error does
not seem to generate a pattern of income misreporting that would explain the results
in the paper. Specifically, we assumed different values for the standard deviation of the
random term which showed the following results, also reported in Table A2: A random
term with standard deviation of 0.35 would re-produce (almost) the same non-take-up
rate based on the second definition for HA and leakage rate for CA observed in the paper.
The generated non-take-up rate based on the first definition for HA, non-take-up rates
(both definitions) for GMI and CA as well as leakage rates for HA and GMI would be
lower than the ones estimated in the paper. Notably, the standard deviation of the income
will be increased by a substantial 22 percent.
Increasing the standard deviation of the random term to 0.4 would result in an even
larger 29 percent increase in the standard deviation of the income data. The simulations
show that the non-take-up rate based on the second definition for HA and the leakage
rate for CA will be slightly overestimated. The non-take-up rate based on the second
definition for GMI will be re-produced at a level as estimated in the paper. However, the
non-take-up rates based on the first definition for HA and GMI and both definitions for
CA will continue to be underestimated. The leakage rates for HA and GMI will be still
nowhere near the rates estimated in the paper.
Introducing a random term with standard deviation of 0.6 would add a lot of noise to
the income data a 70 percent increase in the standard deviation. The simulations show
that the leakage rate for CA and the non-take-up rates based on the second definition
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for HA and GMI will be overestimated. However, adding the random term to the income
data will generate almost the same non-take-up rates based on the first definition for HA
and GMI as the ones estimated in the paper. The non-take-up rates for CA and leakage
rates for HA and GMI will yet not be achieved by this simulation.
The non-take-up rates for CA would be about the same as in the paper if the random
term has a standard deviation of 1.2. However, this will also result in 6 times increase in
the standard deviation of the income data.
The leakage rates for HA and GMI estimated in the paper cannot be achieved by any
plausible value of the standard deviation of the random term (as we increase the standard
deviation, leakage rates for both benefits converge to around 50%, which is about 20-30
percent lower than the rates estimated in the paper).
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Chapter 4
Improving Poverty Reduction in
Europe: What Works Best Where?1
(published in 2018 in the Journal of European Social Policy and co-authored
with Chrysa Leventi and Holly Sutherland)
Abstract
This paper examines how income poverty is affected by changes to the scale of tax-benefit
policies and which are the most cost-effective policies in reducing poverty or limiting its increase
in seven diverse EU countries. We do that by measuring the implications of increasing/reducing
the scale of each policy instrument, using microsimulation methods while holding constant the
policy design and national context. We consider commonly-applied policy instruments with a
direct effect on household income: child benefits, social assistance, income tax lower thresholds
and a benchmark case of re-scaling the whole tax-benefit system. We find that the assessment of
the most cost-effective instrument may depend on the measure of poverty used and the direction
and scale of the change. Nevertheless, our results indicate that the options that reduce poverty
most cost-effectively in most countries are increasing child benefits and social assistance while
reducing the former is a particularly poverty-increasing way of making budgetary cuts.
1Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Bea Cantillon, Francesco Figari, Tim Goedeme´, John
Hills, Alari Paulus and Istva´n To´th, two referees and the Editor for valuable comments and suggestions.
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for Italy the national EU-SILC data made available by ISTAT are used; and for the UK Family Resources
Survey data are made available by the Department for Work and Pensions via the UK Data Service. The
usual disclaimers apply. The research in this paper was financially supported by the European Union
Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement n 290613 (ImPRovE project). The authors also
acknowledge support from the ESRC Research Centre for Micro-Social Change (MiSoC) at the University
of Essex.
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4.1 Introduction
With its roots in the late nineteenth century, the modern welfare state is now established
in all European Union (EU) member states. One of its most important missions has
become poverty reduction. While combating poverty is a high priority objective in the
EU, income poverty remains persistently high or is rising in many European countries and
the EU2020 targets for poverty reduction seem unattainable (Eurostat, 2017b). It is clear
that, in order to move towards the targets in a convincing way, there is need for increased
and differently-allocated public spending. However, in the context of the recovery from
the economic crisis, or its persistence in some countries, budgetary retrenchment remains
on the agenda.
Research on public redistribution has focused on tax-benefit policies, as the main
tools through which governments influence distributional outcomes. The effectiveness
of policies in reducing poverty depends on a number of factors. First, the environment
in which they operate plays a key role. This applies first to the characteristics of the
population for whom they are intended and the macroeconomic conditions of the time
(Atkinson, 2009). Second, the effectiveness of particular policy instruments naturally
depends on the specifics of their design (Levy et al., 2009; Avram et al., 2013). Third,
it depends on how people react to policies. For example, targeting resources on those
with low incomes may appear efficient for poverty reduction but is less so if means-testing
results in incomplete benefit take-up or if benefits reduce the financial incentive to work
for the recipients or others in their household (Adema et al., 2003; Mood, 2006; Bargain
et al., 2007). Finally, effectiveness in reducing poverty depends on the scale of the policy
instrument.
Research on how much ‘size matters’ relative to design has mainly concentrated on
family policies (e.g. Matsaganis et al. (2006) for southern European countries, Levy
et al. (2007) for Austria, Spain and the UK, Notten and Gassmann (2008) for Russia,
Salanauskaite and Verbist (2013) for Lithuania and four other post-2004 EU member
states, and Popova (2016) for Russia in comparison with four western European countries).
Most findings suggest that size is the most important aspect but that specific design
features may be particularly effective in poverty reduction within their national contexts.
The questions we attempt to answer in this paper are the following: how are income
poverty levels affected by changes to the scale of tax-benefit policies? Which are the
most cost-effective policies in reducing poverty in seven diverse EU countries? With these
questions in mind, we address two important limitations of the existing literature: first,
while the literature mainly focuses on one type of policy (family benefits), our analysis
compares across several types of policy instruments within as well as between countries.
The policies considered are child benefits, social assistance benefits and income tax lower
thresholds. In addition, to provide a benchmark against which to compare the effects
of individual policy instruments, we consider what happens to poverty indicators if all
monetary levels and thresholds in the tax-benefit system are altered. Second, while most
of the literature concentrates on the poverty-reducing effectiveness of different policy
designs, this research sheds light on the effectiveness of the scale of given policy designs;
using microsimulation techniques, we explicitly measure the distributional implications of
increasing or reducing the scale of each policy, holding constant its design and national
context.
To assess the relative cost-effectiveness of the instruments in reducing poverty, we also
contribute to the existing literature by developing an indicator, defined as the ratio of
the percentage point change in poverty (headcount or gap) to the net cost to the public
budget, expressed as a proportion of GDP.2 This indicator allows us to compare the
cost-effectiveness across instruments and countries in a meaningful and straightforward
way.
We compare across seven EU countries chosen for their diversity of tax-benefit systems
and size of policy instruments: Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the
UK. These countries cover the whole spectrum of European non-pension social spending:
from the high spenders (Belgium and the United Kingdom with 19.1% and 16.1% of GDP
in 2013, respectively) to the low spenders (Bulgaria and Estonia with 9.4% and 8.2% of
GDP in 2013, respectively).3 Average levels also differ substantially: the mean value of
child benefits (for those in receipt) varies from 6% of the median equivalent disposable
income in Greece to 27.5% in Hungary. Large variations are also observed for social
2This is closely related to measures of target efficiency developed by Beckerman (1979).
3See Eurostat (2017a), indicator spr exp sum.
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assistance benefit levels and the income levels at which people become liable for income
tax (Table 4.1). This diversity is important, as it enables us to compare a number of
different policy settings and, hence, reach conclusions that go beyond the seven countries
in question on top of providing country-specific pointers for practical policy reform.
We use EUROMOD, the tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union
and household micro-data, representative of the national populations. Combining EURO-
MOD with the micro-data provides a unique opportunity to experiment with the scale of
the instruments for a wide range of increases and decreases. It also allows us to calculate
with precision and cross-country comparability the net effects of policy changes, taking
into account the complex interactions within and between the tax-benefit policies as well
as the heterogeneity of population characteristics.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the rationale for choosing the
policy instruments and explains how they are scaled up and down. Section 4.3 explains
the methodology that is used. Section 4.4 presents our estimates of the effect of changes to
each of the policy instruments on poverty and compares cost-effectiveness across countries
and instruments. The final Section 4.5 concludes by summarising the most important
findings and by reflecting on the policy implications of this analysis.
4.2 The policy instruments
The instruments we focus on have been chosen on the basis of two criteria. First, they
are commonly considered as components of reform strategies to reduce income poverty
(or restrain its growth). Thus, we analyse non-contributory benefits that either aim to
target the poor or provide universal support rather than contributory benefits which
have insurance against risks (e.g. unemployment) as their primary aim. Second, the
instruments already exist in most EU countries, and hence are suitable for consideration
in a comparative context.
[place Table 4.1 here]
We consider how cost-effectiveness depends on the scale of the instrument by expand-
ing/contracting relevant monetary levels and thresholds by common percentages: 5%,
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20%, 50%, 70% and 90%.4 We also disentangle the part of poverty change that is related
to changes in eligibility (that is, fewer/more benefit recipients/tax payers) and the part
related to changes in benefit/tax threshold levels for those already in receipt/liable.
4.2.1 Child benefits
We expect increasing the scale of child benefits to contribute to reducing poverty among
households with children. The extent of the effect depends on the design of the benefit,
whether or not benefit entitlements depend on the age and number of children, and how
they impact on the particular households with children below the poverty line (Bradshaw,
2006). If the benefit is universal it may appear to be less cost-effective in terms of poverty
reduction than a benefit targeted on low income families, but it will have the advantages
of high take-up and political support (Matsaganis et al., 2006; Notten and Gassmann,
2008; Levy et al., 2013).
We focus on non-contributory cash benefits specifically targeted at children. Per-child
and per-family amounts in universal and means-tested child benefits are adjusted.5 We
also adjust income thresholds in any child benefit means tests, so the number of bene-
ficiaries changes. We do not adjust maternity and parental benefits or child-contingent
components of adult out-of-work/in-work or housing benefits, nor support for children
channelled through the personal income tax system, which is considerable in Hungary.6
For the instruments we consider, Table 4.1 shows how the average value compares
with median equivalised household disposable income and the proportion of all households
relying on the instrument (in the case of benefits only) in each country. Child benefits are
4We choose not to show the effects of abolishing instruments entirely because in some policy systems
receipt of a particular benefit acts as a passport to entitlement to other benefits or as an alternative
to receipt of other benefits. Invoking these effects would distract from our focus on the effectiveness of
particular instruments.
5The benefits that are adjusted here are as follows: Belgium, non-means-tested child allowance,
means-tested child allowance; Bulgaria: means-tested child benefit, non-means-tested birth grant, non-
means-tested child benefit for mothers in tertiary education, means-tested child benefit for education,
non-means-tested benefit for twins; Estonia: child allowance, childcare allowance, parental allowance for
families with 7+ children, childbirth allowance, foster care allowance (all non-means-tested); Greece:
child benefit, large family benefit (both means-tested); Italy: means-tested family allowances for lone
parents, two parents and for families with at least 3 children; Hungary: non-means-tested family al-
lowance, means-tested regular child protection benefit, non-means-tested maternity grant, non-means-
tested child raising support, non-means-tested child care allowance; UK: means-tested child tax credit,
non-means-tested child benefit.
6Figari et al. (2011) analyse the impact of the whole package of child contingent incomes.
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relatively generous in Hungary, the UK and to a lesser extent in Belgium. They are much
more modest in Greece, Estonia, Italy and Bulgaria. In the latter group of countries only
a minority of households with children is entitled to such benefits.
4.2.2 Social Assistance
Expanding the generosity of cash social assistance schemes is an effective way of increasing
the income of existing recipients, and may also draw in more people who have incomes
that previously made them ineligible. However, the poverty effect of increasing the social
assistance level depends not only on the level relative to the poverty threshold and if condi-
tions of entitlement exclude some people by design (Figari et al., 2013; Van Mechelen and
Marchal, 2013) but also on non-take-up of the benefits due to stigma, mis-administration
or other reasons (Eurfound, 2015).
Table 4.1 shows that Belgium is the country with the highest average benefit payment
and the second lowest benefit prevalence among the seven. The UK comes second in terms
of average payment and first in terms of prevalence.7 In Hungary the prevalence is very
low and no national cash social assistance benefits were available in Greece and Italy in
2013.8
4.2.3 Income tax threshold
Raising the income level at which people become liable for income tax is a way of increasing
their disposable income that could in principle take them out of poverty or reduce the
poverty gap. However, this depends on the relationship between the tax and poverty
thresholds. If the tax threshold is already high there may be few people in poor households
who are liable for income tax.
Bulgaria and Hungary are not included in this part of the analysis as they have a flat
tax without an income-exemption limit. In Italy, where tax credits operate instead of
income exemptions, the amounts of these tax credits are increased/decreased instead. In
7The specific benefits that are included are: Belgium: income support, Bulgaria: guaranteed min-
imum income, heating allowance; Estonia: subsistence benefit, means-tested subsistence benefit for
families; Hungary: social assistance (regular benefit and stand-by allowance); UK: income support,
income-based jobseeker’s allowance, pension credit. All benefits are means-tested.
8See World Bank (2015) and Ravagli (2015), respectively, for analysis of the effects of potential schemes
in these two countries.
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Greece, in 2013 there was no zero-rate band or equivalent but the system of 2012 (and all
the previous ones) included this component. Our simulations first re-introduce that and
then explore the effect of amending it.
Table 4.1 shows that the threshold varies greatly: in Estonia it is half the size of that
in Greece, Italy and the UK.
4.2.4 Re-scaling the whole tax-benefit system
To provide a benchmark against which to compare the effects of individual policy in-
struments, we consider what happens to poverty indicators if all monetary levels and
thresholds in the systems of direct taxes and cash benefits are increased/decreased. One
might expect comprehensive whole-system changes to be less closely targeted on low in-
come households than some of the individual policy instruments that we consider. The
effect depends on the salience of monetary levels, amounts and thresholds in the tax-
benefit system and where in the income distribution these thresholds apply.9 It may
therefore differ across countries and our analysis throws some light on this issue.
4.3 Methodology and data
4.3.1 Model, data and assumptions
We use the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD and household micro-data on
gross incomes, labour market status and other characteristics of individuals and house-
holds. Intuitively, EUROMOD does the following: first, country-specific tax and benefit
rules (as at 30 June 2013 in our analysis) are applied to the household data. By doing so,
EUROMOD identifies in the data i) who (e.g. individual or family) is entitled to receive a
benefit or is liable to pay income taxes or social insurance contributions (SIC) and ii) how
much the benefit entitlements and tax or SIC liabilities amount to. Second, a measure of
cash household net income is derived based on the sum of the reported gross incomes and
the calculated benefit entitlements, net of taxes and SIC.
9For related analysis on the UK see Sutherland et al. (2008) and on the same 7 countries, Hills et al.
(2014).
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Using EUROMOD combined with household data is crucial in our analysis for the
following reasons: we can simulate changes to the parameters of policies, by taking into
account all resulting changes to both the eligibility and the level of benefit/tax amounts
at the individual/household level. In turn, this allows us to decompose the change in the
poverty levels due to changes in the instrument size by changes in the population coverage
versus the benefit/tax level. Furthermore, when changes to a particular instrument are
simulated this may affect other benefit entitlements or tax liabilities. These interactions
are taken into account as it is the net effect on household income that is relevant. Finally,
both the model and household data have been harmonised across countries to allow for
meaningful and consistent cross-country comparisons. EUROMOD has been validated
both at the micro and macro level and has been extensively used to address a wide range
of economic and social policy research questions (see Sutherland and Figari (2013) and
Figari et al. (2015)).
The household data come from the 2010 European Union Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Italy and Hun-
gary. For the UK, the 2009/10 Family Resources Survey (FRS) is used. Gross market
incomes are updated from the micro-data income reference period (2009) to the target
period (2013) using appropriate indices for each income source. Information on income
components that cannot be calculated by EUROMOD is taken directly from the data and
updated to 2013, along with market incomes.10 No adjustments are made for economic
or demographic changes in the period 2009-13.
Non-take-up of means-tested benefits is an important phenomenon to account for in
evaluating their distributional impact. In the case of non-take-up of social assistance
and means-tested child benefits, their poverty effect would be overestimated if full take-
up were assumed. In EUROMOD we make adjustments for benefit non-take-up where
there is relevant information: to social assistance benefits in Belgium and all means-tested
benefits and tax credits in the UK (Leventi and Vujackov, 2016). We assume no change in
take-up probability in the case of our simulated reforms and we do not attempt to capture
behavioral reactions to policy changes in any dimension. Finally, the policy scenarios are
10Non-simulated components are typically contributory pensions and maternity benefits and disability
benefits. They are not simulated because of insufficient information in the household micro-data about
work history or disability status to calculate eligibility or size of entitlement.
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not revenue-neutral by design, because the point is to measure the budgetary cost. Any
financing mechanism would itself have distributional and behavioural effects.
4.3.2 Evaluating the results
We measure effectiveness of the policy instruments according to their impact on income
poverty measured using a fixed threshold of 60% of the national median household dis-
posable income in 2013. To account for household size and economies of scale within the
household, household incomes are equivalised using the modified OECD scale (assigning
a value of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to any other adult and 0.3 for each child aged
under 14). We use the poverty headcount ratio (that is, the percentage of the population
living below the poverty line) and the normalised poverty gap ratio (that is, the average
poverty gap11 expressed as a ratio of the poverty line).12 We calculate standard errors for
the results based on the DASP package developed by Araar and Duclos (2007), taking
into account sampling variation.
We evaluate the change in poverty in relation to the change in the net budgetary
cost to the public finances. We use as an indicator of cost-effectiveness the ratio of the
percentage point change in poverty (headcount or gap) to the change in net budgetary
cost (spending on cash benefits less revenue from direct taxes and SIC), expressed as
a proportion of GDP. This provides a metric that can be compared across the policy
instruments and across countries.
4.4 Results
The effects of changes to the three policy instruments on the poverty headcount and
gap are discussed policy-by-policy and in relation to their budgetary implications (shown
graphically in Figures 4.1 to 4.3), and also relative to re-scaling the whole systems (Figure
4.4). Detailed results for the 5%, 20%, 50%, 70% and 90% increases/decreases are shown
in the Appendix (Tables 4.3, 4.4). Table 4.2 provides an assessment of the relative cost-
effectiveness of the instruments within and across countries.
11Poverty gap is the mean shortfall of the total population from the poverty line (counting the non-poor
as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line.
12These indicators correspond to FGT0 and FGT1 from Foster et al. (1984).
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4.4.1 Child benefits
As shown in the Appendix (Tables 4.3 and 4.4), increasing child benefits by 20% has a
modest effect on the poverty headcount, lowering it by 1.3 percentage points (pp) in the
UK, 1.2pp in Hungary and 0.9pp in Belgium (the countries with the largest child benefit
systems), but by much less in the other countries. An increase of 90% would result in a
reduction of the headcount by at least 1pp in all countries, with large inroads in Hungary
(4.8pp), the UK (3.5pp) and Belgium (3.3pp). The same three countries show the largest
effects on the poverty gap.
Figure 4.1a shows that in many countries the effect on the poverty headcount is broadly
proportional to the scale of the change in spending on child benefits (measured in terms of
percent of GDP), both for increases and decreases: the lines are straight and the effects are
symmetrical for increases and decreases. There are some exceptions as well as differences
in the gradient of the effects (that is, differences in poverty effectiveness depending on the
scale of the benefit). The poverty rate falls fastest for a given increase in child benefit
spending in Hungary and rises fastest for a given reduction in spending in the UK.
These differences can be explained by a number of factors: the density and composition
of populations affected by the changes in benefits, the relationship between any income
thresholds and the poverty threshold, and the nature of the benefit designs. There are
some interactions with other parts of the tax-benefit system: in Hungary elements of
the child benefit are taxable and in Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary they are included in
the assessment for social assistance entitlement and for housing benefit in the UK. But
these do not seem to play a major role in explaining the differences in patterns of cost-
effectiveness, since in many cases they affect both the budgetary effect and the income
position of the household relative to the poverty threshold.
For example, the UK is distinguished by a generous means-tested child benefit, on
top of a child benefit that is not means-tested except at high incomes. Together they
bring many families from below to above the poverty threshold and further expanding
them is not only increasingly less cost-effective because fewer recipients are poor, but also
costs increase due to extension of coverage of the means-tested component as well as the
level of both benefits for existing recipients. Reductions in size have a proportionately
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large adverse effect on poverty because many benefit recipients are brought from above to
below the poverty threshold in part due to reductions in coverage. A similar reduction in
cost-effectiveness is observed in Belgium for high levels of expansion, because of increasing
proportions of recipients of the mainly non-means-tested benefit having crossed above the
poverty threshold. Stronger effects in the other direction, as in the UK, are not observed
as coverage effects are minimal in the mainly universal Belgian child benefit system. In
Hungary, the other country with large child benefits, mostly universal, cost-effectiveness
is broadly unrelated to scale.
In the case of Bulgaria, the reduction in spending is smaller for larger reductions in
child benefits, that is, the rate of return is decreasing. This is mostly due to the population
composition; there are fewer families with very low incomes (between 10% and 30% of
the value of the child benefit income-test) than with low incomes (between 30% and 50%
of the value of the child benefit income-test). It is also due to the interaction between
child benefits and social assistance; spending on social assistance benefits increases when
scaling down child benefits but income levels on social assistance are too low for there to
be an effect on the poverty headcount.
Figure 4.1b shows the relationship between child benefit spending and the poverty
gap, which is still linear for the four countries with smaller child benefits, with Estonia
showing somewhat lower poverty effectiveness (smaller gradient) than Bulgaria, Greece
or Italy. This suggests that the relatively small benefits are important for reducing the
poverty gap, but even the 90% increase does not succeed in lifting many households above
the poverty threshold. The relationships are not linear in Belgium, Hungary or the UK
with higher poverty gap reduction effectiveness at lower levels of spending. This can be
explained by larger benefits lifting households above the poverty threshold, where they
no longer contribute to the poverty gap. This flattening of the curve at higher spending
levels is particularly evident for the UK where increasing child benefits by 90% would
imply a poverty gap reduction of less than one fifth, whereas reducing benefits by 90%
would imply an increase in poverty gap of 70%. For these three countries over the whole
range, poverty gap effectiveness is highest in Hungary and lowest in Belgium, except for
very large increases where it is lower in the UK.
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[Figure 4.1 here]
4.4.2 Social Assistance
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b show equivalent results for changing social assistance benefit lev-
els. There are some aspects that are in marked contrast to the effects of changing child
benefits. First, the scale of the existing systems and hence the effects of proportional ex-
pansion/contraction on budgetary cost vary differently across countries. In contrast with
its relatively large child benefit payments, Hungary has a very small social assistance
scheme. The UK is the country with the costliest proportional expansion, because it
starts with relatively high payments and high coverage. Second, the relationship between
the poverty effects of benefit decreases and increases is different. Typically, increasing
social assistance levels not only increases the income of current recipients but extends
entitlement to those with higher income. Our methodology enables us to disentangle
the part of poverty change which is related to changes in eligibility (that is, fewer/more
benefit recipients) and the part related to changes in benefit levels for those already in
receipt (Appendix Table 4.5). We find that indeed changes in the poverty headcount,
as a result of scaling up/down the policy in Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary and UK are
driven by both changes in the benefit levels and coverage (although we should note that
in Belgium, Bulgaria and Hungary we rarely see large total poverty changes). We draw
the same conclusion for the changes in the poverty gap in all five countries considered,
including Estonia (Appendix Table 4.6).
Depending on the composition of the relevant sections of the income distribution, the
budgetary cost of increases could be higher than the budgetary savings from equivalent
decreases. Figures 4.2a and 4.2b depict this in all five systems with the strongest cases
being Estonia and Belgium. In Belgium and Bulgaria the effect on the poverty headcount
of reducing social assistance is small, whereas the increase in poverty gap is relatively
large, consistent with the finding of Tasseva (2016) for Bulgaria that most social assistance
recipients are among those with incomes far below the poverty threshold. When scaling
down social assistance, we again see decreasing rate of return of spending, that is, for larger
decreases in social assistance benefit levels the reduction in total spending is smaller, due
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to small numbers of beneficiaries on very low incomes.
In contrast, in the UK reducing social assistance has a substantial effect on the poverty
headcount (cutting it by 90% results in a 4pp increase), consistent with some existing
recipients having incomes above the poverty threshold. Reductions add to the poverty rate
and make budgetary savings even comparing the 70% with the 90% reduction scenario.
This is because some social assistance entitlements take account of extra costs, such as
for disability, and may bring recipient incomes a long way above the poverty threshold
in the baseline. In Estonia the poverty headcount effect of expanding/contracting social
assistance is very small and indeed there is no effect except for a 90% expansion (see
Appendix Table 4.3). However, the effect on the poverty gap is dramatic, for a relatively
small increase in GDP. This is consistent with the Estonian social assistance payments
being very low relative to the poverty threshold. Even almost doubling them reduces the
poverty gap by 1.5pp: more than in any of the other countries and at much lower cost (see
the gradient in Figure 4.2b). Otherwise the poverty headcountcost gradients for benefit
increases across countries are rather similar to each other but the poverty gap gradients
vary more across countries with the effects being largest in Bulgaria (after Estonia) and
smallest in Hungary. As with child benefits, in Belgium and the UK the poverty gap
effectiveness of social assistance reduces with the size of the benefit, as larger shares of
recipients are lifted above the poverty threshold.
[Figure 4.2 here]
4.4.3 Income tax threshold
The effects of increasing the income tax threshold on either poverty measure (see Figures
4.3a and 4.3b) are very small although the budgetary cost is large. For example, spending
1% of GDP in this way (and interpolating linearly where relevant) would reduce the
poverty headcount by less than 1pp in all countries except Estonia (where the reduction
is a little more). Most people paying income tax, benefiting from this policy change,
are in households with income above the poverty threshold. However, the effects are not
linear and the gradients are higher for smaller threshold increases, suggesting that there is
scope for modest increases to reduce poverty (but at high cost relative to other strategies).
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There is a similar picture for the poverty gap.
The situation is quite different when reducing the tax threshold. This has an effect on
increasing poverty. The extra tax paid increases the numbers below the poverty threshold
and the size of the poverty gap (Appendix Table 4.4), with the gradient being notice-
ably steeper in Estonia than in the other four countries. Reducing the tax-free income
allowance by 90% would increase the poverty headcount by 7.4pp. This near-abolition sce-
nario would increase the poverty rate in the remaining countries by between 2pp (Greece)
and 3-4pp (Belgium, Italy and UK) (Appendix Table 4.3).
[Figure 4.3 here]
4.4.4 Re-scaling the whole tax-benefit system
To provide a benchmark for the individual policy instruments that we consider, Figure
4.4 shows the poverty cost-effectiveness of contracting/expanding the whole system by
between -20% and +20%. It is notable that neither the budgetary cost of expansion nor
the budgetary gain from contraction are the same size in GDP terms across countries,
reflecting both differences in overall size of the systems and in the importance of monetary
levels and thresholds in the systems. The cost effects are largest in Belgium and Italy
(due at least in part to their large pension systems) and smallest in Estonia. The poverty
cost-effectiveness also differs across countries with the largest poverty effects (in terms of
both headcount and gap) per budgetary unit in Estonia and the UK and the smallest in
Greece.
[Figure 4.4 here]
4.4.5 Comparisons across policy instruments
A comparison of the poverty effectiveness of the particular policy instruments is summa-
rized in Table 4.2 by showing the poverty-cost ratios (gradients) evaluated for the -/+20%
scenarios for the three instruments as well as the benchmark case of the whole tax-benefit
system. For increases in the instruments, the higher the ratio the greater the poverty
reduction for a given increase in spending (that is, cost-effectiveness). For reductions in
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the instruments, the higher the ratio the larger the poverty increase for a given budgetary
gain.
Comparing within columns and between countries shows that increasing child benefits
is most effective at reducing the headcount in Greece and Hungary and the gap in Italy and
Hungary (numbers highlighted in bold). Reducing child benefits increases the headcount
most for a given budgetary saving in the UK and the gap most in Hungary. Social
assistance increases are most cost-effective for the headcount in Belgium and reductions
cause the highest poverty increase for a given budgetary saving in Belgium as well as the
UK. In Estonia changes in either direction have no effect on the headcount but are the
most cost-effective at reducing the poverty gap. Changing income tax thresholds has the
largest effects given costs in Estonia, for both the headcount and the gap. Increasing
income tax thresholds is also cost-effective in reducing the poverty headcount and gap in
Italy. Inflating the whole system is most cost-effective in Estonia and the UK (for the
headcount) and Estonia and Bulgaria (for the gap). The reverse also applies: reducing
all monetary levels has the most poverty-increasing effect given the budgetary gain in the
same countries.
Comparing within countries (that is, across rows in Table 4.2) and focusing first on
the poverty headcount, increasing social assistance is the most cost-effective option of
the four considered in Belgium, the UK and Bulgaria (numbers underlined), and there
are other policy instrument reductions that have a more damaging effect on poverty in
all countries apart from Belgium. This is perhaps surprising, given its targeted nature.
Child benefit increases are most cost-effective, compared to other policies, in reducing
poverty in Greece and Italy, which do not have social assistance, and Hungary. In these
three countries and in Bulgaria and especially the UK these are the most damaging to
reduce for given budgetary saving, of the instruments considered. In Bulgaria and the
UK this may be related to the partial income targeting of child benefits. In contrast,
social assistance is the best performing instrument in poverty gap reduction effectiveness,
as well as being the most damaging to reduce, in all countries with such an instrument
with the exception of Hungary where social assistance is small. In Estonia the highest
poverty headcount increase from a reduction in policy instrument arises with the income
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tax threshold and the most cost-effective change to reduce the poverty headcount is not
any of the individual instruments but instead whole system expansion. This suggests that
the policies that are mostly responsible for poverty reduction in this country are pensions
and contributory (that is, maternity, parental and unemployment) benefits.
[Table 4.2 here]
4.5 Conclusions
Our analysis provides evidence on the relative effectiveness of different types of policy
instrument in reducing the risk of poverty, or limiting its increase, by measuring the
implications of increasing or reducing the scale of the instrument within its national
context.
The assessment of the most cost-effective instrument depends on whether the poverty
headcount or poverty gap is used as the outcome indicator and on the direction and scale
of the change in some instruments and countries and not others. Nevertheless, our results
show that the most preferred options in terms of poverty reduction cost-effectiveness are
child benefits and social assistance. Based on the poverty headcount increasing social
assistance is the most cost-effective approach of those considered in Belgium, Bulgaria
and the UK. Child benefit increases are the most effective option considered in Greece,
Hungary and Italy. In Estonia the benchmark case of re-scaling all monetary components
is actually more cost-effective than any of the single options.
It is important to look at the poverty gap as well as the poverty headcount in evaluating
cost-effectiveness. The effect of social assistance in Estonia provides a good illustration.
As the 2013 level of social assistance is very low relative to the poverty threshold, its
increase makes no difference to the headcount unless it is scaled up to be almost double
its current value but scores very highly in terms of cost-effectiveness when the effect on
the poverty gap is measured.
The effects are not always linear nor are they always symmetrical for increases and
decreases in the instruments. For example, increasing income tax thresholds has little
effect on poverty but lowering them would have a larger negative effect. Nevertheless,
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except in Estonia, this negative effect is smaller for a given budgetary gain than would
occur if any of the other instruments were reduced in size. This suggests that a revenue-
neutral combination of reduction to the tax threshold and increase in child benefit could
be a promising path for policy makers interested in cost-effective poverty reduction. On
the other hand, reducing child benefits is a particularly damaging way to make budgetary
cuts, given the implications for the increase in the poverty headcount. This applies in
countries with both high and low average child benefit payments and high and low benefit
prevalence.
More generally, our approach to measuring the poverty reducing effectiveness of sin-
gle policy instruments can inform the design of policy packages, combining changes to
more than one instrument. For example, similar analysis of the implications for poverty
of increasing the minimum wage level (Leventi et al., 2017) shows that this is not well
targeted on people in households with income below the poverty threshold and is there-
fore a policy approach that will not achieve poverty reduction on its own. Nevertheless,
minimum wages reduce the need for in-work benefits and help to make work pay (Immer-
voll and Pearson, 2009) and are therefore suitable for combining with increases in social
assistance into a package that reduces poverty while minimizing damage to incentives to
work (Collado et al., 2016).
The limitations of our approach relate to the choice of policy instruments that are
compared. First, in countries without one of the policy instruments as part of its system,
the relative effectiveness of the remaining instruments is enhanced. For example, if Greece
had a minimum income social assistance scheme in place then its child benefits might look
less effective than they do in its absence. Second, the instruments analysed were chosen
partly because they exist in many of the seven countries. There are other less common
instruments that are relevant in particular national contexts, such as in-work benefits,
targeted tax credits and housing benefits. As the Estonian case suggests, the most cost-
effective poverty-reducing instrument may not be one of those analysed here. In a single
country context, it would be possible to test all relevant policy instruments using our ap-
proach. Comparing across countries, we have demonstrated how, using microsimulation
techniques, we can take account of the national diversity in existing policy systems, pop-
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ulation characteristics and economic circumstances at a common point in time to assess
the relative poverty-reducing cost-effectiveness of policies with similar goals.
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4.6 Figures
Figure 4.1: Child benefit levels: poverty vs. cost
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Source: Authors calculations using EUROMOD and EU-SILC. Notes: Reading from left to right, the instruments are
decreased by 90%, 70%, 50%, 20% and 5% and increased by 5%, 20%, 50%, 70% and 90%. Poverty is measured using
a fixed threshold, 60% of median equivalised household disposable income under the 2013 baseline policy system. The
poverty gap is expressed as a ratio of the poverty line. The change in the public budget is the direct effect of changing the
instruments net of any interactions with the rest of the tax-benefit system, as a percentage of 2013 GDP.
Figure 4.2: Social assistance minimum income levels: poverty vs. cost
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Source and notes: see Figure 4.1. There is no national social assistance benefit in Greece and Italy.
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Figure 4.3: Income tax thresholds: poverty vs. cost
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Source and notes: see Figure 4.1. There is no income tax zero rate band in Bulgaria and Hungary.
Figure 4.4: Rescaling the whole system: poverty vs. cost
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Source and notes: see Figure 4.1. Here the system is decreased and increased by 5% and 20%.
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4.7 Tables
Table 4.1:
Policy instruments: existing gross levels as a percentage of median equivalent household
disposable income, 2013
   Belgium Bulgaria Estonia Greece Italy Hungary UK 
Child 
benefits 
Mean for 
recipients % 
19.2 10.7 7.9 6.0 8.6 27.5 24.5 
% households 
receiving 
25.5 7.6 18.5 18.4 12.9 19.2 20.8 
Social 
Assistance 
Benefits 
Mean for 
recipients % 
26.6 12.1 17.1 - - 21.6 23.2 
% households 
receiving  
1.9 7.1 2.6 - - 0.3 14.0 
Income tax 
threshold 
Threshold 
level % 
34.1 - 26.2 52.2 52.0 - 64.3 
Median equivalised 
household disposable income 
EUR/month 
1,707 293 550 799 1,282 360 1,450 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD with EU-SILC
Notes: Household disposable income is equivalised using the modified OECD scale in order to take differences in household
composition into account. The scale attributes a weight of 1 to the head of the household, a weight of 0.5 to every person
above the age of 14 and a weight of 0.3 to every child aged 014. Euro exchange rates: BG 1.956BGN; HU 286.0HUF; UK
0.8553GBP.
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Table 4.2:
Poverty-cost ratio by policy instrument
  Child benefit Social Assistance 
Income tax 
threshold 
Whole tax-benefit 
system 
  Poverty headcount 
  -20% 20% -20% 20% -20% 20% -20% 20% 
Belgium 3.23 2.99 4.68 6.48 1.11 0.53 1.97 1.06 
Bulgaria 3.76 1.31 2.04 2.32     1.89 1.32 
Estonia 3.49 2.09 0.00 0.00 4.05 1.37 3.17 2.44 
Greece 4.20 4.99     0.64 0.25 1.19 1.32 
Hungary 4.28 4.70 1.33 2.51     1.85 1.32 
Italy 4.08 4.08     1.14 1.47 1.50 0.94 
UK 6.34 3.93 4.61 5.34 0.59 0.37 2.97 1.87 
  Poverty gap 
  -20% 20% -20% 20% -20% 20% -20% 20% 
Belgium 0.98 0.80 2.83 2.11 0.10 0.06 0.51 0.25 
Bulgaria 0.97 0.70 2.91 2.68     0.82 0.56 
Estonia 1.03 0.97 5.27 5.35 0.50 0.26 1.11 0.59 
Greece 1.16 1.02     0.19 0.13 0.39 0.16 
Hungary 2.03 1.68 1.36 1.29     0.58 0.33 
Italy 1.32 2.11     0.24 0.32 0.42 0.22 
UK 1.32 0.86 1.63 1.01 0.11 0.08 0.76 0.39 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD and EU-SILC.
Notes: The poverty-cost indicator is calculated as the ratio of the change in poverty headcount or gap (using a fixed
poverty threshold) to the change in public budget measured as a % of GDP, using the -20% and the +20% change in policy
for child benefit, social assistance, income tax and whole system re-scaling (the gradient of the curves in Figures 1, 2, 3
and 4). The countries with the highest poverty-cost ratio for each scenario for a particular policy instrument (i.e. within
columns) are indicated in bold (two countries for the policy instruments applying in all seven cases, one country for the
other instruments). The most cost-effective policy instrument within countries for each scenario is shown underlined.
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4.8 Appendix
Table 4.3:
Change in poverty headcount ratio between baseline and policy scenarios (in % points)
 Baseline 
rate (%) 
Decrease by … Increase by … 
Country 90% 70% 50% 20% 5% 5% 20% 50% 70% 90% 
  Child benefits 
Belgium 11.8 3.6 *** 2.8 *** 2.2 *** 1.0 *** 0.2 ** -0.2 *** -0.9 *** -2.3 *** -3.0 *** -3.3 *** 
Bulgaria 19.3 1.3 *** 1.2 *** 1.1 *** 0.5 *** 0.0   0.0   -0.2 *** -0.6 *** -0.8 *** -1.2 *** 
Estonia 17.3 1.4 *** 1.2 *** 0.9 *** 0.3 *** 0.1   0.0   -0.2 *** -0.7 *** -0.9 *** -1.2 *** 
Greece 18.0 1.6 *** 1.6 *** 1.1 *** 0.6 *** 0.1 ** -0.2 ** -0.7 *** -1.0 *** -1.2 *** -1.6 *** 
Hungary 14.4 5.0 *** 3.8 *** 3.0 *** 1.1 *** 0.3 *** -0.3 *** -1.2 *** -2.7 *** -3.9 *** -4.8 *** 
Italy 18.3 1.5 *** 1.2 *** 0.8 *** 0.3 *** 0.0   -0.1 *** -0.3 *** -0.7 *** -0.9 *** -1.2 *** 
UK 15.4 8.2 *** 6.9 *** 5.2 *** 2.0 *** 0.5 *** -0.3 *** -1.3 *** -2.6 *** -3.2 *** -3.5 *** 
  Social assistance 
Belgium 11.8 0.5 *** 0.5 *** 0.4 *** 0.4 *** 0.2 *** -0.1 ** -0.7 *** -2.0 *** -2.5 *** -3.4 *** 
Bulgaria 19.3 0.5 *** 0.5 *** 0.4 *** 0.2 ** 0.1   -0.2 * -0.4 *** -1.2 *** -2.3 *** -3.8 *** 
Estonia 17.3 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0   -0.2 ** 
Greece 18.0                                         
Hungary 14.4 0.6 *** 0.5 *** 0.3 *** 0.0 ** 0.0   0.0   -0.1 ** -0.3 *** -0.4 *** -0.5 *** 
Italy 18.3                                         
UK 15.4 5.3 *** 4.6 *** 3.6 *** 1.8 *** 0.4 *** -0.5 *** -2.5 *** -4.3 *** -5.2 *** -5.8 *** 
  Income tax threshold 
Belgium 11.8 3.2 *** 2.4 *** 1.6 *** 0.7 *** 0.2 *** -0.1 ** -0.3 *** -0.5 *** -0.5 *** -0.5 *** 
Bulgaria 19.3                                         
Estonia 17.3 7.4 *** 5.4 *** 4.2 *** 1.9 *** 0.4 *** -0.1 ** -0.5 *** -1.0 *** -1.3 *** -1.4 *** 
Greece 18.0 1.9 *** 1.2 *** 0.6 *** 0.2   0.1   0.0   -0.1 ** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** -0.3 *** 
Hungary 14.4                                         
Italy 18.3 3.5 *** 2.6 *** 1.5 *** 0.5 *** 0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.6 *** -1.0 *** -1.2 *** -1.4 *** 
UK 15.4 3.6 *** 2.4 *** 1.5 *** 0.4 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** -0.3 *** -0.4 *** -0.5 *** 
  Whole tax-benefit system 
Belgium 11.8 47.1 *** 36.0 *** 25.8 *** 8.2 *** 1.7 *** -1.3 *** -4.4 *** -8.0 *** -8.8 *** -9.4 *** 
Bulgaria 19.3 16.2 *** 15.1 *** 11.6 *** 4.5 *** 0.8 *** -0.8 *** -3.3 *** -7.5 *** -10.3 *** -12.0 *** 
Estonia 17.3 23.8 *** 19.7 *** 15.6 *** 6.7 *** 2.1 *** -1.5 *** -5.1 *** -8.0 *** -9.2 *** -10.6 *** 
Greece 18.0 33.3 *** 23.6 *** 15.5 *** 3.5 *** 1.1 *** -1.0 *** -2.7 *** -3.7 *** -4.0 *** -4.6 *** 
Hungary 14.4 38.0 *** 31.4 *** 20.6 *** 4.8 *** 0.9 *** -1.1 *** -3.4 *** -6.7 *** -8.0 *** -8.6 *** 
Italy 18.3 37.0 *** 30.3 *** 20.7 *** 6.2 *** 1.3 *** -1.0 *** -3.8 *** -6.1 *** -7.0 *** -7.5 *** 
UK 15.4 35.2 *** 27.1 *** 20.9 *** 8.4 *** 1.8 *** -1.3 *** -5.1 *** -8.0 *** -9.1 *** -9.7 *** 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using EUROMOD and EU-SILC.
Notes: The baseline poverty rate is based on 2013 incomes and policies. The poverty threshold is 60% of the 2013 baseline
median equivalised household disposable income. The baseline value for Greece is slightly different in the income tax
threshold scenario because the 2012 tax threshold has been re-introduced. Shaded cells indicate that in 2013 there was no
national social assistance benefit in Greece and Italy and no income tax zero rate band in Bulgaria and Hungary. Significance
levels indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.4:
Change in poverty gap ratio between baseline and policy scenarios (in % points)
 Baseline 
gap  
Decrease by … Increase by … 
Country 90% 70% 50% 20% 5% 5% 20% 50% 70% 90% 
  Child benefits 
Belgium 2.8 1.6 *** 1.2 *** 0.9 *** 0.3 *** 0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** -0.5 *** -0.6 *** -0.8 *** 
Bulgaria 5.4 0.6 *** 0.5 *** 0.4 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.3 *** -0.4 *** -0.5 *** 
Estonia 4.4 0.5 *** 0.4 *** 0.3 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** -0.3 *** -0.4 *** 
Greece 5.4 0.8 *** 0.6 *** 0.4 *** 0.2 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.3 *** -0.5 *** -0.6 *** 
Hungary 3.6 2.9 *** 2.1 *** 1.4 *** 0.5 *** 0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.4 *** -0.9 *** -1.2 *** -1.3 *** 
Italy 6.7 0.7 *** 0.5 *** 0.3 *** 0.1 *** 0.0   -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.3 *** -0.4 *** -0.5 *** 
UK 4.5 3.2 *** 2.3 *** 1.4 *** 0.4 *** 0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.3 *** -0.6 *** -0.7 *** -0.8 *** 
  Social assistance 
Belgium 2.8 0.6 *** 0.5 *** 0.4 *** 0.2 *** 0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** -0.5 *** -0.6 *** -0.6 *** 
Bulgaria 5.4 0.8 *** 0.7 *** 0.6 *** 0.3 *** 0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.4 *** -1.2 *** -1.7 *** -2.1 *** 
Estonia 4.4 0.4 *** 0.4 *** 0.3 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.2 *** -0.6 *** -1.0 *** -1.5 *** 
Greece 5.4                                         
Hungary 3.6 0.2 *** 0.2 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** 
Italy 6.7                                         
UK 4.5 2.8 *** 2.2 *** 1.6 *** 0.6 *** 0.2 *** -0.1 *** -0.5 *** -0.8 *** -1.0 *** -1.1 *** 
  Income tax threshold 
Belgium 2.8 0.6 *** 0.4 *** 0.2 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** 
Bulgaria 5.4                                         
Estonia 4.4 2.3 *** 1.6 *** 0.9 *** 0.2 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** -0.2 *** -0.3 *** 
Greece 5.2 0.6 *** 0.3 *** 0.2 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** 
Hungary 3.6                                         
Italy 6.7 0.9 *** 0.6 *** 0.4 *** 0.1 *** 0.0   -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.2 *** -0.2 *** -0.2 *** 
UK 4.5 0.9 *** 0.5 *** 0.3 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** 
  Whole tax-benefit system 
Belgium 2.8 29.3 *** 18.2 *** 9.7 *** 2.1 *** 0.4 *** -0.3 *** -1.0 *** -1.7 *** -1.8 *** -1.9 *** 
Bulgaria 5.4 14.4 *** 10.5 *** 6.5 *** 1.9 *** 0.4 *** -0.4 *** -1.4 *** -2.9 *** -3.5 *** -3.9 *** 
Estonia 4.4 19.6 *** 13.5 *** 8.4 *** 2.3 *** 0.5 *** -0.4 *** -1.2 *** -2.3 *** -2.8 *** -3.2 *** 
Greece 5.4 20.5 *** 11.7 *** 5.6 *** 1.1 *** 0.2 *** -0.2 *** -0.4 *** -0.6 *** -0.5 *** -0.4 ** 
Hungary 3.6 25.4 *** 14.9 *** 7.0 *** 1.5 *** 0.3 *** -0.3 *** -0.9 *** -1.5 *** -1.7 *** -1.7 *** 
Italy 6.8 24.7 *** 15.1 *** 7.7 *** 1.8 *** 0.3 *** -0.3 *** -0.9 *** -1.5 *** -1.8 *** -2.0 *** 
UK 4.5 22.9 *** 14.4 *** 8.5 *** 2.2 *** 0.4 *** -0.3 *** -1.1 *** -1.7 *** -2.0 *** -2.1 *** 
 
Source and notes: The poverty gap is expressed as a ratio of the poverty line. For further details, see Table 4.3.
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Table 4.5:
Decomposing the total change in poverty headcount ratio between baseline and social as-
sistance policy scenario (in % points) into changes in coverage (cov.) and level
 Base
-line 
rate 
(%) 
Decrease by … 
Country 90% 70% 50% 20% 5% 
 Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level 
Belgium 11.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Bulgaria 19.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Estonia 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Greece 18.0                               
Hungary 14.4 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 18.3                               
UK 15.4 5.3 1.3 4.0 4.6 1.1 3.5 3.6 0.8 2.8 1.8 0.2 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 
  Increase by … 
  5% 20% 50% 70% 90% 
  Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level 
Belgium 11.8 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -2.0 -0.7 -1.3 -2.5 -1.0 -1.5 -3.4 -1.7 -1.7 
Bulgaria 19.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -1.2 -0.4 -0.8 -2.3 -1.1 -1.2 -3.8 -2.2 -1.6 
Estonia 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 
Greece 18.0                               
Hungary 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 
Italy 18.3                               
UK 15.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -2.5 -0.3 -2.2 -4.3 -0.6 -3.7 -5.2 -0.7 -4.5 -5.8 -0.9 -5.0 
 
Source and notes: The sum of the poverty change due to changes in the tax/benefit i) coverage and ii) level adds up to
100% of the total change in the poverty headcount. The change in the poverty headcount due to changes in the tax/benefit
levels captures the in/out-of-poverty transitions of only those households who experienced a change in the tax/benefit
level, conditional on non-zero taxes/benefits in the baseline. The change in the poverty headcount due to changes in the
tax/benefit coverage captures the in/out-of-poverty transitions of only those households who had non-zero taxes/benefits
in the baseline but zero in the reform scenario and vice versa. In the different scenarios, we focus on changes in the
level/coverage of (all) child benefits, social assistance benefits and income taxes. For further details, see Table 4.3.
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Table 4.6:
Decomposing the total change in poverty gap ratio between the baseline and social assis-
tance policy scenario (in % points) into changes in coverage (cov.) and level
 
Base
-line 
gap 
Decrease by … 
Country 90% 70% 50% 20% 5% 
 Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level 
Belgium 2.8 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Bulgaria 5.4 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Estonia 4.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Greece 5.4                               
Hungary 3.6 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 6.7                               
UK 4.5 2.8 0.7 2.1 2.2 0.6 1.6 1.6 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 
  Increase by … 
  5% 20% 50% 70% 90% 
  Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level Total Cov. Level 
Belgium 2.8 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 
Bulgaria 5.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5 -0.7 -1.7 -0.7 -1.0 -2.1 -0.8 -1.3 
Estonia 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -1.0 -0.4 -0.6 -1.5 -0.7 -0.8 
Greece 5.4                               
Hungary 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 
Italy 6.7                               
UK 4.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.1 -0.2 -0.9 
 
Source and notes: The poverty gap is expressed as a ratio of the poverty line. The change in the poverty gap due to changes
in the benefit levels captures the poverty gap changes of households who experienced a change in the social assistance (SA)
benefit level, conditional on non-zero SA benefits in the baseline. The change in the poverty gap due to changes in the SA
benefit coverage captures the poverty gap changes of households who had non-zero SA benefits in the baseline but zero in
the reform scenario and vice versa. For further details, see Table 4.5.
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